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PRIVATIZING BANS ON ABORTION:
EVISCERATING CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
THROUGH TORT REMEDIES
Maya Manian*
State governments have devised a new means to evade the Constitution. Their new
means is to enact tort statutes that, in effect, ban constitutionallyprotected conduct.
In particular,some states have made the provision of an abortion a tort for which
there can be no defense and no cap on the amount of liability. These states have
made performing an abortion essentially illegal. Yet, because tort statutes are
enforced through private litigation, rather than public prosecution, a number of
courts have held that they lack jurisdiction to review these laws. Federal courts
have concluded that standing doctrine and state sovereign immunity bar judicial
review of any privately enforced tort legislation. These courts have refused to
recognize that this new breed of tort statute attempts to "privatize" the
government's restrictionof constitutionalrights. States have taken a law that would
clearly be unconstitutionalwere it properly treated as "public"law and immunized
it as "private" tort law. Courts have refused to disallow this manipulation of the
public/private distinction embedded in our system of law. This Article proposes a
novel method for analyzing tort legislation that violates fundamental rights. It
provides a framework for understanding how state legislatures are attempting to
privatize governmental regulation.It then proposes a new solution that satisfies the
requirements for federal court jurisdiction but also ensures that state legislatures
do not cloak deprivations of fundamental rights under the veil of private rights of
action.
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INTRODUCTION

The battle for abortion rights has been at fever pitch in recent months. In
June 2006, the Louisiana legislature enacted a law criminalizing the provision of
abortions' that will take effect in the event that the Supreme Court overturns
3
Roe v. Wade.2 South Dakota passed a similar criminal ban on abortion in 2006.
Most recently, the Supreme Court, in a striking reversal of course, upheld a
federal "partial-birth abortion" ban despite its broad wording and lack of a
health exception.4 While all of these laws look forward to banning abortion or
particular abortion methods through outright criminal penalties, state
legislatures have already developed a less well-known but potentially far more
dangerous method of restricting access to abortion. A number of states have
crafted tort legislation that so severely chills the provision of abortion services
that, in effect, they have eviscerated the right. This new breed of state tort
statute threatens not only abortion rights, but also threatens fundamental
constitutional rights across the board.

1. Act of June 17, 2006, No. 467, 2006 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 467 (S.B. 33) (West, Westlaw
through 2006 Reg. Sess.) (codified at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:87,40:1299.30 (2006)).
2. The contingent effectiveness of Act 467 is set out at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.30(A). Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), was the landmark Supreme Court decision declaring unconstitutional
state bans on elective termination of pregnancy prior to the third trimester.
3. Women's Health and Human Life Protection Act, 2006 S.D. Laws, ch. 119 (H.B. 1215) (West,
Westlaw through 2006 Reg. Sess.) (repealed 2006). The Governor signed this act into law on March 6,
2006 and South Dakota voters repealed it by referendum on November 7, 2006. As of February 2007,
the South Dakota legislature is pushing a revised ban on abortion. See S.D. H.B. 1293 (2007 Session)
(reflecting the version as of that date).
4. Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1619 (2007). The Court had previously struck down a
state "partial-birth abortion" ban for its similarly broad language and for lack of a health exception.
Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 929-30 (2000). Although Gonzales v. Carharnweakened protections
for the abortion right, the Court reiterated that the right to choose abortion is still constitutionally
protected. Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1626-27.
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The leading case to hear a challenge to this new kind of tort statute,
Okpalobi v. Foster,5 utterly failed to vindicate constitutional rights. Okpalobi
dealt with a Louisiana tort law that gives women who obtain abortions a civil
cause of action against their abortion providers simply for having performed an
abortion. The Louisiana law provides that: "Any person who performs an
abortion is liable to the mother of the unborn child for any damage occasioned or
precipitated by the abortion ....
"6 Damages are defined as any damages to the
mother or unborn childT-thus the abortion itself can constitute remediable
harm. The law also removes a claim under the statute from Louisiana's medical
malpractice scheme, which limits medical liability to situations where a doctor
violated standards of care. 8 Most egregiously, the law refuses to recognize
consent to the abortion as a defense that would eliminate damages. 9 In essence,
the law makes physicians who provide legal, consensual, and medically proper
abortions strictly liable to the woman who had the abortion for potentially
catastrophic damages. The law restricts access to abortions by making doctors
0
unwilling to provide abortion services due to this unmitigated threat of liability.'
As soon as the Louisiana legislature enacted this tort law, abortion
providers immediately brought a challenge in federal court. The doctors and
their patients filed suit against the Attorney General and Governor of Louisiana
as the officials who, under state law, have a duty to defend state legislation. 1
The providers argued that the law was both unconstitutionally vague and
violative of a woman's right to choose abortion because they could no longer
12
provide abortions in Louisiana given this threat of uncapped liability.
Although the providers prevailed in district court and that decision was
affirmed by a two-member panel of the Fifth Circuit, the Fifth Circuit sitting en
bane found that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the challenge to Louisiana's tort
statute. The court held that the doctors and their patients failed to establish
Article III standing to sue any state officials because no state official could
enforce this tort law. 13 Based on similar reasoning, a plurality of the court found
that the doctrine of Ex parte Young, 14 which permits individuals to sue state

5. 244 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
6. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.12 (1999) (emphasis added).
7. Id. § 9:2800.12(B)(2).
8. Id. § 9:2800.12(C)(2); id. § 40:1299.41-49.

9. See id. § 9:2800.12(C)(1) (providing that signed consent form may reduce, but not eliminate,
damages).
10. See Okpalobi v. Foster, 981 F. Supp. 977, 984 (E.D. La. 1998) (describing affidavits from
physicians stating they could not provide abortions under threat of liability in Louisiana statute), rev'd
en bane, 244 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2001).
11. Id. at 977. Although one abortion provider originally brought the suit, additional providers

intervened on behalf of themselves and their patients. Id. at 980.
12. Id. at 982-84.
13. Okpalobi, 244 F.3d at427,429.
14. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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officials in order to challenge unconstitutional state legislation, did not apply. 15
When the doctors and patients then attempted to challenge the law in Louisiana
state court, the state court held that its standing requirements
similarly
6
prevented a preenforcement challenge to "private" tort laws.'
In contrast, if the State of Louisiana had legislated an immediate criminal or
regulatory penalty on abortion services (without a Supreme Court "trigger"
provision), the doctors and their patients whose constitutional rights would be
violated would not have to wait for state prosecutors to impose sanctions before
they could challenge the state law. Rather, as soon as such a law was enacted, the
injured parties could obtain a preenforcement declaration that the law was
unconstitutional and an injunction against the state officials who could enforce
the law. Congress and the Supreme Court have established that individuals can
obtain preenforcement injunctive and declaratory relief against individual state
17
officials who could enforce unconstitutional state legislation.
That the plaintiffs in Louisiana could not challenge in any court an
unconstitutional state statute clearly has dire implications for the protection of
constitutional rights against state encroachment. The Fifth Circuit and other
courts have regarded these laws as merely "private" tort statutes that are more
properly subject to review in the state courts, if and when a civil action is actually
filed. They find no constitutional infirmity to denying preenforcement review
because they reason that a constitutional claim may be raised eventually. These
courts opine that challenging this type of tort law is simply a question of timingfor example that the doctors in Louisiana can wait until they are sued in state
court and bring up as a defense the claim that this tort statute is unconstitutional.
Thus, the Fifth Circuit and other courts addressing this issue have held that there
is no need to test the constitutionality of a privately enforced tort law in federal
court before "enforcement" of that law in the state courts.
Courts addressing this novel type of tort law have refused to recognize that
these anti-abortion tort statutes cause constitutional injury whether or not they
are ever invoked in court. For example, under the tort scheme challenged in
Okpalobi, no one need ever file a civil suit in state court in order to restrict the
provision of abortion services. Like a Sword of Damocles, the threat of a
catastrophic lawsuit alone will chill abortion providers. These tort statutes are
crafted to be "self-enforcing," A self-enforcing tort statute is a tort law that
imposes such a high risk of a severe penalty on constitutionally protected
conduct that it freezes that conduct as effectively as a criminal or regulatory ban.
A self-enforcing tort statute blurs the line between traditionally "public" law
15. Okpalobi, 244 F.3d at 416-19; see also Ex pane Young, 209 U.S. at 157 (holding that state
officers may be sued in federal court so long as they have "some connection with the enforcement of
the act").
16. Women's Health Clinic v. State, 825 So. 2d 1208, 1212-13 (La. Ct. App. 2002).
17. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2000) (authorizing federal courts to "declare the rights and other
legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or
could be sought"); Ex pane Young, 209 U.S. at 148 (establishing availability of preenforcement
injunctive relief where penalty for violation of allegedly unconstitutional state law is so high as to
thoroughly discourage court challenges from ever arising).
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(criminal or regulatory) and "private" law (tort or contract). 8 Although it
appears in the guise of privately enforced tort legislation, a self-enforcing tort
statute operates as direct government prohibition of the targeted conduct. State
legislators are using ostensibly "private" rights of action to make an end-run
around public values and to disguise "public" governmental regulation. For
example, assuming the Louisiana statute achieves its goal of restricting the
provision of abortions merely by its existence, and no abortions are provided in
Louisiana, no possible claims under the tort law will arise. If that happens, the
statute will remain forever unreviewed. The Louisiana legislature will have
denied a woman's constitutional right with no accountability for its actions. The
Fifth Circuit's decision in Okpalobi, and other cases that have followed it, sets a
dangerous precedent for abortion rights in particular and for constitutional rights
in general. Under these courts' approach, state legislators would be free to
"privatize" all kinds of criminal and regulatory laws in ways that infringe on
constitutional rights yet evade judicial review. For example, pro-choice
legislators could draft tort laws granting abortion clinic employees and patients a
cause of action for unrestricted damages for emotional distress against abortion
protestors outside those clinics, which could chill the protestors' exercise of their
First Amendment rights.' 9 A state could grant a civil cause of action against a
white person who sells a home to a person of color, in favor of any other person
living in the neighborhood; 20 or against organizers of a parade, in favor of
anyone offended by the theme of the parade. 21 If tort statutes are categorically
unreviewable in federal court, there is no logical limit to states' ability to violate
22
constitutional rights through the use of self-enforcing tort legislation.
Although a number of scholars have criticized the increasing use of
"privatization" as a means of avoiding government accountability to the
Constitution, 23 few have addressed the privatization of public law through the
18. I use the terms "public" and "private" with some caution here. The lack of a clear divide
between "public" and "private" action has long been discussed by many scholars, yet the divide
between public and private action remains embedded in our law, and particularly in constitutional law.
As explained further infra, my analysis in this Article accepts the principle of a public/private divide in
constitutional law and in the structure of our legal system in general and focuses instead on critiquing
state legislators' use of "private" tort remedies to deny constitutional rights.
19. Cf. Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 377-82 (1997) (holding First
Amendment limits courts' power to enjoin pro-life protests outside clinics providing abortion
services).
20. Cf. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 251, 260 (1953) (holding Equal Protection Clause of
Fourteenth Amendment bars use of state court to enforce racially restrictive covenant). The risk of
chillingly high damages being awarded in a tort action for, say, emotional distress might be sufficiently
higher than the risk of suffering high damages in an action in contract for breach of the covenant to
prevent homeowners from attempting to sell to any buyer whose nature might upset the neighbors.
21. Cf Nat'l Socialist Party of Am. v. Vill. of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 43-44 (1977) (holding
injunction against wearing or displaying swastika must be stayed pending adjudication of First
Amendment rights). The risk of becoming liable for substantial damages in tort for upsetting a private
actor may significantly discourage exercise of the right.
22. These examples are discussed in more detail infra Part IV.A.
23. See generally, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Privatizationas Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1367
(2003) (arguing that privatization of government programs may impermissibly delegate government
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use of tort remedies. Furthermore, courts and commentators have struggled to
solve the difficult problems posed by the Article III standing and Ex parte Young
hurdles to preenforcement judicial review of tort statutes. Instead of recognizing
that state legislatures are hiding behind these doctrines in order to attack
fundamental rights, courts refusing to address these unconstitutional tort statutes
have employed a formalistic mode of analysis that rejects any federal court
review of legislation styled as a "private" tort law.
This Article proposes a novel method for analyzing self-enforcing tort
legislation. This new method satisfies the requirements for federal court
jurisdiction, but also ensures that state legislators do not disguise governmental
deprivations of fundamental rights as "mere" private rights of action. This
Article argues that, because a self-enforcing tort statute causes an immediate,
ongoing violation of a constitutional right upon its enactment, judicial review
should be permitted in a preenforcement challenge as it would be were the law
subject to criminal or regulatory enforcement by government officials-that is if
it were openly a public law rather than being disguised as a private law. Selfenforcing tort legislation is a new and dangerous attempt at privatization of
government regulation for the purpose of avoiding governmental accountability
to the Constitution. Understood in the framework of privatization, self-enforcing
tort legislation can be more readily addressed by the federal courts. In the case
of self-enforcing tort laws, the use of "private" tort remedies is in fact an
expansion of "public" enforcement power. Once courts recognize that selfenforcing tort legislation is in fact an exercise of governmental enforcement
power, both logic and precedent dictate preenforcement judicial review. This
Article argues that with respect to self-enforcing tort laws, instead of
enforcement by executive officers (as with criminal or regulatory laws) or
enforcement by private parties (as with tort laws), individual legislators are
acting as enforcers of the law. Therefore, it is the legislators who enact such laws
who should be subject to suit.
This Article proposes a method to test the constitutionality of a selfenforcing tort statute prior to "enforcement" by private parties without
compromising the principles served by standing doctrine or by Ex parte Young.
The underlying concern of the courts addressing self-enforcing tort laws, buried
in these two federal courts doctrines, is a floodgate problem. Courts fear that
allowing preenforcement judicial review of tort statutes will allow for essentially
unlimited federal judicial review of state tort legislation, which raises concerns
both about the balance of power between the judicial and legislative branches
and about federal encroachment on state prerogatives. Rather than open this
floodgate, federal courts have gone to the opposite extreme and categorically
powers to private entities that are not subject to same constitutional limitations as government actors);
Symposium, Public Values in an Era of Privatization, 116 HARv. L. REV. 1212 (2003) (publishing six
articles concerning potential difficulties with use of religiously affiliated private actors to carry out
public policies that are required to be religiously neutral). In the context of analyzing government
action, "privatization" refers generally to shifting responsibilities from governmental actors to
nongovernmental actors. In this way, privatization can be used as a mechanism to expand government
power beyond limitations that would otherwise obtain. Metzger, supra, at 1395-96.
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denied preenforcement challenges to all tort statutes. To solve the difficulties
posed by self-enforcing tort statutes, this Article proposes two solutions. First, it
offers a new method for assuring courts that only this unique type of tort statute
will be subject to preenforcement judicial review. Second, it develops a novel
doctrinal solution to overcome the hurdles to testing tort statutes presented by
federal courts' jurisdictional rules.
Part II of this Article takes a close look at the recent rise of self-enforcing
tort legislation aimed at the provision of abortion services. This Part discusses in
detail the Fifth Circuit's decision in Okpalobi v. Foster. It reviews the
progression of the case through the federal and state courts, all of which refused
to hear a preenforcement challenge to the tort statute at issue. Part II also
reviews other cases where federal courts refused to review state legislation
creating civil damages actions that chill the exercise of abortion rights. These
cases demonstrate the widespread use of self-enforcing tort laws to attack
abortion rights and show how courts have struggled with the doctrinal puzzles
presented by this type of tort legislation.
Part III argues that tort legislation that violates fundamental rights ought to
be amenable to preenforcement judicial review. By enacting self-enforcing tort
statutes, state legislators are attempting to prevent judicial review of laws that
operate as a prohibition on constitutionally protected conduct. State legislators
have been able to accomplish this by essentially arrogating to themselves the
enforcement powers traditionally left to the executive, while disguising this
power as "private" enforcement. This Part criticizes the courts' approach to selfenforcing tort laws because it ignores how state legislators are manipulating the
legal distinctions made between publicly enforced and privately enforced laws.
The courts' flawed analysis obfuscates the real purpose and effect of selfenforcing tort statutes, which is to allow state legislators to eviscerate
fundamental rights. Courts have therefore also ignored the larger potential
problem of state legislatures using privatization through tort remedies as a
means of infringing constitutional rights across the board. Finally, Part III will
argue that the courts' approach to self-enforcing tort laws also ignores the
underlying principle of Ex parte Young, which establishes that federal courts
must assert jurisdiction for preenforcement review in order to prevent state
legislators from chilling the exercise of constitutional rights.
Part IV resolves the conceptual and doctrinal puzzles presented by selfenforcing tort statutes. Part IV proposes a new method for testing the
constitutionality of state tort legislation. Under this new test, federal courts could
pierce the veil of private rights of action when used to attack fundamental
constitutional rights without opening the feared floodgates to challenges to all
types of tort laws. Part IV also solves the Article III standing and Ex parte
Young hurdles to jurisdiction. As will be discussed in this Part, the primary
hurdle to judicial review of self-enforcing tort legislation has been finding the
appropriate party to sue. This Part argues that the appropriate defendants are
the state legislators and governors who enact these laws.
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Self-enforcing tort legislation presents a serious threat to constitutional
rights. This Article offers a novel approach to prevent state legislators from
utilizing private tort remedies to undermine and erode the Constitution.
II.

SELF-ENFORCING TORT LEGISLATION AND ABORTION RIGHTS

Although there have been many types of criminal and regulatory statutes
passed by states to restrict access to abortion, the use of civil damages statutes to,
in effect, restrict the provision of abortion services is relatively new. These
abortion cases provide examples of how self-enforcing tort legislation operates
like a criminal ban on constitutional rights, yet has evaded judicial review.
Two strands of doctrine are at play in this question of preenforcement
judicial review of state tort laws, both of which look to whether the named
defendants will enforce the challenged law. First, the doctrine of standing, which
is primarily concerned with the separation of powers, requires that plaintiffs sue
only those who will cause their injury, such as by enforcing the law at issue.
Second, the doctrine of Ex parte Young, 24 which is primarily concerned with
federalism, looks to enforcement to determine whether suit may proceed against
a state official or whether the suit is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Both
doctrines are examined in the abortion cases discussed below. These cases show
how courts have struggled with, and have as of yet been unable to resolve, the
doctrinal complexities raised by self-enforcing tort statutes.
A.

A Case Study: Louisiana'sSelf-Enforcing Tort Legislation

Okpalobi v. Foster25 is the leading case to consider the availability of a
federal forum to hear claims that a tort statute violates constitutional rights. The

Fifth Circuit, in an en banc opinion, ultimately concluded that it lacked
jurisdiction to review a preenforcement challenge to Louisiana's abortion26
specific tort law because the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue any state officials.
A plurality of the Fifth Circuit viewed Ex parte Young as a limit on judicial
review of the statute as well, 27 a line of argument that other courts have
followed. 28 Although the en banc court ultimately dismissed the preenforcement
challenge, the analyses undertaken by the district court and the initial appellate
panel explain the effect of the law and possible approaches to exercising
jurisdiction to strike down the law. Therefore, the following sections begin by
analyzing the district and panel opinions, before discussing the en banc ruling.

24. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
25. 244 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
26. Okpalobi, 244 F.3d at 429. The majority opinion was joined in this decision by two separate
concurrences drafted by Circuit Judges Higgenbotham and Benavides. Id. at 429 (Higginbotham, J.,
concurring); id. at 432 (Benavides, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
27. Id. at 415-24, 429 (majority opinion).
28. Id. at 415-16 (collecting cases).
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District Court Opinion

The Louisiana statute at issue in Okpalobi, known in short form as "Act
825," provides women who obtain abortions a civil cause of action against their
abortion providers. Act 825 provides in pertinent part: "Any person who
performs an abortion is liable to the mother of the unborn child for any damage
occasioned or precipitated by the abortion, which action survives for a period of
three years from the date of discovery of the damage with a peremptive period
of ten years from the date of abortion." 29 The statute also provides that the
signing of a consent form by the mother prior to the abortion does not negate the
cause of action 30 and that the laws governing medical malpractice, which limit
physician liability, are not applicable to Act 825. 31 Furthermore, the statute
defines damages as any "injuries suffered or damages occasioned by the unborn
child or mother." 32 In other words, the abortion itself gives rise to a claim of
damages. In essence, the statute imposes strict liability on abortion providers for
legal, consensual, and medically proper abortions.
Plaintiffs, physicians and health care clinics in Louisiana, filed suit on behalf
of their patients against the Governor and Attorney General of the state, seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief from enforcement of the statute.33 The
physicians challenged Act 825, arguing that: (1) the statute places an undue
burden on a woman's right to choose an abortion in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and (2) the statute is unconstitutionally vague. 34 They contended
that the statute creates an undue burden because it exposes a physician to
catastrophic civil damages for the performance of a consensual and legal
abortion even when she meets all standards of due care. 35 Exposure to such a
high risk of a draconian penalty would force abortion providers in Louisiana out

29. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.12(A) (1999) (emphasis added).
30. Id. § 9:2800.12(C)(1).
31. Id. § 9:2800.12(C)(2); see also Filogene v. Brown, 871 So. 2d 1206, 1208 (La. Ct. App. 2004)
(holding that Act 825 does not apply retroactively and explaining that Louisiana medical malpractice
laws require any claim first be brought before expert medical review panel and that medical
malpractice tort only occurs if there is violation of physician's duty of care).
32. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.12(B)(2) (emphasis added).
33. Okpalobi v. Foster, 981 F. Supp. 977, 977-78 (E.D. La. 1998), rev'd en banc, 244 F.3d 405 (5th
Cir. 2001).
34. Id. at 981-82. There is an ongoing dispute among the courts regarding the correct standard of
review for a facial challenge to an abortion statute. See id. (discussing standards set forth in United
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987), and Planned Parenthoodof SoutheasternPennsylvania v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833 (1992)). The Okpalobi court held that under either the Casey or Salerno standard, the
statute would fail. Id. The Salerno standard requires that a "plaintiff asserting a facial challenge to a
statute imposing restrictions on abortion must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which
the Act would be valid." Id. at 981. The Casey standard was more relaxed, requiring only that "in a
large fraction of cases [the statute] will operate as a substantial obstacle to a woman's choice to
undergo an abortion." Okpalobi, 981 F. Supp. at 981 n.4 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 895). The Supreme
Court still has not resolved the dispute over the proper standard of review for facial challenges. See
Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1639 (2007) (stating that Court need not resolve debate between
"no set of circumstances" and "large fraction of the cases" tests for facial challenges).
35. Okpalobi, 981 F. Supp. at 980.
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of business. 36 For example, two doctors submitted affidavits stating that, because
they would constantly be susceptible to significant financial liability, they could
37
not continue to provide abortions to their patients under those circumstances.
In a related argument, the doctors also pointed out that the statute imposes
an "invisible duty of care" on abortion providers. 38 The statute is entirely unclear
on what physicians can do to protect themselves from liability. 39 A physician who
informs the patient in good faith of all known risks associated with the abortion
procedure and who performs the procedure with all due care is still at risk for
liability ten years following the performance of the abortion, including for
"damages occasioned by the unborn child."'40 Obviously, a woman suing on
behalf of her unborn child "need only prove the unborn child was aborted" to
establish a claim for damages. 41 Therefore, the doctors also argued that Act 825
was unconstitutionally vague.
The district court agreed with the doctors' claims. It noted that:
[T]he instant statute presents a new and unprecedented issue of law
concerning abortion-that is, whether a state statute which purports to
provide a woman with a cause of action in tort against her doctor for
damages associated with having an abortion, has the purpose and effect
of unduly burdening a woman's right to choose to have her pregnancy
42
terminated before viability.
In analyzing the merits of plaintiffs' claims, the court emphasized that plaintiffs
were "correct in their assertion that 'this statute sets a standard no physician can
meet and creates a climate in which no provider can possibly operate."' 43 For
example, a physician could be held to unlimited liability even where there is no
physical harm to the woman and the physician has fully complied with
professional standards of care."n The district court concluded that the vague
standard of care essentially provides for strict liability, which in the context of
fundamental rights is especially dangerous. 45 Furthermore, the district court also
stated that it was "disturbed" by the removal of the cause of action from the
state's medical malpractice scheme, which caps damages at $500,000 and limits
physician liability in other respects.46 The district court concluded that "Act 825
is unconstitutionally vague because it fails to provide the abortion provider with
fair warning of what legal standard will be applied and of what conduct will incur

36. Id.
37. Id. at 984.
38. Id. at 982 (stating that "defendants are unable to articulate what new standard of care Act
825 imposes upon abortion providers").
39. Id. at 982-83.
40. Okpalobi, 981 F. Supp. at 983,985.
41. Id. at 986.
42. Id. at 980-81.
43. Id.at 983-84 (citation omitted).
44. Id. at 984.
45. Okpalobi, 981 F. Supp. at 986.
46. Id. at 983.
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civil liability." 47 The court also held that, because the statute was so vague it
would essentially make it financially infeasible to provide abortions, Act 825 on
48
its face created an undue burden on a woman's right to seek an abortion.
The defendant state officials argued that the statute was merely another
mechanism to help enforce Louisiana's informed consent statute related to
abortion but failed to articulate any basis to support this claim. 49 The district
court rejected this argument, finding instead that the statute "presents a new
battlefield-that is unconstitutional regulation of abortion providers so as to
directly strike at a woman's right of choice." 50 The district court declared that the
statute "has the purpose and effect of infringing and chilling the exercise of
constitutionally protected rights of abortion providers and women seeking
abortions. Such backhanded and subtle attempts that chip away at a vital
component of a person's liberty will not be tolerated."51
Because the district court found that the possibility of civil litigation under
Act 825 "is enough to chill the willingness of physicians to perform abortions,"
the court granted a preliminary injunction against enforcement of Act 825.52 The
court did not discuss Article III standing or Ex parte Young.
2.

Panel Opinion

On appeal, a panel of the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's
conclusions and addressed for the first time Article III standing and Ex parte
Young. 53 The panel stated that, although the parties had not raised or briefed
standing or Eleventh Amendment issues, a court must examine the basis for its
54
jurisdiction sua sponte.
The panel began by addressing its Eleventh Amendment concerns, rather
than beginning with standing. 55 The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal
courts from adjudicating "any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State." 56 In Ex parte Young, however, the Supreme

47. Id. at 982-83.
48. Id. at 986.
49. Id. at 982.
50. Okpalobi,981 F. Supp. at 986.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Okpalobi v. Foster, 190 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 1999), rev'd en banc, 244 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2001).
Pursuant to agreement of the parties, the district court converted the preliminary injunction into a
permanent injunction. Furthermore, the court of appeals construed the language in the permanent
injunction as granting plaintiffs' requests for both declaratory and injunctive relief. Id. at 341.
54. Id. at 343.
55. There is some debate about whether standing requirements should be determined first as a
matter of jurisdiction. See, e.g., Scott v. Taylor, 405 F.3d 1251, 1258-59 (11th Cir. 2005) (arguing that
standing should be determined first as jurisdictional matter, prior to determining claims of immunity).
56. U.S. CONST. amend. Xl. Adopted in 1798, the Amendment was enacted in direct response to
the Supreme Court's decision in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 420 (1793), in which the
Court held that the State of Georgia was amenable to suit in federal court by a citizen of another state.

TEMPLE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

Court established that, although the Eleventh Amendment precludes suits
against "states," it permits suits for injunctive and declaratory relief against
individual state officials in order to prevent enforcement of unconstitutional
state statutes. 57 Clearly, the Ex parte Young exception to state sovereign
immunity applies to laws that will be enforced by government officials, such as
laws imposing criminal or regulatory penalties.
The decision in Ex parte Young is considered to be "a bedrock principle of
American law," 58 and its basic outlines are important to understanding the
arguments in the Okpalobi opinions and why courts have struggled with Ex parte
Young in the context of self-enforcing tort laws. The principal question in Ex
parte Young was whether the plaintiffs could invoke federal court jurisdiction to
enjoin enforcement of a state statute. 59 The Supreme Court, based on the
premise that states are incapable of authorizing unconstitutional conduct,
created the "fiction" that any officer of a state engaging in unconstitutional
conduct is no longer acting as an agent of the state and, therefore, is not entitled
to sovereign immunity pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment. 6° In creating this
"fictional" distinction between the official and the state for purposes of
injunctive relief, the Court has at the same time characterized a state official's
conduct as "state action" for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, a
suit against a state official is not a suit against a "state" for purposes of the
Eleventh Amendment, but is state action for purposes of establishing a
constitutional violation. This reasoning allows for the Fourteenth Amendment to
be used "as a sword as well as a shield against unconstitutional conduct of state
The Supreme Court has read the Eleventh Amendment far more broadly than its literal text would
suggest. For example, the Supreme Court has extended the Eleventh Amendment prohibition to suits
against states brought by their own citizens, and to suits to vindicate federal rights in state court. See
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 732 (1999) (extending states' sovereign immunity to suits based on
federal law); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1890) (holding Eleventh Amendment immunizes states
from suits by its own citizens); Roger C. Hartley, Alden Trilogy: Praiseand Protest,23 HARV. J. L. &
PUB. POL'Y 323,406-07 (2000) (criticizing Supreme Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence).
57. ExparteYoung, 209 U.S. 123,159-60 (1908).
58. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 564 (3d ed. 2000); see also Great
W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1265 (1978) (describing Ex parte Young as "one of the
cornerstones of our legal system"); 17A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACICE &
PROCEDURE § 4231 (3d ed. 2007) (describing Er parte Young as "one of the three most important
decisions the Supreme Court of the United States has ever handed down").
59. Exparte Young, 209 U.S. at 149.
60. Id. at 159-60; see also Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 114 n.25
(1984) (noting that Ex parte Young rests on "fictional" distinction between official and state); Home
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of L.A., 227 U.S. 278, 282 (1913) (holding that although official is not "the
state" for purposes of Ex pane Young, challenged action is state action for purposes of Fourteenth
Amendment claim). Furthermore, Ex pane Young only applies to actions seeking prospective relief,
i.e., injunctive and declaratory relief, but not retrospective relief, i.e., money damages. Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677 (1974). Individuals can sue for money damages for violations of federal
rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) by naming state officers in their personal or individual
capacities. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30-31 (1991); Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71
(1989). In sum, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar (1) suits for prospective relief against state
officials named in their official capacities; and (2) suits for retrospective relief, i.e., money damages,
against state officials named in their personal capacities.
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officers." 61 Through these doctrinal contortions, Ex parte Young ensures that
constitutional rights are protected against state infringements, while paying lip
service to the limits the Eleventh Amendment sets on federal court
encroachment of state powers.
In order to balance the requirements of the Supremacy Clause with the
requirements of the Eleventh Amendment, Ex parte Young established:
In making an officer of the State a party defendant in a suit to
enjoin the enforcement of an act alleged to be unconstitutional it is
plain that such officer must have some connection with the
enforcement of the act, or else it is merely making him a party as a
representative of the State, and thereby attempting to make the State a
62
party.
Therefore, the connection requirement, at least theoretically, respects the
federalism principles of the Eleventh Amendment (protecting state sovereignty)
without sacrificing constitutional rights. Arguably, if any state official can be
named in a suit challenging any state statute, the "fictional" line in the sand
between officials and their states that Ex parte Young draws dissolves
completely.
Nevertheless, Ex parte Young emphasized that the requisite "connection"
to enforcement of the challenged law can be derived from general state law
describing the duties of the office:
It has not, however, been held that it was necessary that such duty
should be declared in the same act which is to be enforced. In some
cases, it is true, the duty of enforcement has been so imposed ... but
that may possibly make the duty more clear .... The fact that the state
officer by virtue of his office has some connection with the enforcement
of the act is the important and material fact, and whether it arises out of
the general law, or63is specially created by the act itself, is not material
so long as it exists.
Thus, the official's enforcement obligation can flow from "a general duty
imposed upon him, which includes the right and the power to enforce the
64
statutes of the State."
The Okpalobi panel carefully reviewed this "famous fiction" created by Ex
parte Young. 65 Quoting language from Ex parte Young regarding the
requirement of "some connection" between the state official and the challenged
act, 66 the panel noted that "[n]either the Supreme Court nor the Fifth Circuit has
defined the exact nature of the 'connection' between a defendant state officer

61. Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 335 (1977).
62. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 157 (emphasis added).
63. Id. (emphasis added).
64. Id. at 161. In Ex pane Young, the Court held that the plaintiffs had properly sued the
Attorney General of Minnesota based on his general duty to uphold a statute that regulated railroads
and imposed criminal penalties on individuals who did not comply with its terms. Id.
65. Okpalobi v. Foster, 190 F.3d 337, 343-44 (5th Cir. 1999), rev'd en banc, 244 F.3d 405 (5th Cir.
2001).
66. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 157.
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and the enforcement of the statute required by Ex parte Young."67 The panel
analyzed decisions of a number of courts that have wrestled with Ex parte
68
Young's "some connection" requirement.
Relying largely on Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes,69 the panel
opined that the Governor may be joined as a defendant in cases concerning "the
enforcement of programs, civil or criminal, dealing with the relations between
the state and the individual. ' 70 Allied involved a federal challenge to a state
statute that affected the trade practices of distributors and exhibitors in the
movie industry. The challenged law prohibited "blind bidding," a usual movie
industry practice by which distributors solicit bids for their films from exhibitors
before the exhibitors have had the chance to preview the film. 71 No state official
enforced the law, however; the prohibition was effected only by allowing
exhibitors to file private lawsuits against distributors who required blind
bidding. 72 The Allied court found that the law was "drafted to be self-enforcing;
thus the alleged impact upon plaintiffs is immediate and occurs without the
'73
active participation of or enforcement by state officers.
In determining whether suit could proceed against the Governor despite his
lack of specific enforcement power, the Allied court held that the proper balance
between Ex parte Young and the Eleventh Amendment "can be struck only on a
case-by-case basis, after a review of the relationship between the Act, the
defendant state officials, and the plaintiffs. '74 Allied held that, although plaintiffs
could have awaited a private civil suit to test the constitutionality of the trade
practices law at issue, the Governor of Ohio had a sufficient public interest in the
enforcement of the statute to invoke the Ex parte Young fiction. 75 The Sixth
Circuit, affirming the decision, held that "[e]ven in the absence of specific state
enforcement provisions, the substantial public interest in enforcing the trade
67. Okpalobi, 190 F.3d at 344.
68. See id. at 344-45 (reviewing Federal National Mortgage Ass'n v. Lefkowitz, 383 F. Supp. 1294
(S.D.N.Y. 1974), which held that Governor's general duty to "take care" that state laws are faithfully
executed and the Attorney General's power to seek injunctions against persons engaging in illegal acts
under New York law was sufficient to challenge act's constitutionality, and Mendez v. Heller, 530 F.2d
457 (2d Cir. 1976), which held that New York Attorney General's duty to support constitutionality of
state statutes and to defend actions in which state is "interested" was insufficient connection).
69. 473 F. Supp. 560 (S.D. Ohio 1979), aff d, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982).
70. Okpalobi, 190 F.3d at 345 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
71. Allied, 473 F. Supp. at 561-62.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 570.
74. Id. at 568. Allied rejected a previous decision, Gras v. Stevens, 415 F. Supp. 1148 (S.D.N.Y.
1976), one of the few other cases to address constitutional challenges to purely "private" tort statutes.
In Gras,the court stated that "we know of no case in which the general duty of a governor to enforce
state laws has been held sufficient to make him a proper party defendant in a civil rights action
attacking the constitutionality of a state statute concerning matrimonial or other private civil actions."
Gras, 415 F. Supp. at 1152 (emphasis added).
75. Allied, 473 F. Supp. at 569. The Allied court also considered the state officials' failure to
challenge the suit on Eleventh Amendment grounds relevant to the inquiry, although not controlling.
Id. The Okpalobi panel also relied to some extent on the fact that the Governor and Attorney General
did not raise or argue the Eleventh Amendment defense. Okpalobi, 190 F.3d at 346-47.
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practices legislation involved here places a significant obligation upon the
76
Governor to use his general authority to see that state laws are enforced.
Allied emphasized:
Were this action unavailable to the plaintiffs, they would be unable to
vindicate the alleged infringement of their constitutional rights without
first violating an Ohio statute requiring a significant change in their
what the doctrine in Ex parte
business conduct. Such a result is clearly
77
Young was in part designed to avoid.
Finding the analysis in Allied persuasive, the Okpalobi panel formulated a
two-part test for resolving the question of when there is a sufficient "connection"
between the named defendants and the challenged state act as required by Ex
parte Young: (1) the court must first determine "what powers the defendants
wield [under state law] to enforce the law in question," and (2) the court must
then "discern the nature of the law and its place on the continuum between
public regulation and private action." 78 The first step of the Okpalobi test
ensures that the state official does in fact have some general enforcement powers
to satisfy the Ex parte Young connection requirement. As for the second step of
the test, both the Allied and Okpalobi courts felt the need to rely on a
public/private analysis in order to avoid opening a floodgate of challenges to
"private" civil legislation. If the general power to defend state law granted to
most governors and attorneys general was a sufficient enforcement "connection"
in every case, the Allied and Okpalobi courts feared that plaintiffs would
"merely attempt[] to survey the statute books.., in order to receive a premature
constitutional adjudication of the challenged Act."' 79 Based on this floodgate
concern, the second step of the Okpalobi panel's test tries to limit such suits to
regulations of truly "public" concern. This is the vexing problem caused by selfenforcing tort laws. Both of these courts recognized the need to protect injured
parties' rights but struggled with finding a coherent method for limiting suits
challenging private legislation to "self-enforcing" laws.
Applying their new two-step test to Act 825, the Okpalobi panel first found
that Louisiana state law grants both the Governor and the Attorney General
sufficient powers and duties to meet the first prong of their test. 80 Specifically,
the Attorney General has the power and duty to "institute, prosecute, or
intervene in any civil action or proceeding" to assert or protect the interest of the
state; if the Attorney General neglects this duty, "the Governor has the right and
duty to do so.''8t Second, the panel concluded that Act 825 falls on the "public"
end of the continuum. 82 The panel stated: "[T]he purpose and effect of the Act is
to prevent women from obtaining legal abortions in Louisiana: The Act is a
76. Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 679 F.2d 656, 665 n.5 (6th Cir. 1982).
77. Id.
78. Okpalobi, 190 F.3d at 346.

79. Allied, 473 F. Supp. at 571 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Okpalobi, 190 F.3d at
346 (agreeing implicitly with Allied's result).
80. Okpalobi, 190 F.3d at 346.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 347.
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thinly-veiled attempt to regulate and interfere with a right protected by the
United States constitution." 8 3 Therefore, the panel held that the Governor and
84
Attorney General of Louisiana were proper defendants under Ex parte Young.
After deciding the Eleventh Amendment question, the court considered
whether the plaintiffs' challenge met Article III standing requirements. The
panel viewed the standing question as a "closely related-indeed, overlappinginquiry" to the Fx parte Young question.8 5 Not surprisingly, the panel reached
86
the same conclusion as it had with respect to Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Understanding the basic outlines of standing is also crucial to analyzing the
Okpalobi opinions and to recognizing that the courts face a truly difficult
problem in trying to address self-enforcing tort laws. Under Article III, Section 2
of the United States Constitution, the federal courts have judicial power only to
decide "cases" and "controversies. '8 7 It has long been established that the caseor-controversy requirement of Article III prohibits federal courts from issuing
advisory opinions. This core prohibition based on the Constitution's case-orcontroversy limit on federal judicial authority is implemented through the
88
doctrine of standing.
Plaintiffs have standing under Article III where they demonstrate: (1) an
injury in fact, (2) a causal relationship between the injury and the challenged
conduct of the defendant, and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by
a favorable court decision. 89 Although it appears to be a clear three-part test,
often "each of the three standing elements blends into the others." 90 As the
Supreme Court has explained:
The essence of the standing inquiry is whether the parties seeking
to invoke the court's jurisdiction have "alleged such a personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness

83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Okpalobi, 190 F.3d at 347. The panel noted that parties may invoke federal jurisdiction in a
suit seeking declaratory relief as well as injunctive relief. Id. at 347-48. For additional information on
declaratory relief, see The Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (2000). The purpose of the
Declaratory Judgment Act is to provide a remedy to persons who are uncertain of their rights under a
particular statute and require an early adjudication of the statute without having to act at their peril in
the interim. McGraw-Edison Co. v. Preformed Line Prods. Co., 362 F.2d 339, 342 (9th Cir. 1996)
(quoting Shell Oil Co. v. Frusetta, 290 F.2d 689, 691-92 (9th Cir. 1961)). A claim for declaratory relief
can stand on its own for purposes of the case-or-controversy jurisdictional requirement. See Super Tire
Eng'g Co. v. McCorkle, 416 U.S. 115, 122 (1974) (holding that case-or-controversy requirement was

met by claim for declaratory relief even though claim for injunctive relief was settled).
86. Okpalobi,190 F.3d at 349.
87. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
88. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81
(2000) (noting standing to be among justiciability inquiries grounded in Article III case-or-controversy
requirement). Considerations of mootness and ripeness also may limit jurisdiction. Id. at 189-94.
89. Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 771 (2000); United
States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 743 (1995); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
90. Ash Creek Mining Co. v. Lujan, 969 F.2d 868,875 (10th Cir. 1992).
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which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so
largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." 91
The Supreme Court has characterized the "injury-in-fact" requirement as
meaning that the plaintiff "has suffered an [injury] that is (a) concrete and
' 92
particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. "
The Court has made it clear, however, that a plaintiff need not already have
suffered an injury. 93 Nor is it even necessary that the plaintiff have been
threatened with injury.94 For example, federal courts have repeatedly permitted
abortion providers to bring preenforcement challenges to statutes that impose
penalties on their actions. 95 In addition, the Declaratory Judgment Act provides
another mechanism for seeking preenforcement review of a statute, although it
does not alter the constitutional requirements of standing. 96 Moreover, standing
is not defeated because it is not certain that the plaintiff will be injured by the
defendant. 97 Rather, it is enough that there be some likelihood that the
98
challenged law would be used to injure the plaintiffs interests.

91. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 72 (1979) (quoting Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186,204 (1962)).
92. Friendsof the Earth, 528 U.S. at 180.
93. See, e.g., Dep't of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 327-33 (1999)
(standing found for injunctive relief where plaintiff's state was likely to lose Representative if U.S.
Census Bureau used challenged statistical sampling techniques in conducting next census).
94. See, e.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188 (1973) (finding physicians had standing to
challenge abortion statute although they had not yet been prosecuted or threatened with prosecution);
United States v. Colo. Supreme Court, 87 F.3d 1161, 1164-66 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding it sufficient to
allege that challenged rules required federal prosecutors to alter their conduct, despite absence of
allegations that disciplinary or grievance proceedings were threatened).
95. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 845 (1992) (allowing
preenforcement challenge to abortion law even before defendants threatened prosecution); Planned
Parenthood Ass'n of Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 822 F.2d 1390, 1395-96 (6th Cir. 1987)
(finding that abortion clinic had standing to bring injunctive action against fetal tissue disposal
ordinance because clinic's "fear of prosecution is reasonably founded in fact").
96. See, e.g., MedImmune, Inc. v. Genetech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764,771 (2007) (noting that Court has
long held that actions for declaratory relief must satisfy, and can satisfy, requirements of Article III
standing); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 478 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) ("[M]y reading of
the legislative history of the Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934 suggests that its primary purpose was
to enable persons to obtain a definition of their rights before an actual injury had occurred .. ");
Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of Am. v. Magaw, 132 F.3d 272, 279 (6th Cir. 1997) ("[Dleclaratory judgments are
typically sought before a completed 'injury-in-fact' has occurred.").
97. See, e.g., Wabash Valley Power Ass'n v. Rural Electrification Admin., 903 F.2d 445, 451-52
(7th Cir. 1990) (concluding that, although sequence of events leading to alleged injury was
"speculative," Article III requirements were met); see also Daniel A. Farber, Uncertainty as a Basis for
Standing, 33 HOFsTRA L. REV. 1123, 1123 (2005) (arguing that under certain circumstances, extreme
uncertainty of injury ought to satisfy injury-in-fact requirement).
98. See Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1988) (granting landlord association standing
to challenge ordinance providing hardship rent relief, although no relief hearings had yet been held
and without need to show any particular tenants of association members were likely to seek such
relief, because ordinance presented "sufficient threat of actual injury").
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As to redressability, it is sufficient for plaintiff to show that there is a
99
substantial likelihood that the relief requested will redress the claimed injury.
The relief sought need not, however, eliminate all injury to the plaintiff from all
possible parties. The Supreme Court has held that "a plaintiff satisfies the

redressability requirement when he shows that a favorable decision will relieve a
discrete injury to himself. [A plaintiff] need not show that a favorable decision
100
will relieve his every injury."

It is the causation element that has presented a bar to judicial review of selfenforcing tort legislation because, like Ex parte Young, it requires that a state
official defendant have some enforcement connection to the challenged statute.
To satisfy the causation requirement, a plaintiff must show that the injury is
"fairly traceable" to the defendant, which means that the plaintiff needs to
establish a "chain of causation between the challenged Government conduct and
the asserted injury" that is not too speculative.10 1 Thus, plaintiffs must trace their
injury to the powers of the named defendants to enforce that law or to use the

99. See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 75 n.20 (1978)
(reviewing U.S. Supreme Court cases to establish plaintiffs satisfied second prong of standing test by
showing "substantial likelihood" that requested relief would redress claimed injury).
100. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 n.15 (1982).
101. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751, 759 (1984). In Allen, the Supreme Court made clear that
lack of causation alone can be a bar to federal court review. Id. at 751. The plaintiffs in Allen, parents
of African American public school children, brought a class action alleging that the Internal Revenue
Service's failure to deny tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory private schools violated their right
to have their children in desegregated schools. Id. at 739-40. Plaintiffs sought to change the regulatory
scheme by which the IRS granted tax exemptions to private schools. The Supreme Court recognized
that plaintiffs' claim stated an injury and that the relief requested from the Court could redress that
injury. Id. at 756-57. The Court held, however, that plaintiffs lacked standing solely because of lack of
causation. Id. at 759. The Court found that the injury was not "fairly traceable" to the government
conduct being challenged because the "chain of causation" was too weak. Allen, 468 U.S. at 759.
Notably, the Court argued that there was an independent private actor that broke the chain of
causation-the private schools who engaged in the discriminatory action. Id. at 759. Interestingly, this
public/private distinction noted in Allen echoes in the private/public dichotomy the courts have relied
on in analyzing self-enforcing tort legislation, as discussed infra Part IV.
In Allen, the Supreme Court emphasized that the elements of standing serve separation of powers
concerns. The Court explicitly stated that "the law of Article III standing is built on a single basic
idea-the idea of separation of powers." Id. at 752. For example, the Allen Court reasoned that
separation of powers principles explained why the injury to plaintiffs was not fairly traceable to or
"caused" by the IRS:
[A contrary] conclusion would pave the way generally for suits challenging, not specifically
identifiable Government violations of law, but the particular programs agencies establish to
carry out their legal obligations. Such suits, even when premised on allegations of several
instances of violations of law, are rarely if ever appropriate for federal-court adjudication.
Id. at 759-60. In other words, the causation requirement prevented too much judicial interference with
executive branch apparatus. Causation, like the other elements of standing, serves separation of
powers by ensuring that the courts only step in as a necessity and only when the dispute is one
"traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through the judicial process." Id. at 790 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). For more recent articulations of causation and redressability as distinct obstacles to
standing, see United States v.Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 743 (1995), Northeastern Florida Chapter of the
Associate General Contractors of America v. Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 663 (1993), and Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).

2007]

PRIVATIZING BANS ON ABORTION

law to injure the plaintiff's interests. 1° 2 In the case of criminal or regulatory laws,
causation would be met by filing suit against whichever state official would
prosecute a case under the challenged law.
As in the Eleventh Amendment context, the Okpalobi panel concluded that
a preenforcement remedy was necessary to address the constitutional injury
caused by Act 825. The doctrinal problem presented by standing was the same as
with Ex parte Young-who to sue? The plaintiff doctors had no way of knowing
which, if any, of their patients would eventually enforce Act 825. Furthermore,
since by its terms Act 825 limited claims to women who had abortions, no state
official has any specific enforcement power under the law. To address standing,
the panel again faced the question "whether the State of Louisiana and its
Governor are the proper defendants in plaintiffs' claims." 10 3 The panel
ultimately concluded that "Article III [did] not require a plaintiff to plead or
prove that a defendant state official has enforced or threatened to enforce a
statute in order to meet the case or controversy requirement" in this particular
10
case. 4
Although the panel was able to support its claims that the mere existence of
the statute injured plaintiffs and that declaratory relief could redress this injury,
it did not sufficiently explain how any actions of the Governor and Attorney
General satisfied the causation element of standing given that neither could sue
under the law. Instead, the panel emphasized that the key question is simply
whether the challenged statute has a "self-enforcing nature. '10 5 If a statute has
an immediate impact on plaintiffs' exercise of constitutional rights that occurs
without the active participation or enforcement of state officials, the panel
reasoned that a concrete case or controversy exists "even absent overt adverse
action by the named defendants."' 1 6 The panel found that plaintiffs had a case or
controversy with the Governor and Attorney General of Louisiana because Act
825 is "immediately and coercively self-enforcing."10 7 Finally, as to the merits,
the panel agreed with the district court that the statute was both
unconstitutionally vague and an undue burden on a woman's Fourteenth

102. In addition, the rule against allowing "collusive" lawsuits would prevent the doctors from
arranging for a "friendly" plaintiff to bring suit under Act 825 in order challenge its constitutionality.
See United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 305 (1943) (describing collusive suits as "not in any real
sense adversar[ial].... [and lacking] the honest and actual antagonistic assertion of rights to be
adjudicated-a safeguard essential to the integrity of the judicial process, and one which we have held
to be indispensable to adjudication of constitutional questions" (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted)).
103. Okpalobi v. Foster, 190 F.3d 337, 348 (5th Cir. 1999), rev'd en banc, 244 F.3d 405 (5th Cir.

2001).
104. Id. at 349.
105. Id. at 348.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 349. Noting that the law was well-established in this area, the court also held that
plaintiffs were entitled to assert third-party standing of their patients' constitutional rights. Okpalobi,
190 F.3d at 351-53.
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Amendment right to seek an abortion. 1°8 Based on the foregoing, the panel
affirmed the permanent injunction and declared Act 825 unconstitutional. 10 9
3.

En Banc Opinion

In a fractured opinion, the Fifth Circuit sitting en banc reversed the panel's
opinion and dismissed the case. 110 Judge Jolly, who had dissented from the
panel's opinion, wrote the majority opinion for the en banc court on the issue of
standing. Only a plurality of the court agreed with Judge Jolly's conclusion that
the Eleventh Amendment also barred the suit, although other federal appeals
courts have followed this line of reasoning.
A majority of the court agreed that the doctors failed to meet Article III
standing requirements in their suit against the Attorney General and the
Governor."' The court concluded that, although the doctors and their patients
did suffer constitutional injury based on the challenged act, they could not
establish the causation and redressability prongs of the standing test against the
named defendants. 112 The court emphasized that, although it does not "challenge
that the plaintiffs are suffering a threatened injury," the injury alleged
is not, and cannot possibly be, caused by the defendants.., and ...
their injury cannot be redressed by these defendants-that is, these
defendants cannot prevent purely private litigants from filing and
prosecuting a cause of action under Act 825 and cannot prevent the
courts of Louisiana from processing and hearing these private tort
13
cases.

1

The court did not explain why declaratory relief against the challenged law
would not provide sufficient redressability for the plaintiffs, since a declaration
that the law was unconstitutional could largely assure the doctors that they
would not face liability under the law for a medically proper and consensual
4
abortion procedure."

108. Id at 357, 359. Similarly to the district court, the panel found that "Act 825's structure and
language put the lie to the State's insistence that the legislation is designed merely to enhance the
information furnished to women seeking abortions." Id. at 356.
109. Id. at 361. Judge Jolly dissented from the panel's opinion, stating that the majority
disregarded the limits of federal judicial power set forth in Article III and the Eleventh Amendment
and "simply... issue[d] an advisory opinion." Id. at 362 (Jolly, J., dissenting).
110. Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405,409 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
111. Id. at 429.
112. Id. at 428; see also id. at 431 (Higginbotham, J., concurring) ("The requirements of causation
and redressability are not met here. Lack of standing disposes of this case regardless of the relief
sought-injunctive or declaratory.").
113. Id. at 427 (majority opinion).
114. Judge Benavides addressed this point. Okpalobi, 244 F.3d at 432-441 (Benavides, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). With respect to the standing issue, Judge Benavides claimed
that, although plaintiffs were not entitled to injunctive relief under the Supreme Court's standing
doctrine, he believed that under the Declaratory Judgment Act plaintiffs did present a sufficient
controversy to satisfy Article Il. Id. at 433-36. Judge Benavides asserted that declaratory relief would
redress plaintiffs' injury because the declaration of unconstitutionality would in practice serve to bar
private parties from invoking Act 825. Id. at 435. Judge Benavides pointed out that redressability
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With respect to the Eleventh Amendment analysis, Judge Jolly and the

plurality focused on the meaning of the "some connection" requirement
articulated in Ex parte Young. 115 Judge Jolly concluded that to fit within the Ex
parte Young exception to state sovereign immunity, plaintiffs must show a
"special relation" between the challenged act and the defendants.1t 6 As to the
statute at issue in Okpalobi, Judge Jolly proceeded to find that no state actors
had the power under Act 825 to invoke its provisions. 117 He emphasized that the
court "should not be diverted from the crucial and determinative consideration
under Ex parte Young and its progeny: These defendants have no ability to
enforce Act 825, a purely private tort statute, which can be invoked only by
118
private litigants."'
In rejecting a preenforcement challenge, the Fifth Circuit claimed that the
plaintiffs could simply wait until a tort action was filed pursuant to Act 825 and
raise their constitutional challenge as a defense in that action.119 Unwilling to
take such a risk, the plaintiffs then filed their preenforcement challenge in
Louisiana state court.
4.

No Preenforcement Review in Louisiana State Courts

Following the Fifth Circuit's en banc opinion, the same doctors filed suit for
declaratory relief in Louisiana state court. 120 After the doctors successfully
obtained a preliminary injunction in trial court, the Louisiana appellate court

concerns the court's power to redress the injury, not the named defendants' power to redress plaintiffs'
injury. Id. at 436. Judge Benavides failed to address the causation requirement of standing doctrine,
however. The argument that declaratory relief would provide sufficient redressability is also discussed
further in the text and notes accompanying Part ll.B.
115. Id. at 411-12 (majority opinion).
116. Okpalobi, 244 F.3d at 412-13 (Jolly, J., dissenting). Judge Jolly's opinion describes Ex parte
Young as creating a "precise exception" to the Eleventh Amendment and requiring "(1) the ability of
the official to enforce the statute at issue under his statutory or constitutional powers, and (2) the
demonstrated willingness of the official to enforce the statute." Id. at 416-17. Judge Jolly emphasizes
that "Young requires that the defendant state official ...at least have the ability to act [to enforce the
statute].... It is this unconstitutional conduct, or at least the ability to engage in the unconstitutional
conduct, that makes him no longer a representative of the sovereign." Id. at 421.
117. Id. (noting that defendant Louisiana officials have no power to enforce Act 825); see also id.
at 409 n.2 (majority opinion) (citing Louisiana statute in issue, which grants cause of action only to
"the mother of the unborn child for any damage occasioned or precipitated by the abortion").
118. Okpalobi, 244 F.3d at 422 (emphasis added). Seven of the fourteen en banc judges stated
that Judge Jolly's opinion erroneously narrowed the Ex parte Young exception to Eleventh
Amendment immunity. Id. at 408 n.*; see also id. at 436 n.6 (Benevides, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (noting that Judge Jolly's opinion on the Eleventh Amendment issue is not
controlling authority).
119. d.at 428 (majority opinion).
120. The Louisiana trial court granted a temporary restraining order and granted the plaintiffs'
request for a preliminary injunction based on its finding that Act 825 is unconstitutional. See Women's
Health Clinic v. State, 804 So. 2d 625, 626 (La. 2001) (discussing ruling of trial court). The state then
appealed directly to the Louisiana Supreme Court, which vacated the portion of the trial court's
judgment declaring Act 825 unconstitutional and remanded to the court of appeals for expedited
review of the grant of the preliminary injunction. Id. at 626.
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concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the case based on a lack of
standing. 121 Although state courts are not faced with the same Federal Article III
limitations, the Louisiana appellate court relied in large part on the Okpalobi en
banc opinion's reasoning to conclude that "no justiciable controversy exists
between plaintiffs and the [named defendant, the] State of Louisiana. '122 The
court therefore reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for
123
dismissal.
In sum, plaintiffs were unable to mount a preenforcement challenge to Act
825 even in Louisiana state courts, despite the lack of an Article III "case-orcontroversy" requirement in the Louisiana Constitution. 24 Furthermore, by
refusing to hear the case on state law standing grounds, the state courts
prevented plaintiffs from bringing a challenge on the merits of Act 825 directly
to the United States Supreme Court through an appeal from the state court of
last resort. 125 If the statute achieves its goal of restricting the provision of
abortions merely by its existence, and no abortions are provided in Louisiana, no
possible claims under the Act will arise. Or even if a few risk-taking doctors
continue to provide abortions in Louisiana and no one brings suit under the Act,
the law will never be subjected to judicial review and continue to operate as a
Sword of Damocles deterring the provision of abortion services.1 26 In either case,
the Louisiana legislature will have denied or largely eviscerated a woman's right
to choose abortion and will never be held accountable for its actions. Such a
result is contrary to the precedent set by Ex parte Young, which holds that state
actors cannot violate fundamental constitutional rights and yet evade judicial
review.

121. Women's Health Clinic v. State, 825 So. 2d 1208, 1213 (La. Ct. App. 2002).
122. Id. The court stated that the requirement of "justiciability" was found in Louisiana case law.
Id. at 1211. But see Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the "Passive Virtues": Rethinking the Judicial
Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1834, 1941 (2001) (reviewing state court justiciability doctrines and
arguing that state courts should not follow Article III court justiciability requirements).
123. Women's Health Clinic, 825 So. 2d at 1213. The plaintiffs appealed the decision to the
Louisiana Supreme Court, which denied review. Women's Health Clinic v. State, 828 So. 2d 586 (La.
2002).

124. See Women's Health Clinic, 825 So. 2d at 1211 (stating that "[t]here is no comparable
limitation [toArticle III's case-and-controversy requirement) found in the Louisiana Constitution");
Jennifer L. Achilles, Using Tort Law to Circumvent Roe v. Wade and Other Pesky Due Process
Decisions: An Examination of Louisiana's Act 825, 78 TUL.L. REV. 853, 855-57 (2004) (describing
Louisiana's repeated legislative attempts to circumvent Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade and
critiquing state court's justiciability decision in Women's Health Clinicv. State).
125. If a state court refuses to hear a case on state law grounds that decision is not amenable to
review by the United States Supreme Court. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICION 667 (4th
ed. 2003).
126. This is what appears to be currently happening in Louisiana. Since the law was enacted in
1997, only one case has been filed under Act 825, and that case did not reach the merits. See Filogene
v. Brown, 871 So. 2d 1206, 1208 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that Act 825 does not apply retroactively
and therefore plaintiff could not invoke it for incident that occurred prior to Act 825's enactment).
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JudicialRefusal to Review OtherStates' Self-Enforcing Tort Legislation

A number of other federal appellate courts have refused to review selfenforcing tort legislation. These courts have set a dangerous precedent by
allowing state legislators to use extreme tort remedies to chill the exercise of
fundamental rights.
In Nova Health Systems v. Gandy,127 the Tenth Circuit rejected a challenge
to a tort statute that violated abortion rights, largely relying on the reasoning in
Okpalobi. The Tenth Circuit refused to allow preenforcement review of a selfenforcing tort statute even though the defendant state officials could have
"enforced" the challenged law as tort plaintiffs.
Oklahoma passed a statute authorizing civil damages lawsuits against
abortion providers who failed to obtain parental consent before providing
minors' abortions. The statute states: "Any person who performs an abortion on
a minor without parental consent or knowledge shall be liable for the cost of any
subsequent medical treatment such minor might require because of the
abortion."1 28 The statute does not provide any limit to who can file suit pursuant
to its provisions, so doctors could be liable to the minor herself, the minor's
parents, other doctors or medical clinics, or to government entities that provide
medical services. 129 Furthermore, a doctor who performs an abortion on a minor
without parental consent is subject to strict liability if the minor later requires
additional medical treatment that can be tied to the abortion procedure. Doctors
are usually only liable for medical malpractice, for the obvious reason that strict
liability allows for no defense and would make it financially infeasible to provide
medical services subject to such liability.
Plaintiff Nova Health Systems, a medical facility that provides abortion
services to minors, filed suit on behalf of itself and its patients and sought
injunctive and declaratory relief against state officials overseeing health care
facilities. 130 The named defendants were four state officials who oversaw state
institutions providing medical treatment and oversaw the state Medicaid
131
program.
Nova argued that the statute was unconstitutional because it essentially
mandated parental consent without any exception, despite Supreme Court
doctrine that requires parental consent statutes to provide both an exception for
medical emergencies and a judicial bypass mechanism. 132 Not only did the tort

127. 416 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 2005).
128. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-740 (West 2004).
129. Nova, 416 F.3d at 1159.
130. Id. at 1152-53. As in Okpalobi, doctors are permitted to assert their patients' constitutional
rights under established rules of third-party standing.
131. Id. The district court had dismissed other named defendants who had no authority to seek
reimbursement for medical treatment. Nova Health Sys. v. Fogarty, No. 01-CV-0419-EA, 2002 WL
32595281, at *1 (N.D. Okla. June 14,2002).
132. Nova, 2002 WL 32595281, at *6-10 (discussing constitutional requirements with respect to
parental involvement laws in abortion context); see also Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New
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law create liability against abortion providers without proof of malpractice, but
the meaning of the phrase "any subsequent medical treatment such minor might
require because of the abortion" is extremely unclear. Nova feared that it could
be held liable for the cost of virtually any type of medical treatment that could in
some way relate to the abortion.1 33 Furthermore, Nova feared that harassing
lawsuits would be filed by pro-life protestors who had already used a variety of
means to intimidate its staff and patients. 134 Because of the high risk of
potentially catastrophic costs created by the statute, Nova felt compelled to
1 35
require all minor patients to establish parental consent.
Unlike the Okpalobi statute, which prescribes that only the mother of the
unborn child can file suit, this statute's broad grant of a strict liability civil cause
of action against abortion providers at least allowed for the possibility that the
defendant state medical officials would "enforce" this tort statute against Nova.
The Oklahoma statute does not limit who can bring suit against the abortion
provider (for example, it does not limit tort claims to the minor who had the
abortion or her parents). The four defendant state officials oversaw state medical
institutions and medical programs that could provide postabortion care to
minors. By the terms of the statute, these state officials could file a tort suit
against abortion providers for the costs of any arguably related treatment the
state medical institutions provided to a minor who had an abortion without
parental consent. It is the threat of such a strict liability tort suit that causes the
constitutional injury because it essentially forces abortion providers to obtain
parental consent from all minors seeking abortions (without constitutionally
mandated exceptions) in order to avoid the potentially catastrophic costs of
litigation. Furthermore, declaratory relief against the defendant state medical
officials could redress the constitutional injury. A declaration that the statute is
unconstitutional would ensure that neither the defendant state medical officials
nor other private individuals would invoke the statute in court, which would
36
remove the chilling effect of strict civil liability.

England, 126 S. Ct. 961, 965-66 (2006) (reviewing previously established constitutional requirements
for parental notice requirements for minors seeking abortion).
133. Declaration of Linda Meek in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment 1911416, Nova Health Sys. v. Fogarty, 2002 WL 32595281 (No. 84).
134. Id. 1$ 17-20.
135. Id. 1 21.
136. This point is discussed further infra. The Tenth Circuit also held that Nova failed to
establish redressability, opining that an injunction against these four defendants would not prevent
others from filing suit. Nova Health Sys. v. Gandy, 416 F.3d 1149, 1158-59 (10th Cir. 2005). The court
rejected the argument that favorable declaratory relief would deter other potential litigants from
relying on § 1-740. Id. at 1159. It is well-established, however, that a plaintiff need not show that the
particular lawsuit at issue will redress every possible future injury in order to satisfy the redressability
prong of standing. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 n.15 (1982). The dissent in Nova stated with
respect to declaratory relief: "If we declare § 1-740 unconstitutional, there is a substantial likelihood
that the precedential value of our opinion will prevent future parties from attempting to recover under
§ 1-740." Nova, 416 F.3d at 1164 (Briscoe, J., dissenting). It should be noted that one of the state
defendants, Mike Fogarty, did not appeal the judgment against him; the Tenth Circuit notes twice that
it does not disturb that judgment. Id at 1153 n.2, 1154 n.4 (majority opinion). Given that the district
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The Tenth Circuit rejected this argument and instead relied on the standing
analysis of Okpalobi. Notably, the court characterized the relevant injury for
standing purposes not as the constitutional injury suffered by underage patients,
but as an injury to Nova based on the decrease in underage patients that would
result from its new, statutorily driven policy of obtaining pare'tal consent in all
cases. The court did not address the violation of the minor patients'
constitutional rights based on the statute's creation of strict liability (the doctors
had third party standing to raise their minor patients' constitutional claims)
because it found "mere possible future exposure to civil liability under § 1-740
too remote to constitute an actual or imminent injury in fact."'1 37 This reasoning
is fundamentally flawed. The doctors submitted affidavits stating that the threat
of strict liability under the challenged tort law was the reason they began
requiring parental consent in all cases; therefore, a minor's constitutional right to
a judicial bypass procedure and emergency health exception is violated at least in
part because of the threat of enforcement of the civil liability statute by the
defendant state medical officials. 138 The court ignored this direct causal link
between the state medical officials' ability to enforce the challenged tort statute
and the injury to minor patients' constitutional rights. The court attempted to
skirt this point by claiming that it was the enactment of the statute that caused
the change in Nova's behavior, not any potential actions by the state
defendants. 139 This logic simply misses the point-as with any criminal or
regulatory statute, it is the threatof enforcement of a statute (by the state medical
officials as well as other potential tort plaintiffs) that causes the constitutional
injury.
Although the statute at issue in Nova was distinguishable from the statute in
Okpalobi, the court rejected Nova's argument:
It may be true that these defendants potentially have the power to
sue Nova under § 1-740 .... In this respect, § 1-740 is not unlike a

multitude of other state tort laws under which these defendants might
someday have a cause of action. Yet if these defendants' latent power
to litigate were enough to support standing, anyone who might
someday have a claim under § 1-740 could be summoned preemptively
before the federal courts to defend the constitutionality of that
0
statute.t4
Like the Okpalobi court, the court reasoned that allowing preenforcement
review of this tort law would open a floodgate of challenges to state tort laws in
which state officials might be future litigants. 141 The court did not pause to

court's declaratory relief against Fogarty still
stands, the precedential value of that opinion may
provide sufficient assurance against liability to doctors in Oklahoma.
137. Nova, 416 F.3d at 1156 n.6.
138. Id. at 1153.
139. Id. at 1157.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1158 (opining that Nova's approach would erroneously vest "all public officials with
standing to litigate the constitutionality of any state legislation that might be the basis of a future
lawsuit in which the state agency might be a civil litigant"); see also Summit Med. Ctr. of Ala., Inc. v.
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consider how it could limit judicial review to the narrow case of self-enforcing
tort statutes.
In sum, according to the reasoning of the courts, as long as a state
legislature styles a statute as a tort law, a federal court cannot exercise
jurisdiction for preenforcement review. The lesson state legislatures learn from
Okpalobi and Nova is that a state may deny the fundamental right to choose
abortion (or other fundamental rights) by empowering individual citizens to
claim enormous damages when those rights are exercised. In other words, the
state can "privatize" what are in fact governmental restrictions of fundamental
rights. This possibility poses a grave and growing threat to constitutional rights
across the board.
Several other courts have reached similar conclusions with respect to
preenforcement review of state tort statutes, even when their mere enactment
chills the exercise of constitutionally protected activity. These cases provide
further examples of state legislators using tort remedies to eviscerate
constitutional rights, and in particular show how self-enforcing tort laws have
been widely used to attack abortion rights. In the cases discussed below, the
courts again struggled with the vexing doctrinal puzzles presented by selfenforcing tort laws. Since the tort enforcement provisions in these cases were
tied to criminal enforcement provisions, however, the chilling effect of the laws
were significantly limited, as explained further below.
In Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 142 plaintiffs brought suit against a number of public
officials in a challenge to Illinois and Wisconsin "partial-birth abortion" statutes,
which provided private rights of action. 4 3 As in Okpalobi, the Seventh Circuit
held that "plaintiffs lack standing to contest the statutes authorizing private
rights of action, not only because the defendants cannot cause the plaintiffs
injury by enforcing the private-action statutes, but also because any potential
dispute plaintiffs may have with future private plaintiffs could not be redressed
by an injunction running only against public prosecutors."'" As the court noted,
however, its ruling on the private damages portion of the statute "is of little
moment after Stenberg [the Supreme Court case declaring 'partial-birth
abortion' bans unconstitutional], which knocks out the substantive rules that
145
either public or private plaintiffs would seek to enforce."'
Riley, 274 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1281-83 (M.D. Ala. 2003) (holding that Eleventh Amendment barred
challenge to anti-abortion tort statute even though statute did not limit enforcement actions to private
individuals, relying mainly on Ex parte Young). But see Corporate Health Ins., Inc. v. Tex. Dep't of
Ins., 215 F.3d 526, 532 (5th Cir. 2000) ("Aetna replies that it has standing because the liability
provisions expose it not only to private suits but also to the regulatory reach of the Attorney General.
We agree. This is not a case in which private suits are the only means of enforcing a challenged statutory

standard." (emphasis added)).
142. 249 F.3d 603 (7th Cir. 2001).
143. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 513/5, 513/10, 513/15 (1998); WIS. STAT. § 895.038 (1997).
144. Hope Clinic, 249 F.3d at 605. The court emphasized that "[bloth causation and redressability
are essential to an Article III controversy." Id. The court did not discuss whether declaratory relief
could provide the requisite redressability.
145. ld. at 606 (discussing Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000)). Hope Clinic also cited
Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911), for the proposition that "Article III does not permit the
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Until recently, Stenberg v. Carhart146 rendered unconstitutional the
definitional clauses on which both a criminal prosecution or a private tort suit
would depend. Therefore, doctors could rely on Stenberg as precedent to defend
themselves against tort liability. 147 Although one could argue that doctors might
still have to bear the cost and inconvenience of defending a tort suit since the
Seventh Circuit refused to declare the private damages provision
unconstitutional, Hope Clinic's explicit statement that "after Stenberg any
private suit based on these state laws would lack a legal foundation"1 48 made it
highly unlikely that any such suits would be filed, particularly given that lawyers
may face sanctions for filing frivolous law suits. At the least, declaratory relief

granted pursuant to the criminal enforcement provisions provided doctors some
assurance that a tort suit could be dismissed based on federal precedent. Even
though a federal circuit court ruling is not binding on state courts, it is persuasive
authority. 149 Thus, in contrast to Okpalobi and Nova, the private damages

portions of unconstitutional criminal anti-abortion statutes were, practically
speaking, a low-risk factor, because the federal courts determined that the
substance of the statutes were unconstitutional anyway. The declaration that the
substantive portion of the statute in Hope Clinic was unconstitutional reduced
the chilling effect of the tort provisions.150
federal judiciary to determine the constitutionality of a statute providing for private litigation, when
the federal government (or its agents) are the only adverse parties to the suit." Hope Clinic, 249 F.3d

at 605. Muskrat is discussed further infra Part IV.
146. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
147. Of course, Stenberg has now been overruled by the Supreme Court's decision in Gonzales v.
Carhart. See supra note 4 and accompanying text for more on Gonzales. Interestingly, the federal
"partial-birth abortion" statute upheld by the Supreme Court in Gonzales also contains a civil remedy
provision (in addition to criminal remedies), which allows for the husband of the woman who
undergoes the procedure or the parents of a minor who undergoes the procedure to file a civil suit
against physicians who allegedly violate the federal ban. 18 U.S.C. § 1531(c)(1). The woman's consent
to the procedure, even to protect her own health, is irrelevant under the federal law. See Susan Frelich
Appleton, Gender, Abortion, and Travel After Roe's End, 51 ST. Louis U. L.J. 655, 677-80 (2007)
(discussing chilling effects of civil remedy in federal "partial-birth abortion" ban and other tort
statutes targeting abortion).
148. Hope Clinic, 249 F.3d at 606.
149. A declaration by a federal court that a statute is unconstitutional could be used by an
individual to defend him or herself against a private damages suit based on the challenged statute. A
state court hearing such a suit would treat a federal court ruling on the statute's constitutionality as
persuasive precedent. See, e.g., Phillips v. Williams, 608 P.2d 1131, 1135 (Okla. 1980) ("[T]he
pronouncement on a federal-law question by an inferior federal court is . . . indeed highly
persuasive."). Not only will the threat of successful claims be vastly reduced, but even the risk of
meritless, harassing claims will be dramatically reduced by a court's ruling on the substance of the
statute, as any attorney will have an obligation to refrain from asserting a claim that is based on a law
found unconstitutional. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party
Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1341 n.109 (2000) ("[A] federal court's ruling that a state statute is
facially unconstitutional may not only have a persuasive effect, but typically will also signal a
willingness to hold the statute unenforceable in cases involving other parties. As a result, such rulings
may discourage enforcement efforts by state authorities.").
150. See Hope Clinic,249 F.3d at 606 (stating that with regard to private damages suits, "plaintiffs
must rely on the value of Stenberg and this decision as precedent, rather than on an injunction against
state officers").
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Similarly, in Summit Medical Associates, P.C. v. Pryor,151 the Eleventh
Circuit held that, while it could permit plaintiffs' challenge to the criminal
liability provision of a "partial-birth abortion" statute, it could not permit a suit
against the statute's provision for a tort remedy when only private litigants could
seek damages. 152 Similar to Judge Jolly's plurality opinion in Okpalobi, the court
found that the Eleventh Amendment barred plaintiffs' challenge to the civil
liability provision because none of the state official defendants "has any
connection to the enforcement of the challenged law at issue."1 53 Because the
statute allowed only a husband or maternal grandparent to invoke the civil
damages provision, the court concluded that sovereign immunity protected the
state defendants. 154 Yet, as in Hope Clinic, the court's declaration that the
criminal portion of the statute is unconstitutional provided relief from the
155
chilling effect of the civil portion.
151. 180 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 1999).
152. Summit, 180 F.3d at 1329 (invalidating criminal penalties of both Alabama Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act of 1997, ALA. CODE §§ 26-23-1 to -6 (LexisNexis Supp. 1998) and Abortion of
Viable Unborn Child Act, ALA. CODE §§ 26-22-1 to -5 (LexisNexis Supp. 1998), but finding no
jurisdiction to review private civil penalties provided by former). The civil damages portion of the
statute provided that the physician performing the "partial-birth abortion" is liable in a civil suit to the
"father" of the fetus, if he is married to the woman who underwent the abortion, or to the "maternal
grandparents" of the fetus, if the woman is a minor at the time of the procedure. ALA. CODE § 26-23-5
(LexisNexis 2006).
153. Summit, 180 F.3d at 1341. Due to the unique procedural posture of the case, the court
focused on Eleventh Amendment immunity rather than standing. See id. at 1334 (noting that only
immunity question was reviewable on interlocutory appeal under collateral order doctrine; court
would not exercise discretionary pendent appellate jurisdiction to review determination of standing).
154. Id. at 1342.
155. Interestingly, a few courts have struck down civil damages provisions attached to criminal
and regulatory provisions of unconstitutional abortion statutes without separately analyzing standing
as to the civil damages remedy. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 898 (1992)
(striking down spousal notification law containing provision for civil damages to husband); Colautti v.
Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 397-401 (1979) (striking down for vagueness portion of anti-abortion statute
providing for civil damages against physician); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S.
52, 83-84 (1976) (striking down both civil and criminal penalties against physician); Women's Med.
Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187, 201-02 (6th Cir. 1997) (declaring Ohio statute unconstitutional
because of provision for strict liability for damages against physician for certain late-term abortions);
Planned Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic v. Miller, 63 F.3d 1452, 1467 (8th Cir. 1995) (striking down civil
damages provision in anti-abortion statute because itprovided for strict liability); Causeway Med.
Suite v. Foster, 43 F. Supp. 2d 604,619 (E.D. La. 1999) (permanently enjoining enforcement of partialbirth abortion statute containing both criminal and civil provisions).
In Casey, the Supreme Court case that partially reaffirmed Roe v. Wade, the Court struck down
the civil damages portion of a spousal-notification statute without considering any standing or
Eleventh Amendment problems. Casey, 505 U.S. at 898. The Court recognized that the provision at
issue, section 3209 of Pennsylvania's abortion law, provided for two kinds of remedies if a physician
violated the provision's spousal notification requirement: (1) revocation of the physician's license by
the state, and (2) liability to the husband for damages. Id. at 887-81. The Court declared section 3209
invalid in its entirety, without separately discussing whether the Court had jurisdiction to review the
tort remedy provision, as the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits did in the "partial-birth abortion" cases
discussed above. Id. at 898. Perhaps the tort remedy provision was simply not severable from the
regulatory remedy, and therefore the entire spousal notification statute had to be struck down, but
neither the Supreme Court opinion nor the lower court opinion on remand discusses this issue. See id.
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Several other lower federal courts have also reached similar conclusions
1 56
with respect to challenges to civil damages provisions of anti-abortion statutes.
But when tort causes of action are combined with a criminal statute that has
been enjoined, the court's holding on the criminal provision significantly reduces
the risk associated with the civil liability provision. By decoupling the civil
remedies from any criminal remedies, the Louisiana and Oklahoma legislatures
managed to enact a tort law that violates constitutional rights yet completely
evades judicial review.
III. THE COURTS' FLAWED ANALYSIS OF SELF-ENFORCING TORT LEGISLATION

If fundamental constitutional rights are to have real meaning, courts must
have a method for conducting preenforcement review of tort statutes that
operate as bans on constitutionally protected conduct. To hold otherwise, as
courts have done, defies both reason and precedent. Taken to its logical
conclusion, the Okpalobi v. Foster 57 approach leaves state legislators free to
"privatize" infringements on fundamental rights through the use of tort
remedies, with no avenue for judicial protection of those rights. Reason dictates
that state legislators should not be permitted to violate constitutional rights with
impunity simply because they have found a clever way to manipulate the law.
Furthermore, the key precedent here-Ex parte Young t58-establishes that state
officials cannot evade judicial review when they violate constitutional rights,
even if asserting the power of judicial review requires finessing legal formalities.
The key term used by the courts in describing these tort laws is "selfenforcing." The few courts that have addressed these unusual types of tort
statutes have described the laws as "self-effectuating" or "self-enforcing," but
without defining precisely what such terms mean in this context. 159 All laws can
more generally be described as self-enforcing, in the sense that they establish

at 890-91, 893-94, 895 (finding subsection (e) of section 3209 on "penalty" combines both the
regulatory and civil liability remedies); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 978 F.2d 74, 78 (3d
Cir.) (severing all spousal notification requirements as unconstitutional without differentiating
between regulatory and civil remedies), affd in part, rev'd in part,505 U.S. 833 (1992). It is tempting to
make more of Casey's holding on the tort remedy, particularly since standing (unlike Eleventh
Amendment immunity) cannot be waived by defendants and should be raised and considered by the
courts sua sponte. Since the Court did not expressly consider the standing issue, however, it remains
uncertain how the Court would treat an Okpalobi-like statute.
156. See, e.g., Summit Med. Ctr. of Ala., Inc. v. Riley, 274 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1278-1283 (M.D. Ala.
2003) (following Summit and holding that challenge to civil damages provision of "informed consent"
statute was barred by Eleventh Amendment); Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Taft, 162 F. Supp. 2d 929,
963-66 (S.D. Ohio 2001) (holding that criminal provision of partial-birth-abortion law was
unconstitutional but plaintiffs lacked standing to seek injunctive or declaratory relief with respect to
civil damages provision of statute), vacated on other grounds, 353 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2003).

157. 244 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
158. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
159. See, e.g., Okpalobi v. Foster, 190 F.3d 337, 349 (5th Cir. 1999) (describing Act 825 as
"immediately and coercively self-enforcing"), rev'd en banc, 244 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2001); Allied
Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 473 F. Supp. 560, 570 (S.D. Ohio 1979) (describing a tort statute
allowing only private enforcement as "drafted to be self-enforcing"), affd 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982).
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norms of behavior and provide incentives to conform to those norms in order to
avoid some kind of liability or punishment. In the statutes at issue here, "selfenforcing" has a much more specific meaning. A self-enforcing tort statute
means a tort law that imposes such a high risk of a severe penalty directed at
constitutionally protected conduct that it freezes that conduct in the same way as
would a criminal ban. In other words, the tort law does not just shift costs for
unjustified or unwarranted injuries, but in effect it operates like a direct
prohibition on the conduct being regulated. For example, in the statute at issue
in Okpalobi, the combination of removal of the defense of consent and removal
of the law from medical malpractice limitations exposes doctors to an extremely
high risk of catastrophic liability. The Okpalobi tort law is a strict liability tort
statute targeted at a fundamental right, which presents an immediate
constitutional problem by chilling the exercise of the right. 160
Through the mechanism of self-enforcing tort remedies, state legislators can
ban constitutionally protected conduct by making it prohibitively expensive.
Self-enforcing tort statutes manipulate the line between "public," i.e., criminal or
regulatory laws, and ostensibly "private" tort laws. A self-enforcing tort law is
essentially a publicly enforced law appearing in the guise of a privately enforced
tort law. Although styled as privately enforced tort legislation, in operation a
self-enforcing tort statute is direct government regulation of the targeted
conduct, similar to a criminal or regulatory fine. As explained further in Part IV,.
legislators use self-enforcing tort laws to arrogate the enforcement power of the
executive to itself-to assume the role of enforcer and thereby also evade the
judicial branch. The statute at issue in Okpalobi in particular represents a cynical
manipulation of distinctions the law draws between public and private actors.
The courts' current approach insulates any statute styled as "tort"
legislation from constitutional scrutiny, despite a showing that the legislation
causes an immediate injury to fundamental rights that cannot be remedied
without preenforcement judicial review. This formalistic mode of analysis-the
assumption that there are easily recognizable and clear categories or boundaries
between "private" and "public" law-ignores the larger potential problem of
legislatures attempting to shift regulation into private hands in order to avoid
constitutional accountability. Although the "privatization" of criminal or
160. See Alan C. Michaels, Constitutional Innocence, 112 HARV. L. REV. 828, 867-76 (1999)
(arguing that Supreme Court has consistently rejected strict liability in criminal context for conduct
related to freedom of speech, freedom of association, and abortion). See also infra Part IV.A for a
discussion of constitutional problems with imposing strict tort liability for the exercise of
constitutionally protected rights. A self-enforcing tort law will most likely arise in the context of strict
liability aimed at constitutionally protected conduct, but even a tort law based on a negligence
standard could eviscerate constitutional rights. Suppose a state crafts a tort law that creates
unrestricted liability for negligent infliction of emotional distress in the provision of an abortion,
removes the defense of consent, and fails to limit the definition of negligence or define the standard of
care. If a patient later has regrets about obtaining an abortion and can sue for damages based on her
emotional distress, such a law could be just as chilling on the provision of abortions. See Pamela S.
Quinn, Note, Preserving Minors' Rights After Casey: The "New Battlefield" of Negligence and Strict
Liability Statutes, 49 DUKE L.J. 297, 327 (1999) (arguing that suits for negligent infliction of emotional
distress or negligence in obtaining parental consent could also chill exercise of abortion rights).
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regulatory law has thus far been largely restricted to the abortion context, as
long as there is the political will in the state legislatures to utilize this tort
strategy any number of constitutional rights could be attacked with impunity.
One could imagine any number of state tort statutes written to directly
challenge Supreme Court decisions on fundamental rights yet evade judicial
review. 161 For example, pro-choice legislators could draft a law granting abortion
clinic employees and patients a cause of action for damages for emotional
distress against abortion protestors outside those clinics, which would chill the
protestors' exercise of their First Amendment rights. 162 In the post-Brown v.
Board of Education163 era, one could imagine segregationist legislators creating
tort causes of action against school board members who established integrated
classrooms. 164 A state could grant a civil cause of action against a white person
who sells a home to a person of color, in favor of any other person living in the
neighborhood; 65 or against organizers of a parade, in favor of anyone offended
by the theme of the parade. 166 States could promulgate tort laws restricting
interracial marriage, or chilling the exercise of First Amendment rights related to
defamation or flag burning. 167 If tort statutes are categorically unreviewable in
federal court, there is no logical limit to states' ability to violate constitutional
rights through the use of self-enforcing tort legislation. 168 Reason dictates against
such an absurd result.
A counter to this argument may be that the Fifth Circuit and other courts'
position that "private" tort legislation should not be amenable to
preenforcement review is reasonable based on existing legal rules. The core
underlying concern of the courts, buried underneath the doctrinal formulations
of standing doctrine and Ex parte Young, is a floodgate problem. Particularly
with respect to standing doctrine, self-enforcing tort laws do not fit within the
161. One existing example is the Allied case cited in Okpalobi. In Allied, private enforcement of
a trade practices law was used to allegedly violate free speech and other federal rights. Allied, 473 F.
Supp. at 563. See supra notes 69-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of Allied.
162. Cf Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 377-81 (1997) (using narrowly
tailored restrictions on expressive conduct of protesters outside abortion clinic).
163. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
164. Cf. Bush v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 188 F. Supp. 916, 920-21 (E.D. La. 1960) (describing
how state legislators attempted to take over school board functions in order to defy federal court
desegregation orders and holding that such actions should be subject to judicial review). This case is
discussed further infra notes 355-63 and accompanying text.
165. Cf Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249,259 (1953) (barring state court from awarding damages
for breach of racially restrictive covenant).
166. Cf Nat'l Socialist Party of Am. v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 44 (1977) (holding
injunction against wearing or displaying swastika must be stayed pending adjudication of First
Amendment rights).
167. See Caitlin E. Borgmann, Legislative Arrogance and Constitutional Accountability, 79 S.
CAL. L. REV. 753, 760-61 (2006) (describing other possible examples of self-enforcing tort laws that
impinge on constitutional rights); Terry O'Neill, Flying Under the Radar: Louisiana's New "Stealth
Abortion Law," NAT'L NOW TIMES, Special Edition 2001, available at http://www.now.org/nntl
special-2001/stealth.html (suggesting possibility of other kinds of tort legislation that would in effect
ban interracial marriage or allow racially restrictive covenants).
168. See infra Part IV.A for a discussion of the effects test for self-enforcing tort legislation.
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established paradigm, as evidenced by the number of courts that have relied
solely on standing to reject preenforcement judicial review of tort laws.
Separation of powers principles, as articulated through standing doctrine,
circumscribe the courts' role. 169 We generally do not want people suing just
anybody as a defendant simply to use the judicial power to review legislative
action. This fundamental principle is reflected in the causation requirement of
standing. Self-enforcing tort laws thus present a vexing problem from the
perspective of standing requirements because courts fear they will open a
floodgate of challenges to any and all tort statutes if they do not adhere to the
rules of standing. 170 Similarly, under Ex parte Young, courts fear that if there is
no specific connection between the defendant's enforcement power and the
challenged statute, the limits set by the Eleventh Amendment will be
meaningless. 17' If a party can sue the Attorney General or Governor, simply
based on their official title, in a preenforcement challenge to a tort statute, in
theory any person can challenge any tort law in federal court at any time. There
would arguably be no limit to federal judicial scrutiny of state tort legislative
enactments, which raises concerns both about the balance of power between the
judicial and legislative branches and about federal encroachment on state
prerogatives. Rather than open this floodgate, federal courts have gone to the
opposite extreme and categorically denied preenforcement challenges to all tort
statutes.
On the other hand, of course courts should not permit the exploitation of
otherwise reasonable legal limits when the resulting effect is to evade
government accountability and to make a mockery of constitutional rights. The
courts' current approach leaves no way to test laws that in essence operate as a
criminal ban on constitutionally protected conduct as long as the law is veiled in
a private right of action. Not only does the reasoning in Okpalobi lead to the
absurd result that state legislatures can eviscerate constitutional rights across the
board merely by disguising their attacks as private rights of action, but also key
precedent in this context does not support the courts' approach to self-enforcing
tort laws. Ex parte Young was also concerned with a floodgate problem-that the
Eleventh Amendment would be rendered meaningless if individuals could sue
any state officials in bringing federal challenges to state statutes.1 72 The Supreme
Court was equally concerned, however, that constitutional rights would be
rendered meaningless if individuals could not obtain preenforcement judicial
review of unconstitutional state regulation. 73 These twin concerns resulted in
quite a bit of tension in the Ex parte Young decision, between adopting a
169. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 757 (1984).
170. E.g., Okpalobi v. Foster, 190 F.3d 337, 347 (5th Cir. 1999), rev'd en banc, 244 F.3d 405 (5th
Cir. 2001); Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 473 F. Supp. 560, 571 (S.D. Ohio 1979), affd, 679
F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982).
171. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 157 (1908) (requiring some connection to enforcement
because otherwise Attorney General could always be sued, effectively eliminating states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity).
172. Id. at 166-67.
173. Id. at 165.
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formalist approach and reading the Eleventh Amendment strictly, or a more
functional approach that seeks flexibility in ensuring that constitutional rights
are protected by preenforcement federal judicial review. The resulting
"fiction"-that individuals can sue state officials for violations of federal law but
only those with "some connection" to the challenged statute-is an effort at a
functional approach. Ultimately, Ex parte Young stands for the fundamental
principle that courts must make constitutional rights meaningful by ensuring
judicial review. Even though fidelity to this principle required the creation of
some rather convoluted legal fictions (particularly the notion that the state
official is not the state for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment but is engaged
in state action for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment), Ex parte Young
established a bottom line that if judicial review is the only means for protecting
constitutional rights it must be asserted.
Unfortunately, the few courts that recognized that self-enforcing tort laws
threaten constitutional rights and allowed preenforcement challenges have
rested their decisions on unpersuasive reasoning. The Allied court, relied on by
the panel in Okpalobi, described federal court review of state civil law as
acceptable when the statutes "have been concerned with the enforcement of
programs, civil or criminal, dealing with the relations between the state and the
individual. '174 In other words, the "public" nature of the tort statute at issue has
been relevant to the question of whether federal courts should assert jurisdiction
to review state tort laws. 175 Where a state officer has a connection with a
challenged statute only based on general duties to uphold and defend state law,
courts have stated that there must "be a real, not ephemeral, likelihood or
realistic potential that the connection will be employed against plaintiffs'
interests. 1 76 Similarly, the Okpalobi panel proposed a "continuum" test for both
the standing and Ex parte Young inquiries, involving a case-by-case analysis to
resolve where the law in question falls on "the continuum between public
177
regulation and private action."
Likewise, in a number of cases analyzing Ex parte Young, lower courts have
deemed this additional inquiry into the "public" or "private" nature of the law
174. Allied, 473 F. Supp. at 567 (citing Gras v. Stevens, 415 F. Supp. 1148, 1152 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)).
175. See NAACP v. California, 511 F. Supp. 1244, 1254 (E.D. Cal. 1981) (noting confusion
among courts with respect to scope of Ex parte Young connection requirement and stating that courts
have "creat[ed] a distinction based on the nature of the statute under attack" in determining whether
general duties to enforce state laws are sufficient).
176. Allied, 473 F. Supp. at 568; see also Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1208 (3d Cir. 1988)
(finding no likelihood that Governor would enforce state police administrative regulations).
177. Okpalobi v. Foster, 190 F.3d 337, 346 (5th Cir. 1999), rev'd en banc, 244 F.3d 405 (5th Cir.
2001). Such a case-by-case analysis depending on the nature of the tort statute has been explicitly
rejected in the Ex parte Young context by a majority of the Supreme Court. Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002) (rejected by majority); Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe,
521 U.S. 261, 293 (1997) (rejected by three Justices). The Court has reiterated that "[i]n determining
whether the doctrine of Ex parte Young avoids an Eleventh Amendment bar to suit, a court need only
conduct a 'straightforward inquiry into whether [the]
complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal
law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective."' Verizon Md. Inc., 535 U.S. at 645
(alteration in original) (quoting Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 296).
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mandatory because they fear a floodgate of lawsuits against states unmoored
from any limits placed by the Eleventh Amendment. Courts opine that this
public/private analysis is necessary "to preclude parties from testing the
constitutionality of state legislation by simply naming the governor as a
defendant, a practice which if unchecked would effectively eviscerate the
Eleventh Amendment."' 7 8 In general, in cases where courts have looked to the
nature of the statute in question to determine whether a state official's general
duty to enforce state laws is sufficient to assert jurisdiction to review the
challenged statute, courts are more likely to conclude that such general duties
are sufficient when the law can be characterized as addressing "public" rather
than "private" concerns. Thus, in cases involving state election law, civil rights
claims, or other rights that the court could characterize as involving "public"
values or interests, general enforcement duties under state law have been found
sufficient to establish the requisite enforcement connection. 179 In contrast, in
cases relating to so-called "private" disputes, such as marital regulations, a state
80
official's general duty to enforce state laws has been considered insufficient.1
Characterizing laws as either "public" or "private," however, is an arbitrary
and easily manipulable line to draw. Critical theorists have long questioned the
categories of public/private as a false dichotomy. 181 At some level, all laws are
directed to the public interest. Even statutes regarding domestic relations law are
enacted to serve the public interest in the private ordering of individual
relationships-the private is deeply structured by law. Feminist legal theorists in
particular have criticized the public/private dichotomy, especially for insulating
the family, arguably women's primary place of subordination, from legal
178. Allied, 473 F. Supp. at 568.
179. See, e.g., Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012, 1015-16 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that, in civil
rights action seeking constitutionally sufficient indigent defense services, the Governor has sufficient
contacts with alleged unlawful statute because he is generally responsible for law enforcement); Allied,
473 F. Supp. at 571 (allowing suit based on Governor's general duty to uphold state legislation where
tort statute was "self-enforcing"); Socialist Workers Party v. Rockefeller, 314 F. Supp. 984, 988 n.7
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (allowing suit against Governor based on general obligation to take care that state
laws are faithfully executed in challenge to state election laws).
180. See, e.g., Mendez v. Heller, 530 F.2d 457, 460 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that Eleventh
Amendment barred suit challenging jurisdictional requirements for divorce); Merrick v. Merrick, 441
F. Supp. 143, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (holding that Eleventh Amendment barred suit challenging laws
governing child custody); Gras v. Stevens, 415 F. Supp. 1148, 1152 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (holding that
Eleventh Amendment barred suit challenging divorce regulations).
181. See, e.g., Susan Moller Okin,Justice and Gender: An Unfinished Debate, 72 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1537, 1552 (2004) (discussing feminist critiques of dichotomy between "public" and "private"
spheres and noting that feminist theorists have pointed out that "'[b]ecause the state is deeply
implicated in the formation and functioning of families,' the notion that it can choose whether to
intervene in the formation and functioning of families is nonsense; the only real question is how it
intervenes" (quoting Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 835, 837 (1985))). See generally CHALLENGING THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DIVIDE: FEMINISM,

LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY (Susan B. Boyd ed., 1997) (collecting essays examining impact of
public/private divide on state intervention, family-work balancing, regulation of motherhood, and
global markets); PUBLIC AND PRIVATE: FEMINIST LEGAL DEBATES (Margaret Thornton ed., 1995)

(exploring ambiguities to which women are subjected by analytic distinction between public and
private action).
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scrutiny.1 82 This criticism is particularly salient in the context of tort laws
regulating abortion, which could conceivably be characterized as a matter of
"private" rather than "public" concern. Courts addressing self-enforcing tort
laws erroneously describe these laws as if they clearly fall into categories of
"private" tort legislation versus "public" criminal or regulatory law. Or, as noted
above, laws are characterized and divided by subject matter, as if family laws fall
obviously into a "private" category and almost any other subject matter of law
1 83
falls into a "public" category.
Although the dichotomy of "public" and "private" is conceptually
problematic, it is deeply embedded in our law. We recognize the difference
between state actors and private actors in many contexts. Constitutional law
embeds this dichotomy through the state action doctrine, which provides that
84
only public or governmental actors are subject to constitutional restrictions.1
Although these distinctions are not always clearly defined, due to the lack of a
coherent theoretical foundation for the public/private dichotomy, such a divide
does serve important institutional concerns, such as the separation of powers and
federalism concerns at play in the question of federal court jurisdiction to review
self-enforcing tort laws.' 85 The courts' concern with opening a floodgate of
lawsuits, to essentially allow individuals to use the federal judiciary to "survey
the statute books" of states, 186 is not unfounded if courts lack a coherent means
of distinguishing tort statutes that are "self-enforcing." Ultimately, courts are not
likely to jettison the public/private distinction because of concerns with too much
oversight by the judiciary, and particularly by the federal judiciary over state
187
government.
If the law is going to take this divide between public and private seriously,
however, courts should not simply allow facile manipulation of these distinctions
and permit state legislators' use of "private" torts to deny constitutional rights
while avoiding constitutional remedies. Utilizing a mechanical method of
analysis that completely excludes any law labeled as a "tort" law from
preenforcement review is not a workable approach given the problem of selfenforcing tort laws. Yet, due to the deeper conceptual difficulties with the
182. See Okin, supra note 181, at 1551-52 (arguing families are not unaffected by coercive laws);
Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism,and the Family,
115 HARV. L. REV. 948, 951 (2002) (arguing that historical view of Nineteenth Amendment shows
breakdown between categories of "private" sphere of family versus "public" sphere with respect to
women's rights).
183. Siegel, supra note 182, at 981-83.
184. Metzger, supra note 23, at 1400-02.
185. See id. at 1407-10, 1448 ("Doing away with the public-private divide, artifice though it may
be, would make every question of government policy a potential constitutional issue and thus
ultimately subject to judicial scrutiny and resolution. Judicial intrusiveness in the ordinary workings of
the political order would rise to the level of unbearability.").
186. Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 473 F. Supp. 560, 571 (S.D. Ohio 1979) (internal
quotation marks omitted), affd, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982).
187. See Metzger, supra note 23, at 1448 (arguing that, despite academic attacks on public-private
divide, Supreme Court will not jettison this dichotomy because of concerns about limits of federal
judicial role in our democracy).
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public/private dichotomy, a test that relies on that dichotomy will also fail. We
need not rely on or resolve the deep and thorny issues surrounding the
public/private divide in order to adequately address self-enforcing tort statutes,
however. Part IV proposes a new method that would allow for a more nuanced
consideration of self-enforcing tort legislation without opening the feared
floodgate to federal court review of all kinds of state tort statutes or delving into
the likely irresolvable controversies surrounding the public/private dichotomy.
IV. PIERCING THE VEIL OF "PRIVATE" RIGHTS OF ACION
To address the underlying concern of the courts regarding opening a
floodgate, and to solve the unique doctrinal problems raised by "self-enforcing"
tort statutes, this Article proposes two solutions. First, it proposes a new test for
ferreting out self-enforcing tort legislation that attacks fundamental
constitutional rights and subjecting only this narrow type of tort statute to
preenforcement judicial review. This new test will address the courts' floodgate
concerns without resorting to a public/private analysis. Second, it argues that the
appropriate defendants to a challenge to a self-enforcing tort law are the state
legislators who enact the law. Suing state legislators would solve the doctrinal
188
problems presented by both standing doctrine and Ex parte Young.
A.

A New Test for Self-Enforcing Tort Legislation

A better test for analyzing whether a particular tort law is "self-enforcing"
is to ask whether the tort statute has the effect of inhibiting constitutionally
protected conduct. Such an effect would occur where a reasonableperson would
not take the risk of engaging in the targeted conduct under the tort law's scheme of
liability. This test does not require courts to consider where a tort law falls on
"the continuum between public regulation and private action," or otherwise rely
on the public/private divide. 189 Rather, it focuses the court on the crucial
question for determining whether a tort law is self-enforcing: Does the law
impose such a high risk of a draconian penalty on constitutionally protected
conduct that it essentially bans that conduct? This new test is a means to an
end-using this test will allay courts' fears of opening a floodgate of challenges
to general tort laws. Under this new test, only self-enforcing tort laws, which
operate as a direct governmental prohibition on constitutionally protected
behavior without any enforcement by state or private parties, will be subject to
preenforcement review.
Furthermore, this effects test for self-enforcing tort laws could be limited to
established constitutional rights. 190 If courts are concerned with opening a
floodgate of lawsuits to general tort laws, the effects test could be limited to

188. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
189. Okpalobi v. Foster, 190 F.3d 337, 346 (5th Cir. 1999), rev'd en banc, 244 F.3d 405 (5th Cir.
2001).
190. Ex pane Young itself is not limited to protecting constitutional rights, but protects all federal
rights.
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protecting only fundamental rights or rights subject to heightened scrutiny by the
Supreme Court. This limit would prevent challenges to every tort law that would
be subject to a rational basis test. Courts should be less concerned with the
floodgate problem when fundamental rights are at stake. 191 When the effect of a
tort law is to chill the exercise of established constitutional rights, logic and
precedent dictate that federal courts step in and protect those rights.
With this limit, the proposed reasonable person test that focuses on the
effect of the challenged tort law has a number of advantages. From a practical
point of view, the reasonable person standard is already quite familiar to the
courts. In addition, using a reasonable person standard takes account of the fact
that some individuals may be less risk averse and may continue to engage in the
targeted conduct despite the threat of severe tort liability. Self-enforcing tort
statutes threaten constitutional rights because of the chilling effect they have on
constitutionally protected conduct. Even if a few risk-taking individuals might
still engage in the targeted activity, evidence that the challenged tort law would
chill the average, risk-averse individual from exercising his or her constitutional
rights is sufficient to show a constitutional injury.192 Using this effects test thus
takes account of the fact that self-enforcing tort statutes essentially achieve the
same result as a criminal or regulatory fine, in that they chill the exercise of
constitutionally protected conduct, without entering into a vague analysis
regarding whether the nature of the tort law is "public" or "private." Finally, this
"effects on a reasonable person" test addresses the fact that no government
official or nongovernmental party needs to "enforce" the tort statute by filing
suit in order for the statute to violate constitutional rights, but it does not open
the door to preenforcement challenges to any and all tort laws. Only selfenforcing tort laws would be subject to preenforcement review under this test.
Utilizing this new method to test for a self-enforcing tort law would require
the following analysis. Usually, "[a]n allegation of an ongoing violation of federal
law ... is ordinarily sufficient" to establish jurisdiction. 93 When an individual
attempts to bring a preenforcement challenge to a tort law, she must allege that
the tort law targets a constitutional right and has a draconian effect on the
exercise of that right. In other words, the plaintiff must allege an ongoing
violation of a constitutional right by showing that the tort law's scheme of
liability chills the exercise of the right. Courts can analyze whether the tort
statute could have the effect of chilling constitutionally protected conduct at the

191. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 700-01 (1976) (describing floodgate concerns with civil rights
statutes but noting that concern should be lessened when fundamental rights are at stake).
192. See Ex pane Young, 209 U.S. at 165 (stating that individuals should not be left with
Hobson's choice because it will chill exercise of constitutional rights). In permitting suits against state
officers, Ex pane Young particularly emphasized the importance of allowing for preenforcement
review in federal court of unconstitutional state statutes. See id. ("To await proceedings against the
company in a state court, grounded upon disobedience of the act, and then, if necessary, obtain a
review in this court by writ of error to the highest state court, would place the company in peril of
large loss... if it should be finally determined that the act was valid. This risk the company ought not
to be required to take.").
193. Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 281 (1997).
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first stage solely for jurisdictional purposes and address the merits question at a
later stage for purposes of granting equitable relief.1 94
The precise contours of this effects test will depend on the constitutional
right at issue. A few examples can illustrate how the test could apply. Selfenforcing tort laws will largely arise in cases of strict liability tort statutes
directed at constitutionally protected conduct, although there are some cases
where even a negligence standard would be sufficiently chilling. 195 For example,
applying this test in the abortion context means that state tort statutes that create
strict liability for the provision of abortion services would likely be subject to
preenforcement review in federal courts.1 96 The Supreme Court has recognized
that strict liability with respect to abortion services can violate the right by
1 97
chilling the provision of abortions. In Colautti v. Franklin,
the Court held that,
although states may punish performance of an abortion after viability, states
cannot do so by attaching strict liability to determinations of viability. 198 The
Court stated that "the constitutionality of a vague statutory standard is closely
related to whether that standard incorporates a requirement of mens rea."1 99 The
Court struck down the statute on vagueness grounds and also noted that such a
statute could have "a profound chilling effect on the willingness of physicians to
200
perform abortions near the point of viability."
When considering the constitutionality of statutes regulating abortion,
constitutional concerns are generally raised by laws that lack an element of
intent, which is necessary to protect physicians who perform abortions with due

194. This may seem like a redundant analysis. If the court agrees that the plaintiff has made
sufficient allegations that the tort statute has the effect of chilling constitutionally protected conduct at
the jurisdictional stage, it is likely to then conclude that the tort law violates constitutional rights at the
merits stage. Nevertheless, courts engage in a kind of redundant analysis of constitutional claims at an
early, jurisdictional stage of litigation in other contexts as well, such as in addressing claims of qualified
immunity. See, e.g., Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001.) (holding that in analyzing claims of
qualified immunity, courts should first address whether factual record shows violation of constitutional
right before analyzing whether qualified immunity applies; if immunity does not apply, then court
should address "merits" of constitutional claim). One basic idea behind qualified immunity is that
when state officials knowingly violate clearly established constitutional rights, their actions should be
subject to suit. Similarly, when state legislators knowingly attack established constitutional rights
through self-enforcing tort laws, their actions should be subject to suit.
195. See infra notes 203-04 discussing strict liability in tort. See also A.J. Stone, III, Comment,
Consti-Tortion: Tort Law as an End-Run Around Abortion Rights After Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
8 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 471, 513 (2000) (arguing that even tort statutes based on
negligence, such as negligent infliction of emotional distress, could chill provision of abortions in
certain cases).
196. For example, strict liability provisions regarding parental consent laws could be selfenforcing tort statutes. See Quinn, supra note 160, at 324-25 (arguing strict liability for failing to notify
parent would unconstitutionally "chill the willingness of abortion providers to perform abortions").
197. 439 U.S. 379 (1979).
198. Colautti,439 U.S. at 396.
199. Id.
200. Id.
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care and in good faith from civil liability. 2° 1 Thus, a tort law that requires
physicians to provide abortions with due care, or that defines the standard of
care more specifically, would not be "self-enforcing" as defined here. A
reasonable person would not be chilled from providing abortion services when a
tort law has an established standard of care that allows the doctor to avoid
liability. Therefore, such a tort law would not be subject to preenforcement
review.
The First Amendment provides another example of how the effects test can
apply to private tort statutes. In Texas v. Johnson,2 2 the Supreme Court
famously held that burning the United States flag is a form of expression
protected by the First Amendment and thus cannot be subjected to a criminal
ban. 203 Suppose that, in response to this decision, hypothetical State X
promulgates a tort statute creating a private cause of action related to flag
burning. The statute provides that any person who burns the flag of the United
States on public property (such as a public sidewalk) is strictly liable to an
individual who personally suffers damages as a result, including damages for
emotional distress. Furthermore, assumption of risk or consent is not a defense
to liability. In other words, State X's statute creates a private cause of action for
damages against an individual who publicly burns the flag and thereby offends
other individuals who witness the event. If a plaintiff could show that the threat
of such a lawsuit would chill the actions of a reasonable person who wished to
express their First Amendment rights by flag burning-that the effect of the law
is that a reasonable person would not risk burning the flag in public-the tort
law is self-enforcing. In essence, the state has created a tort statute that will
override the Supreme Court's controversial decision in Johnson and ban the
burning of the flag.
Similarly, suppose that pro-choice legislators wish to override the Supreme
Court's protection of pro-life demonstrators' free speech rights. For example, in
Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, 2°4 the Supreme Court
held that a court-ordered "floating" buffer zone, which required pro-life
protestors to stay fifteen feet away from people and vehicles entering and
leaving an abortion clinic, violated the First Amendment. 20 5 State legislators who
disagree with this holding could promulgate a "private" damages statute granting

201. E.g., Okpalobi v. Foster, 190 F.3d 337, 360 (5th Cir. 1999) (invalidating abortion statute
because strict liability made it possible for physicians performing legal procedures in good faith to be
liable for accidental violations), rev'd en banc, 244 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2001); Summit Med. Assocs., P.C.
v. James, 984 F. Supp. 1404, 1447 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (cautioning "perils of strict liability" and holding
"where, as here, the specter of medical expert disagreement conjoins with a statute imposing strict
criminal and civil liability for an erroneous medical determination, the result could very well be 'a
profound chilling effect on the willingness of physicians to perform abortions'' (quoting Colautti,439
U.S. at 396)).
202. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
203. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 420; see also United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 318-19 (1990)
(striking down federal ban on flag burning as violation of First Amendment).
204. 519 U.S. 357 (1997).
205. Schenck, 519 U.S. at 377.
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a cause of action to abortion clinic patients and employees against protestors for
intentional infliction of emotional distress if the protestors come within fifteen
feet of people entering and leaving the clinic. Perhaps some protestors would still
engage in close contact, but the effect of such a tort law on a reasonable person
would be to maintain a fifteen foot distance when protesting outside abortion
clinics rather than risk the costs of defending and potential liability from a tort
suit.
Another useful hypothetical is the case of defamation laws. In New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan,2°6 the Supreme Court held that the common law of libel is
a "state action" that must comport with First Amendment requirements, and in
particular held that state libel law could not impose liability without fault.20 7 The
Court stated that although an action for defamation is a "civil lawsuit between
private parties, the Alabama courts have applied a state rule of law which
[allegedly] ...impose[s] invalid restrictions on their constitutional freedoms ....
It matters not that the law has been applied in a civil action and that it is
2 8
common law only...". 0
That case rose to the Supreme Court through a private lawsuit initiated in
state court. 20 9 Suppose, however, a state legislature now decides that it disagrees
with the Supreme Court's decision in Sullivan and promulgates a new libel law
ignoring the First Amendment requirements set forth by the Supreme Court.
The mere existence of a strict liability tort statute regulating defamation would
chill the exercise of First Amendment rights, as explained by the Court in
Sullivan.210 Thus, the effects test would be met-if the effect of the tort law is to
immediately chill constitutionally protected conduct, without any enforcement
through a tort lawsuit, courts should have preenforcement jurisdiction to review
it.
How this "effects" test with respect to state tort laws would play out beyond
the First Amendment and abortion contexts is not quite as clear. Any tort law
that has the effect of violating fundamental constitutional rights would have to
do so by chilling protected conduct through the threat of potentially catastrophic
liability. The Supreme Court has explicitly recognized protection against laws
that chill the exercise of fundamental rights in First Amendment speech and
association cases and abortion cases. 2t1 The analysis could work in other contexts
as well, however.

206. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
207. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 265; see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974) (holding
that "so long as [state libel statutes] do not impose liability without fault, the States may define for
themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood
injurious to a private individual").
208. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 265.
209. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 144 So. 2d 25 (Ala. 1962).
210. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
211. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 396 (1979) (invalidating statute that "could have a
profound chilling effect on the willingness of physicians to perform abortions near the point of
viability"); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 154-55 (1959) (invalidating statute imposing strict liability
for possession of obscene material due to "inhibitory effect" on selling books that were not obscene);
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Suppose for a moment that the Supreme Court declares that state bans on
same-sex marriage violate the Equal Protection Clause. 212 Therefore, all states
must allow gay and lesbian couples to submit marriage licenses in the same
manner as heterosexual couples. In response, an anti-same-sex marriage state
enacts a tort law providing a cause of action for emotional distress damages to
the parents of any same-sex couple against the minister or other functionary who
signs the marriage license and eliminates consent of the couple as a defense.
Because it is a privately enforced tort law, under Okpalobi no preenforcement
judicial review would be allowed. Under the effects on a reasonable person test,
however, a plaintiff could very likely show that the effect of the tort law is to
severely restrict access to same-sex marriages in violation of the hypothetical
Supreme Court ruling. Because a reasonable person would not be willing to sign
a marriage license under the threat of strict liability created by this hypothetical
tort statute, the law should be subject to preenforcement review.
Although using this proposed test to define and ferret out self-enforcing tort
laws will provide courts with a mechanism for avoiding the floodgate problem,
there are a number of potential difficulties with using an effects test. First, as
mentioned already, it may be difficult to apply the effects test when analyzing
tort legislation outside the First Amendment and abortion contexts, where courts
have already acknowledged constitutional problems with laws that chill the
exercise of those rights. Second, injured parties may also face a heavy
evidentiary burden in establishing that a tort law has the immediate and ongoing
effect of violating their constitutional rights. How draconian must the law be for
a court to find that the liability potential of a tort statute makes it too "chilling"?
For example, what if the Okpalobi v. Foster213 statute had been written to limit
liability in each case to $100? Such a statute would likely make abortions more
expensive but perhaps not prohibitively so, in which case it could be difficult for
plaintiffs to prove that the law would have the effect of placing a "substantial
obstacle" in the path of women seeking abortions. 214 Furthermore, how courts
define a "chilling" effect can be very malleable. 215 Finally, the Supreme Court

Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195 (1952) (invalidating statute requiring teachers to take oath

swearing they had not been members of certain organizations as restriction that engendered "caution
and timidity in their associations by potential teachers"); Michaels, supra note 160, at 867-77 (noting
courts have prohibited strict liability in context of free speech, association, and abortion due to chilling
effects and arguing that whenever underlying act cannot be criminalized, strict liability should be
unconstitutional (citing United States v. X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. 64 (1994))); Quinn, supra note
160, at 324-25 (arguing that strict liability in parental consent laws is unconstitutional).
212. The model for this hypothetical is Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), the landmark case
declaring that racially based restraints on marriage violate the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
213. 244 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2001).
214. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) (holding that law that has
"the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a
nonviable fetus" constitutes undue and therefore unconstitutional burden on woman's ight to decide
whether to have abortion). The undue burden test established by Casey is an example of an effects test
that is difficult to apply because it so fact based and changeable.
215. See Michaels, supra note 160, at 890-91 (noting pliability of chilling effect standard).
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generally disfavors effects tests due to the problem that many statutes have
"incidental effects" on fundamental rights.21 6 Professor Dorf has argued that the
Supreme Court should, and in fact largely does, only scrutinize laws with
217
incidental effects when they place a substantialburden on fundamental rights.
Because of the difficulty with defining how to limit incidental burdens on
fundamental rights, however, an effects test is easily subject to manipulation and
218
may not capture all cases that it should.
Arguably, courts could use a purpose test to determine whether a tort law is
actually a guise for legislators to attack fundamental rights. 2 19 The Louisiana law
at issue in Okpalobi implicitly evinces a purpose to violate abortion rights, as
well as having the effect of violating the right. Yet, proving legislative purpose is
often extremely difficult. Courts are reluctant to infer a "bad" intent on the part
of legislatures. 220 In the context of equal protection analysis, where the Court
does require proof of "bad" purpose on the part of legislatures to establish a
claim of discrimination based on race or gender, plaintiffs have had great
difficulty proving their claims. 221 In addition, the effects test used here can also
be understood as a surrogate for a purpose test in analyzing tort statutes. 222 If the
effect of the tort law is that a reasonable person would not engage in the
constitutionally protected conduct subject to liability, it is likely that the
legislature's purpose in enacting the law was to chill the conduct at issue by
styling the regulation as "private" tort legislation in order to evade judicial
review.
216. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54,
85-86 (1997) (stating that Supreme Court is wary of effects tests because "the Justices believe that for
courts to invalidate every governmental act that incidentally burdens constitutional rights ... would
infringe too far on powers that must, as a matter of good sense, be vested in government").
217. See Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on FundamentalRights, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1175,
1179 (1996) (describing Supreme Court's reluctance to scrutinize laws that have incidental burdens on
constitutional rights but arguing that laws that have incidental effect of substantially burdening
fundamental rights should be subject to heightened scrutiny).
218. See Fallon, supra note 216, at 85-86 (explaining Supreme Court is wary of effects test
because it allows judges unfettered discretion and yields unpredictable results).
219. See Note, After Ayotte: The Need to Defend Abortion Rights with Renewed "Purpose," 119
HARV. L. REV. 2552, 2569 (2006) (arguing improper legislative motive taints entire statute, which must
therefore be held invalid).
220. See Lawrence G. Sager, Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to
Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 23 (1981) (noting difficulty of
proving legislative intent); Laurence H. Tribe, Jurisdictional Gerrymandering: Zoning Disfavored
Rights Out of the FederalCourts, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 129, 150 (1981) (arguing that "one need
not show intent to deter or penalize exercise of a right so long as one can show that a law's effect is to
withhold ordinary levels of protection with respect to that right").
221. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (holding that disproportionate racial
impact of facially race-neutral statute does not prove invidious discrimination based on race or trigger
strict scrutiny); Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 355 (1987) (criticizing purpose requirement in equal
protection analysis).
222. Fallon, supra note 216, at 94 (arguing that "effects-based tests can reasonably be viewed as
surrogates for purpose tests" and noting evidentiary and institutional difficulties with proving that
legislature acted with improper motive).
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Despite these potential difficulties with applying an effects test, focusing on
the effects of a tort statute on constitutional rights is still a better method for
defining a tort statute as "self-enforcing" than relying on a public/private
analysis. The effects test at least provides less conceptually problematic grounds
to narrow preenforcement review of tort statutes. When this effects test
establishes that a tort law is self-enforcing, courts should recognize that the mere
enactment of the tort statute is government prohibition of the exercise of
fundamental rights. Injured parties should be permitted to seek declaratory relief
against the statute, as they would be if the law was not disguised as a privately
enforced tort statute.
B. Who Can You Sue? Applying the New Approach to Sue Legislativeand
Executive Officials
Using the "effects on a reasonable person" test for ferreting out selfenforcing tort laws addresses the courts' underlying fear of opening a floodgate
to preenforcement challenges to all kinds of state tort laws. Once courts
recognize that, although styled as a privately enforced tort statute, a selfenforcing tort law has the same chilling effect on constitutional rights as a
publicly enforced statute, then logic and precedent dictate preenforcement
review. Ex parte Young long ago established that state officials cannot punish the
exercise of constitutional rights without their actions being subject to federal
court review. 223 Simply because state legislators have now found a way to
camouflage their punishment of constitutional conduct through tort remedies is
no reason to reject the precedent set by Ex parte Young. Given that a selfenforcing tort law operates in effect like a criminal or regulatory law, Ex parte
Young establishes that there ought to be a state official to sue in order to protect
constitutional rights. Nevertheless, courts must still address the doctrinal
problem presented by standing-who can you sue?
This Part argues that the proper parties to sue are the individual state
legislative actors who vote to enact the self-enforcing tort law. Every "public
law" statute basically involves three governmental actors: legislative officials
who draft and promulgate the law, executive officials who enforce the law, and
judicial officials who review the law. 224 Self-enforcing tort laws are attempts by
legislators to arrogate the power of the executive to themselves-to assume the
role of enforcer and thereby also evade the judicial branch. Based on the
argument that self-enforcing tort statutes are not really "privately" enforced, this
Part proposes that these laws are in fact publicly "enforced" by state legislators
merely by their enactment. Through self-enforcing tort laws, state legislators
have found a clever way to enforce their enactments without any collaboration
with the executive or the judiciary. Once courts recognize that self-enforcing tort
statutes are publicly enforced by legislators rather than executive officials, the

223. Ex ParteYoung, 209 U.S. 123, 145 (1908).

224. Of course, with respect to regulatory laws, administrative agencies may be charged with all
three functions.
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doctrinal solution is relatively straightforward-sue the individual legislators
who enacted the law.
This Part proceeds in three parts. First, it analyzes the "causation" problem
of self-enforcing tort laws and argues that a suit against the officials who enacted
the challenged law would solve the puzzle presented by standing. Second, it
argues that those courts that relied on Ex parte Young as a bar to suit
erroneously interpreted the Ex parte Young doctrine, and the reasoning behind
Ex parte Young further supports allowing suit against legislative officials in order
to test the constitutionality of a self-enforcing tort law. Third, it addresses the
potential hurdle of legislative immunity and argues that the common law
doctrine of legislative immunity should not apply to suits against legislative
officials when challenging the enactment of self-enforcing tort laws.
1.

Standing to Challenge Legislative Actions

Although a few courts relied on the Eleventh Amendment and Ex parte
Young test as a bar to preenforcement challenges to tort laws, most courts have
concluded that standing is the primary hurdle, particularly since justiciability
issues are usually decided prior to affirmative defenses such as immunity. 225 As
explained in Part II, standing has three elements that plaintiffs must establish:
injury, causation, and redressability.
Article III standing is one of the most confused and criticized areas of
federal courts doctrine. Many courts and commentators have attacked the
inconsistency in application of standing rules.226 A number of scholars have
argued that standing doctrine is easily manipulated depending on how the injury
is characterized and whether the court wishes to reach the merits. 227 Scholars
have also criticized the use of an "autonomous" causation element in standing
doctrine, as compared to a previous focus on causation and redressability as a
single, overlapping inquiry. 228 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has reiterated
229
that causation is a separate inquiry and a separate bar to jurisdiction.
225. E.g., Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405, 424-29 (5th Cir. 2001), rev'd en banc, 244 F.3d 405
(5th Cir. 2001); Summit Med. Assocs., P.C. v. Pryor, 180 F.3d 1326, 1329 (11th Cir. 1999); see also Scott
v. Taylor, 405 F.3d 1251, 1258-59 (11th Cit. 2005) (arguing standing should be determined first as
jurisdictional matter, prior to determining claims of immunity).
226. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982) ("We need not mince words when we say that the concept of 'Art. III
standing' has not been defined with complete consistency in all of the various cases decided by this
Court .... "); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability,Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes on
the Jurisprudenceof Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 42 (1984) (critiquing standing doctrine on ground
that, inter alia, as applied it unduly prevents people with serious injuries from obtaining a judicial
remedy).
227. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 100 (1985) (examining Supreme
Court cases on standing and concluding that Court's view of merits often dictate standing
determinations); Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatizationof Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REv.
1432, 1464-66 (1988) (stating that causation determinations often depend on how injury is
characterized).
228. Scholars have criticized the causation element of standing as particularly manipulable and
used as a guise for disfavor of the merits. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 58, at 424-34 (criticizing use of
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Of course, the difficult question faced by the courts that have addressed
self-enforcing tort statutes is the causation element. The courts that have
considered the standing question in this context have agreed that self-enforcing
tort statutes create an ongoing injury. 230 Furthermore, the redressability
requirement, which focuses on whether the court's action would relieve a
plaintiff's injury, can be satisfied by declaratory relief against the challenged tort
statute.231 The Okpalobi opinion was incorrect in holding that redressability
could not be met because the availability of declaratory relief would allow for
sufficient redress against the chilling effect of a self-enforcing tort law. 232 The
availability of declaratory relief still does not solve the problem of causation,
however. Although the Declaratory Judgment Act provides an alternative
mechanism of preenforcement relief, it does not change the requirements of
standing-injury, causation, and redressability must still be established. 233 As the
Okpalobi court opined, although it does not "challenge that the plaintiffs are
suffering a threatened injury," the injury alleged "is not, and cannot possibly be,
caused by the defendants [Attorney General and Governor of Louisiana] ...that
is, these defendants cannot prevent purely private litigants from filing and
prosecuting a cause of action under Act 825."234
Due to the way in which standing doctrine has developed, the element of
causation mandates looking to enforcement. The crux of the dilemma presented
by self-enforcing tort legislation is that, at least as decided so far, there is no one
to sue. If no state official can enforce the tort law and thereby "cause" the injury,
and any private party who may in the future enforce the law is as yet unknown,
"autonomous causation requirement"); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Causation as a Standing Requirement: The
Unprincipled Use of Judicial Restraint, 69 KY. L.J. 185, 198-201 (1980) (noting causation element of
standing analysis to be "most troubling"); Sunstein, supra note 227, at 1459 ("[C]ausation
requirements are being used to do work that has little to do with causation.").
229. United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 743 (1995).
230. E.g., Okpalobi, 244 F.3d at 427 (recognizing that plaintiffs were suffering threatened injury);
Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 249 F.3d 603, 605 (7th Cir. 2001) (acknowledging implicitly that plaintiffs had an
injury).
231. Okpalobi, 244 F.3d at 435-36 (Benavides, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Although Judge Benavides's opinion explains how the plaintiffs established an injury in fact and
persuasively argues that a declaration of unconstitutionality would redress that injury, it never directly
addresses the problem of causation. Note that the Declaratory Judgment Act does not abolish the
requirements standing. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937); Okpalobi, 244
F.3d at 431 (Higginbotham, J., concurring) ("[Allthough the Declaratory Judgment Act 'brings to the
present a litigable controversy, which otherwise might only be tried in the future,' it does not jettison
traditional standing requirements." (quoting Societe de Conditionnement en Aluminium v. Hunter
Eng'g Co., 655 F.2d 938, 943 (9th Cir. 1981))).
232. See supra Part II.B discussing the Summit and Hope Clinic cases.
233. See supra Part II.A for a discussion of standing and declaratory relief. See also Keene Corp.
v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("The standard for finding a justiciable
,case or controversy' in a declaratory judgment action is no less demanding than the standard in any
other type of action."); N. Va. Women's Med. Ctr. v. Balch, 617 F.2d 1045, 1049 (4th Cir. 1980)
(finding no case or controversy for declaratory relief against judges who acquitted criminal defendants
of criminal trespass outside abortion clinic on grounds that defendants believed trespass was necessary
to save lives and that law permitting abortions was unconstitutional).
234. Okpalobi, 244 F.3d at 427.
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there is seemingly no one to bring to court in a preenforcement suit. Most
disturbingly, a self-enforcing tort law is likely never to be "enforced" by a private
party because its self-enforcing nature could prevent anyone from engaging in
the targeted conduct as long as the law is on the books. Causation thus seems to
present an insurmountable hurdle to a preenforcement challenge to a tort law.
Yet, to simply hold that privately enforced tort laws categorically never
meet Article III standing requirements would allow state legislators to cloak
unconstitutional regulatory actions in tort garb and thereby insulate such actions
from constitutional review. Looking for "causation" by tracing the injury from
the challenged statute to potential future "enforcement" by tort plaintiffs, where
no enforcement is necessary to achieve the constitutional injury, makes little
235
sense.
Instead, the injury of self-enforcing tort laws traces back to the legislators
that enacted the law. Because no lawsuit or prosecution is needed to "enforce" a
self-enforcing tort law, the mere enactment of such legislation is an enforcement
action, so to speak. 236 The "enforcement" is embedded in the tort law itself. The
officials who enact a self-enforcing tort statute "cause" the injury to the relevant
individuals (i.e., the doctors and their patients in Okpalobi) simply by their
vote. 237 In essence, state legislators have assumed the role of enforcer
traditionally left to executive officials by enacting self-enforcing tort laws.
Instead of having the structure that current law assumes is standard-three

235. The few other commentators to have addressed self-enforcing tort laws have argued
essentially for an exception to the causation element of standing. See Achilles, supra note 124, at 87475 (arguing that Okpalobi court should have relaxed standing requirements); Borgmann, supra note
167, at 776-80 (reasoning that self-executing tort statutes cause harm when enacted, not just when
enforced). Many critics have noted that the Supreme Court has utilized expansive interpretations, or
arguably outright manipulation, of elements of standing doctrine to allow federal courts to either
address or avoid the merits of constitutional claims. See supra note 228 for sources criticizing use of
causation element to avoid addressing merits. Therefore, one route to addressing self-enforcing tort
laws is to tweak standing doctrine in this context, as the Court has in other contexts. Yet, because
Article III standing is a constitutionally based jurisdictional requirement, it is generally difficult to
argue for an exception to the rules of standing. Lower federal courts are understandably reluctant to
simply create an exception to an established constitutional rule for asserting jurisdiction, which may
explain why courts have firmly rejected this approach. On the other hand, courts may be more willing
to tweak the common law doctrine of legislative immunity, as discussed in detail infra Part IV.B.3.a.
Unlike standing, legislative immunity is nonconstitutional and nonjurisdictional-it is an affirmative
defense. Furthermore, proposals to create an exception to standing rules do not answer the underlying
concern of the courts of opening a floodgate of challenges to state tort laws. If the general duty to
uphold or defend state legislation usually assigned to Attorneys General and Governors is sufficient to
satisfy standing, then any state law can be challenged by suing those two officials. Courts need some
method for limiting judicial review to self-enforcing tort legislation, such as the "effects on a
reasonable person" test proposed in this Article.
236. See Nova Health Sys. v. Gandy, 416 F.3d 1149, 1157 (10th Cir. 2005) (stating that Nova's
requirement of parental consent in all cases "was a response to the enactment of" challenged statute);
Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 473 F. Supp. 560, 571 (S.D. Ohio 1979), affd, 679 F.2d 656
(6th Cir. 1982) (describing self-enforcing law as where "enforcement arguably commenced against
plaintiffs upon its enactment").
237. See Okpalobi, 244 F.3d at 435 (Benavides, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(arguing that causation of injury is "directly traceable to the promulgation of [the] Act").
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separate actors engaged in three separate functions of legislation, enforcement,
and judicial review-self-enforcing tort statutes bury the enforcement function in
legislation and thereby have also evaded judicial review. Filing suit against the
state legislators who enact self-enforcing tort laws would solve the causation
problem because the injury caused by the statute flows directly from the actions
of the legislators. Furthermore, establishing standing to sue the legislators would
bring these laws in line with the logic and precedent of Ex parte Young by
allowing for preenforcement judicial review.
A number of courts have held that suits against individual state
legislators for action taken in their legislative capacity are justiciable-meaning
that the requirements of standing can be met. In addition, courts have
specifically rejected the argument that constitutional challenges to legislative
actions by state legislators are nonjusticiable political questions. 238 One court

stated that although "the [state] Senators may deem it inappropriate to find
themselves as defendants in a federal court, the overriding fact is that the
Fourteenth Amendment and § 1983 were intended to radically alter the
239
distribution of power between the federal government and the states.
Accordingly, the court held that "although fully cognizant of the respect due
members of a state legislature when they act within the sphere of legitimate state
interests, we reject the Senators' arguments that.., claims against them are not
240
justiciable."
Critics of this position might argue that allowing a challenge to a privately
enforced tort statute against state legislators to test the constitutionality of the
statute presents the paradigmatic "advisory opinion" and violates the separation
of powers principles standing doctrine is designed to protect. The requirement of
causation is "a means of ensuring against certain sorts of actions against
241
governmental defendants, actions that raise serious questions of judicial role."
A number of courts that denied standing to challenge tort laws have pointed out
"the very real problem of state officers being named as essentially symbolic
defendants" who do not have a real stake in the defense. 242 This problem is why
the effects test proposed in this Article is crucial. The effects test will ensure that
state legislators will only be subject to suit when they enact self-enforcing tort
laws and are thereby assuming the executive role as enforcers. Legislators who

238. See, e.g., Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 131 (1966) (holding that Court had jurisdiction to

review whether Georgia House of Representatives deprived one of its members of his constitutional
rights); Larsen v. Senate of the Commonwealth of Pa., 152 F.3d 240, 246-47 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding
that political question doctrine is concerned with separation of powers and does not apply to federal
judicial review of state legislative action); Parker v. Merlino, 646 F.2d 848, 852 (3d Cir. 1981) (holding
that group of New Jersey state Senators could file § 1983 claim against other state Senators); Davids v.
Akers, 549 F.2d 120, 123 (9th Cir. 1977) (determining that, although idea of federal court meddling in
internal affairs of state legislature is "startlingly unattractive," constitutional claims against Speaker of
Arizona House of Representatives are justiciable as there are no separation of powers concerns).
239. Larsen, 152 F.3d at 248.
240. Id.
241. Sunstein, supra note 227, at 1459.
242. NAACP v. California, 511 F. Supp. 1244, 1256 (E.D. Cal. 1981).
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vote for such a law have a strong stake in defending its constitutionalityprobably the strongest stake. When the effect of a tort law is to prevent a
reasonable person from engaging in constitutionally protected conduct,
legislators should be subject to suit. Allowing for judicial review of self-enforcing
tort legislation is the only way to ensure that state legislators do not punish
243
constitutional rights with impunity.

243. If we are to focus on "enfucement" as the key issue for purposes of standing, there is
arguably official enforcement of a tort statute at some point-that is through the state courts. Even the
Okpalobi panel opinion noted:
Act 825, on its face, does not direct the State or its officers to do anything. Rather, the
Act envisions private law suits brought by abortion patients against abortion providers in
state courts, leaving the judicial branch of the state government with the most direct
involvement in enforcing the Act. Therefore, one argument goes, the plaintiffs' quarrel is
with Louisiana courts rather than the Governor.
Okpalobi v. Foster, 190 F.3d 337, 346 (5th Cir. 1999), rev'd en banc, 244 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2001). This
suggests the possibility that, to solve the dilemma caused by the "causation" element of standing,
plaintiffs could name state court judges or court clerks who enter judicial orders as defendants in a suit
for prospective relief against a self-enforcing tort statute. Lawsuits for prospective relief against judges
have been allowed to proceed only when judges are sued in their administrative or enforcement
capacity, however. See Listenbee ex rel. Brandon E. v. Reynolds, 201 F.3d 194, 199 (3d Cir. 2000)
(denying relief because plaintiffs sued judges, "who are neutral adjudicators and not enforcers or
administrators"). The reason is not because of judicial immunity, but because of standing. Although
judges are not entitled to official immunity from suits for declaratory relief, see Pulliam v. Allen, 466
U.S. 522, 541-42 (1984); Reynolds, 201 F.3d at 198, courts have found nonadministrative cases against
judges to be nonjusticiable because of lack of standing or barred by the Eleventh Amendment. There
are no courts that have allowed a challenge to a state statute to proceed against a state court judge on
the ground that the judge, simply by adjudicating a case pursuant to that law at some future point, will
"enforce" the law and thereby "cause" injury. The argument is that the judges are not the cause of
plaintiff's injury under the statute simply by being the neutral adjudicator of a potential lawsuit by a
private party. See, e.g., Reynolds, 201 F.3d at 199 (holding that declaratory relief against judges still
permitted but judges were not proper defendants because they were neutral adjudicators and not
enforcers or administrators); Shalaby v. Freedman, No. C 03-03358 CRB, 2003 WL 22416492, at *4
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2003) ("It is thus unsurprising that Shalaby has not cited a single case, and the
Court has not located any, in which a plaintiff challenging a civil statute enforced by private litigants
was able to avoid the Eleventh Amendment bar by suing the judges of a state."); Falwell v. City of
Lynchburg, 198 F. Supp. 2d 765, 778 (W.D. Va. 2002) ("This job does not turn the judge into either an
'enforcer' of the law or a proper party the Plaintiffs could sue after suffering an adverse decision.
Under this logic, any Plaintiff who lost any case in any circuit court of the Commonwealth or was
burdened by any particular law in the Virginia code, could sue the circuit judge in the plaintiff's
jurisdiction.").
Similarly, court clerks or other judicial personnel are not "enforcers" of a state tort law and
thereby the cause of a plaintiff's injury simply by entering court orders as issued by the judge.
Causation is a difficult hurdle in a suit against court personnel challenging a state statute primarily
because the chain of causation is too attenuated. A judge would not "enforce" the challenged tort
statute unless an independent third party actually filed suit under the law. A third party's independent
actions can break the chain of causation for standing purposes. See Ass'n for Children for
Enforcement of Support, inc. v. Conger, 899 F.2d 1164, 1166 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that plaintiff,
who had been told by attorney for one party to child support hearing that she could not attend
hearing, lacked standing to sue state court judge for determination of her right to attend: "the injury
resulted not from Judge Conger's conduct, but from the conduct of an independent third party"). For
example, the Fifth Circuit held that a class of chancery judges and court clerks lacked a sufficient
personal stake to meet standing in a case challenging the constitutionality of involuntary civil
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The Principle of Exparte Young

Ex parte Young's connection requirement mimics the causation element of
Article III standing. Both look for the state official who will enforce the
challenged state law, although for different reasons. Standing looks to
enforcement through the element of causation to protect separation of powers
by ensuring a concrete controversy between the plaintiff and defendant. Ex parte
Young looks at enforcement through the requirement of "some connection" out
of concern for federalism principles (i.e., encroachment on state prerogatives);
arguably, if any state official can be named in a suit, the "fictional" line that Ex
parte Young draws dissolves entirely. 244 Because the two inquiries are
overlapping, suing state legislators for enacting self-enforcing tort laws would
also resolve the "connection" requirement of Ex parte Young under the same
theory, i.e., that state legislators are acting as enforcers of such laws.
This is not to suggest, however, that the courts that have relied on Ex parte
Young to bar preenforcement review of self-enforcing tort laws have been
correct in their analysis. This Part critiques courts' reliance on Ex parte Young to
reject review of self-enforcing tort laws and argues that the principles animating
Ex parte Young support allowing suit against the individual legislators who enact
a self-enforcing tort law. Ex parte Young sets a precedent for what courts should
be doing in the context of self-enforcing tort laws-ensuring judicial review in
order to protect constitutional rights.
The reasoning behind Ex Parte Young provides key support for federal
judicial review of self-enforcing tort laws. Although Ex parte Young went out of
its way to make clear that the Eleventh Amendment was not being sacrificed for
the sake of the Fourteenth Amendment, practically speaking Ex parte Young
effected a substantial limitation on state immunity from lawsuits challenging
commitment proceedings administered by them. Chancery Clerk v. Wallace, 646 F.2d 151, 159-60 (5th
Cir. 1981). The court did, however, grant leave to substitute as defendants state officials with executive
responsibility for defending the challenged procedures. ld.; see also Grant v. Johnson, 15 F.3d 146, 148
(9th Cir. 1994) (finding standing question uncertain and instead relying on implied limitation in § 1983,
stating that § 1983 does not "encompass suits against state judges acting in their adjudicative capacity"
because judge "has no stake in upholding statute: he is not the plaintiffs adversary").
The problems raised by a suit against state court judges to challenge a tort statute are analogous
to the problems with Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), which held that court enforcement of
racially restrictive covenants violated equal protection. Id. at 20. Shelley has long been criticized
because, under its reasoning, ultimately any private action would have to comport with constitutional
requirements. Private rights only have meaning if, eventually, they can be enforced in court. Arguably,
if court enforcement of general contract law is "state action," all private arrangements are essentially
subject to the Federal Constitution, thereby eviscerating the "state action" requirement. Although the
Supreme Court has never overruled Shelley, it has rarely relied on it to find state action. See, e.g.,
Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 445-46 (1970) (finding no state action when park was returned to
private ownership because original grantor had willed park for whites only, with right of reversion if
provision not followed).
244. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 157 (1908) ("In making an officer of the State a party
defendant in a suit to enjoin the enforcement of an act alleged to be unconstitutional, it is plain that
such officer must have some connection with the enforcement of the act, or else it is merely making
him a party as a representative of the state, and thereby attempting to make the state a party."
(emphasis added)).
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violations of federal law. 24 5 In permitting suits against state officers, Ex parte
Young emphasized the importance of allowing for a preenforcement federal
remedy against state statutes that violate the Constitution. Otherwise, injured
parties would have to make a "Hobson's choice" between violating state laws
and facing the risk of "enormous penalties" or else submitting to an
unconstitutional state law.246 Ex parte Young stressed that the doctrine's
"fiction" serves to protect the supremacy of federal law. 247 This underlying
concern for the protection of constitutional rights should animate current
interpretation of Exparte Young's doctrine.
By preventing preenforcement review of self-enforcing tort laws that
restrict abortion rights, proponents of such legislation blatantly flout
constitutional rights. Doctors and their patients are left to face the "Hobson's
choice" of either risking severe penalties for the exercise of constitutional rights
while awaiting a lawsuit from an unknown tort plaintiff, or complying with state
law directives by abandoning their constitutional rights. 2 48 Ex parte Young serves
precisely to avoid this dilemma. 249 Certainly, "the need to promote the
supremacy of federal law must be accommodated to the constitutional immunity
of the States." 250 But this is precisely the balance that Ex parte Young already
strikes, a balance that falls in favor of vindicating constitutional rights through
251
preenforcement judicial review.

245. See id. at 150 ("We may assume that each exists in full force, and that we must give to the
llth Amendment all the effect it naturally would have, without cutting it down or rendering its
meaning any more narrow than the language, fairly interpreted, would warrant.").
246. Id. at 165. The Supreme Court later explained that the state official need not already have
taken or even threatened to take action to enforce the challenged law before plaintiffs can file suit
pursuant to Ex parte Young. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 460-62 (1974) (holding that Younger
abstention doctrine, which instructs federal courts not to enjoin pending state prosecutions, does not
apply to federal declaratory action brought before state prosecution had commenced, noting that "a
refusal on the part of the federal courts to intervene ... may place the hapless plaintiff between the
Scylla of intentionally flouting state law and the Charybdis of foregoing what he believes to be
constitutionally protected activity").
247. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 144-45. Ex parte Young rested in part on the "superior authority
of that [Federal] Constitution" in holding that "[tihe state has no power to impart to [its officials] any
immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States." Id. at 160.
248. See, e.g., Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 381 (1992) ("When
enforcement actions are imminent ... there is no adequate remedy at law .... Like the plaintiff in
Young, then, respondents were faced with a Hobson's choice .... "); Okla. Operating Co. v. Love, 252
U.S. 331, 336-37 (1919) (explaining that without Ex parte Young exception only way to challenge state
statute would be to violate it and thereby risk suffering penalties).
249. See, e.g., Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405,448 (5th Cir. 2001) (Parker, J., dissenting) (stating
that Ex parte Young stands for principle "of permitting preenforcement officer suits to vindicate
federal rights and hold state officials responsible to the supreme authority of the United States"
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)), rev'd en banc, 244 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2001).
250. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105 (1984); see also Idaho v. Coeur
d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 270 (1997) ("Application of the Young exception must reflect a proper
understanding of its role in our federal system and respect for state courts ... ").
251. See TRIBE, supra note 58, at 566 ("That Young represents a balance of federal and state
interests does not mean the doctrine's application should be balanced against other factors in any
given case. Instead, Young's rule recognizing federal judicial power in suits against state officers to
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Thus, the Okpalobi plurality and other courts that have unduly narrowed
Ex parte Young to bar challenges to unconstitutional self-enforcing tort statutes
make a serious error. The holding in Okpalobi removes any incentives for state
legislatures to uphold federal law by removing the threat of judicial review. The
"fiction" created by Ex parte Young is precisely that-a fiction that suing the
state official involved in enforcement of the statute is not a suit against the state
itself. As Professor Monaghan has noted: "Everyone now recognizes that
nothing but a fiction is involved [in Ex parte Young], one designed, as the Court
subsequently recognized, 'to permit the federal courts to vindicate federal rights
and hold state officials responsible to the supreme authority of the United
States.' 252 The Okpalobi plurality deviates from the principles outlined in Ex
parte Young and elevates form over substance where it acknowledges that the
challenged law creates an ongoing injury to constitutional rights but refuses to
provide prospective relief against that injury.
Of course, one might argue that the entire area of Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence is an elevation of form over substance. 253 Perhaps the larger
question raised here is how does one coherently critique a fiction anyway? 254 The
best answer would seem to be to look at the purpose behind the fiction. Clearly,
the Court felt the need to draw some line in Ex parte Young in order to pay lip
service to the Eleventh Amendment and federalism concerns. If that line is
openly described as "fictional," there must be some "real" basis on which to
determine the extent of that fiction. That underlying basis is the need to make
constitutional rights meaningful by ensuring judicial review. When all

enjoin ongoing violations of federal law itself strikes the requisite balance between state and federal
interests." (internal quotations omitted)). Ex parte Young also emphasizes the need for a federal court
to address federal constitutional questions in a preenforcement challenge. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at
160; Coeurd'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 293. As Professor Richard Fallon has stated:
The case's doctrinal innovation lay in its authorization of an injunction to prevent a state's
attorney general from initiating a suit in state court, where federal rights at least in theory
would have been protected as fully as in federal court. The decision's plain policy was to
permit the vindication of federal rights in federal court, implicitly on the assumption that a
federal forum would ensure more effective vindication of federal constitutional claims.
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REV. 1141, 1197 (1988)
(footnote omitted). Similarly, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was meant
to give federal courts a preeminent role in enforcing constitutional rights. Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of
Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 502-03 (1982); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961).
252. Henry Paul Monaghan, The Sovereign Immunity "Exception," 110 HARV. L. REV. 102, 127
(1996) (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted). In addition, when placing limits on the Ex
parte Young doctrine, the Supreme Court has largely focused on the effects of the remedy on a state's
sovereign immunity. Thus, Ex parte Young cannot be used to expose states to retroactive monetary
relief or to quiet title to submerged lands. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 165; Edelman v. Jordan,
415 U.S. 651, 651 (1974). In contrast, the injunctive and declaratory relief requested by the plaintiffs in
Okpalobi and other similar cases is precisely the type of remedy envisioned by Ex parte Young.
253. See David P. Currie, Ex Parte Young After Seminole Tribe, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 547, 548
(1998) (arguing that Ex parte Young contravenes Hans's interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment
for "[one does not go to the trouble of amending the Constitution in order to alter the caption on the
complaint").
254. I thank Susan Frelich Appleton for raising this point.
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acknowledge that the starting point is a fiction, it seems absurd to elevate the
technicalities of the fiction over the principles on which the fiction was decided
in the first place. Courts that have relied on Ex parte Young's connection
requirement to prevent preenforcement review of self-enforcing tort laws have
simply ignored the purpose behind Ex parte Young's fiction. Rejecting a strict
reading of the Eleventh Amendment, Ex parte Young held that courts must
assert the power of judicial review when it is the only way to protect
constitutional rights. Ex parte Young can and should be read more broadly to
allow for preenforcement review of self-enforcing tort statutes to protect
constitutional rights.
Despite the Supreme Court's recent expansions of state sovereign immunity
under the Eleventh Amendment, the Court has not retrenched with respect to
the availability of Ex parte Young suits against individual state officers.255 To the
contrary, Ex parte Young remains a vital doctrine. 256 The Supreme Court has
255. The Court recently reaffirmed the holding in Ex parte Young in Verizon Maryland Inc. v.
Public Service Commission of Maryland, 535 U.S. 635 (2002). There the Court held that the Eleventh
Amendment presents no bar to suits against state officials as long as there is an allegation of a
violation of federal law. Id. at 645. Justice Scalia, writing for a unanimous Court, declared: "In
determining whether the doctrine of Ex parte Young avoids an Eleventh Amendment bar to suit, a
court need only conduct a 'straightforward inquiry into whether [the] complaint alleges an ongoing
violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective."' Id. (quoting Idaho v.
Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 296 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring)). The Supreme
Court's affirmation of Ex parte Young in Verizon Maryland strongly suggests that any narrowing of
the Ex parte Young doctrine is not imminent.
Several scholars have noted that rapid changes in Eleventh Amendment law have not affected the
availability of the Ex parte Young remedy. See Wayne L. Baker, Seminole Speaks to Sovereign
Immunity and Ex parte Young, 71 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 739, 766 (1997) (concluding that Seminole Tribe
has not changed the applicability of Ex parte Young); Monaghan, supra note 252, at 103 ("[L]ittle has
changed after the Seminole Tribe decision because the rule of Ex pane Young remains in full force....
In that sense, sovereign immunity has become a rare exception to the otherwise prevailing system of
state governmental accountability in federal court for violations of federal law, an exception many,
including this author, find difficult to justify."). One commentator goes so far as to state, "My message
is one of calm placidity: Not to worry; Ex pane Young is alive and well and living in the Supreme
Court." Currie, supra note 253, at 547.
256. Although two Rehnquist Court cases created narrow exceptions to the Ex parte Young
doctrine, the Court upheld Ex parte Young's basic principle in both cases. First, in Seminole Tribe of
Florida v. Florida,517 U.S. 44 (1990), the Court held that the Ex parte Young doctrine does not apply
to federal statutory rights "where Congress has prescribed a detailed remedial scheme for the
enforcement against a State of a statutorily created right." Id. at 74. Thus, the Court inferred
congressional intent to displace Ex parte Young as the remedy for violation of federal law. Seminole
Tribe has no effect on the availability of Ex parte Young to remedy violations of constitutional rights
because it only addresses statutory remedies, which can be altered by Congress. See Baker, supra note
255, at 766 ("[U]nlike the Court's Eleventh Amendment analysis, the opinion does little to change the
applicability of Ex parte Young, and Congress can easily empower future legislation by creating a
private right of action against state officials, notwithstanding a limited remedial scheme."); Currie,
supra note 253, at 550 (arguing that Seminole Tribe will have no effect on vindication of constitutional
rights pursuant to Ex pane Young); Monaghan, supra note 252, at 132 ("Seminole Tribe does not
disturb the doctrine of Young."). Furthermore, Seminole Tribe has been interpreted narrowly. See,
e.g., Verizon Maryland, 535 U.S. at 647 (holding that existence of statutory scheme did not foreclose
Ex parte Young remedy); Ellis v. Univ. of Kan. Med. Ctr., 163 F.3d 1186, 1197 (10th Cir. 1998)
(holding that Seminole Tribe does not bar claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985).
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continued to reiterate that the principle underlying Ex parte Young is
fundamental to the concept of federalism embodied in the Constitution. In fact,
the Court has emphasized the importance of Ex parte Young as an alternative to
suits against the state to remedy state violations of federal rights.257 A number of
scholars have argued that the Supreme Court's recent expansive Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence is more rhetorical than real, due to the availability of
the Ex parte Young remedy. 258 Of course, the Court's expansion of Eleventh
Amendment immunity also means that there will be increased pressure on Ex

Second, in Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997), the Court carved out a special
exception to Ex parte Young for suits to quiet title to submerged lands. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 125,
at 436; see also Elephant Butte Irrigation Dist. of N.M. v. Dep't of the Interior, 160 F.3d 602, 611-13
(10th Cir. 1998) (holding that Coeurd'Alene Tribe represents "the extreme and unusual case" in which
traditional Ex parte Young analysis does not apply). Although it created a new, narrow exception to
Ex parte Young in the Coeurd'Alene Tribe case, the Court also reaffirmed the validity of the Ex parte
Young doctrine, and in particular the vital purpose of Ex parte Young in effectuating the Supremacy
Clause. As Justice O'Connor stated in her concurrence in Coeur d'Alene Tribe: "We have frequently
acknowledged the importance of having federal courts open to enforce and interpret federal rights....
There is no need to call into question the importance of having federal courts interpret federal rightsparticularly as a means of serving a federal interest in uniformity ....
521 U.S. at 293 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). Furthermore, the majority emphasized that the Court "do[es] not, then, question the
continuing validity of the Ex parte Young doctrine." Id. at 269 (majority opinion). Thus, the Supreme
Court's Ex parte Young test remained "a straightforward inquiry into whether a complaint alleges an
ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective." Id. at 296
(O'Connor, J., concurring). In Coeur d'Alene Tribe, Justice Kennedy proposed an extreme narrowing
of Ex parte Young, but only Chief Justice Rehnquist joined Justice Kennedy's opinion with regard to
adopting a "case-by-case approach to the Young doctrine." Id. at 280 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Justice Kennedy argued that "[n]either in theory nor in practice has it been shown problematic to have
federal claims resolved in state courts." Id. at 274-75. Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Scalia and
Justice Thomas, explicitly rejected this analysis, stating that "[tihis approach unnecessarily
recharacterizes and narrows much of our Young jurisprudence." Coeurd'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 291
(O'Connor, J., concurring). The four dissenters also rejected Justice Kennedy's approach to Ex parte
Young but recognized that Justice O'Connor's concurrence was controlling because it rests on
narrower grounds. Id. at 298 (Souter, J., dissenting).
257. See Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 269 (majority opinion) ("We do not.., question the
continuing validity of the Ex parte Young doctrine."); Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985)
("Remedies designed to end a continuing violation of federal law are necessary to vindicate the
federal interest in assuring the supremacy of that law."); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman,
465 U.S. 89, 105 (1984) ("[T~he Young doctrine has been accepted as necessary to permit the federal
courts to vindicate federal rights and hold state officials responsible to 'the supreme authority of the
United States."' (quoting Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 160)).
258. See, e.g., John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84 VA.
L. REV. 47, 49 (1998) ("In almost every case where action against a state is barred by the Eleventh
Amendment, suit against a state officer is permitted under Section 1983."); Monaghan, supra note 252,
at 103 ("[L]ittle has changed after the Seminole Tribe decision because the rule of Ex parte Young
remains in full force."); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, What is Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 106 YALE
L.J. 1683. 1790 (1997) ("I conclude that as long as the Constitution continues to be interpreted to
authorize private suits against state officers who violate federal law, an interpretation of the
Constitution as barring private damage actions against the states themselves does not raise severe ruleof-law problems."). But see Hartley, supra note 56, at 399-402 (arguing that individual and official
capacity suits against state officers pursuant to Ex parte Young are insufficient remedy because of
doctrine of qualified immunity and that Ex parte Young does not close enforcement gap created by
Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence).
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parte Young as the only avenue to vindicate federal rights.25 9 Thus, it is more
important than ever that Ex parte Young be interpreted broadly, because in
many cases, it is the only available mechanism for subjecting state laws to federal
constitutional scrutiny.
The doctrinal confusion generated by Ex parte Young's "some connection"
requirement is due to the Supreme Court's failure to clarify two prior, conflicting
cases. Ex parte Young relied heavily on a prior case, Smyth v. Ames, 26° which
similarly held that a suit against individual state officers for the purpose of
preventing them, as officers of the state, from enforcing an unconstitutional
enactment was not a suit against a state within the meaning of the Eleventh
Amendment. 261 Ex parte Young explained that there was no special provision in
the statute at issue in Smyth imposing an enforcement duty on the Attorney
General, yet there the Court held that the Attorney General's broad powers
under state law were sufficient authority to enforce such laws and were therefore
' 262
a sufficient enforcement "connection."
The defendant in Ex parte Young objected that a Supreme Court decision
subsequent to Smyth, Fitts v. McGhee,263 limited this principle. 264 Fitts held that
in the absence of any "special relation" to the challenged statute on the part of
the defendant state official, the Eleventh Amendment bar could not be
avoided. 265 The Supreme Court in Ex parte Young specifically rejected the
"special relation" requirement of Fitts, however. 266 But rather than simply
overruling Fitts, the Supreme Court limited its holding on two grounds. First, the
Court soundly rejected Fitts's notion that a plaintiff should be content with the
option of first violating an unconstitutional state statute and then defending

259. Hartley, supra note 56, at 382-83.
260. 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
261. Smyth, 169 U.S. at 518-19.
262. Okpalobi v. Foster, 190 F.3d 337, 344 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at
154).

263. 172 U.S. 516 (1899).
264. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 156.
265. Fitts, 172 U.S. at 529-30. In Fins, the Alabama legislature fixed the rate of tolls to be charged
for crossing a certain bridge. Id. at 516. As a remedy for violation of the toll rate, the statute
authorized any person who paid a higher rate than the statutorily authorized toll to seek twenty dollars
in penalties. Id. The Supreme Court held that the Eleventh Amendment barred federal court review
of the statute. Id. at 532-33. The Court emphasized that the state officials in question "were not
expressly directed to see to [the statute's] enforcement." Id. at 530. Thus, the Court held that the suit
was in fact a suit against the state. Fitts, 172 U.S. at 530. The Court stated that to argue otherwise
would allow "the constitutionality of every act passed by the legislature [to] be tested by a suit against
the governor and the attorney general." Id.
266. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 156-57. The Court attempted to distinguish Fitts, noting that
"[n]o officer of the State had any official connection with the recovery of [any] penalties." Id. at 156.
Since the statute in Fitts
did not limit persons who could seek the twenty dollar penalty to private
persons, however, arguably, the Attorney General or Governor could have sought the penalty
pursuant to "general duties" under state law. See id. at 158 (recognizing that the Fitts requirement of
an officer being "specially charged" with enforcement is met where officer has general duty to enforce
all laws of state).
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herself in state court, at least where serious harm can occur in the interim.267
Second, the Court rejected the notion that the state official must be "specially
charged" with a duty to enforce the challenged statute. 268 Instead, the Court held
that the defendant state official need merely have "some connection," based on
state law generally, with the future enforcement or recovery of penalties under
the challenged statute.269 Although in Ex parte Young the Court departed from
Fitts's "close connection" or "special relation" requirement, it neither explicitly
overruled Fitts nor specified what "some connection" means. 270 Depending on
how one reads the Ex parte Young-Smyth-Fitts trilogy, courts have more or less
flexibility in finding a state defendant with "some connection" to a challenged
state law in order to ensure the vindication of constitutional rights. This tension
between Ex parte Young, Smyth, and Fitts with respect to the precise scope of
the "connection" requirement has led to much confusion among lower courts as
to the limits of Ex parte Young. 271 Although some courts have held that, in
certain circumstances, a general duty of the Attorney General or Governor
under state law to uphold and defend state legislation is sufficient to allow suit
under Ex parte Young, 272 other courts reject this approach entirely.2 73 Still, in

267. Id. at 163-65.
268. Id. at 157-58.
269. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 157-58.
270. See City of Altus v. Carr, 255 F. Supp. 828, 834-35 (W.D. Tex. 1966) (attempting to explain
relationship between Ex parte Young and Fitts); Monaghan, supra note 252, at 126 n.165 (noting that
Ex parte Young did not create doctrine of suits against state officials but "simply reconciled, or
rationalized, the Court's prior precedents").
271. As one court phrased the issue:
Courts have had considerable difficulty in coming to terms with this ["connection"
requirement] in cases where the requisite connection with enforcement allegedly arises by
virtue of general enforcement obligations attendant to particular state offices. This difficulty
is due in no small part to the Supreme Court's opinion in Ex parte Young....
This uncertainty is aggravated by the Supreme Court's discussion in Ex parte Young of
Smyth v. Ames... and Fitts v. McGhee ....
NAACP v. California, 511 F. Supp. 1244, 1251-52 (E.D. Cal. 1981) (citations omitted). In his dissent in
Ex parte Young, Justice Harlan noted that Fitts "is not overruled, but is, I fear, frittered away or put
out of sight by [the Ex parte Young majority's] unwarranted distinctions." Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at
193 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
272. See, e.g., Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012, 1015-16 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that, in civil
rights action seeking constitutionally sufficient indigent defense services, the Governor has sufficient
contacts with alleged unlawful statute because he is generally responsible for law enforcement); Rode
v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1208 (3d Cir. 1988) (permitting case to proceed against defendant
whose sole connection to challenged statute was general authority to uphold law, provided there was
"real, not ephemeral, likelihood or realistic potential that the connection will be employed against the
plaintiff's interests" (quoting Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 473 F. Supp. 560, 568 (S.D. Ohio
1979))); Allied Artists, 473 F. Supp. at 566, 570 (allowing suit based on Governor's general duty to
uphold state legislation where tort statute was "self-enforcing"), affd, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982);
Socialist Workers Party v. Rockefeller, 314 F. Supp. 984, 988 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (allowing suit against
Governor based on general obligation to take care that state laws are faithfully executed in challenge
to state election laws); cf Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 282 & n.14 (1986) (holding that Secretary of
State was responsible for "general supervision" of local school officials and could be enjoined under
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many of the cases in which courts have held that the Ex parte Young doctrine
does not apply because of an insufficient enforcement connection between the
named defendants and the challenged statute, the plaintiffs had merely named
the "wrong" state officials as defendants. The case could still move forward for
preenforcement review merely by naming as a defendant the official with the
proper "connection" as determined by the court. 27 4 In contrast, Okpalobi and
other courts leave no avenue for judicial review of an unconstitutional selfenforcing tort law. Ex parte Young should not be interpreted to allow for this
result when the very purpose of its fiction is to ensure judicial review.
One additional point with respect to Ex parte Young merits consideration
here. This proposal to sue individual legislators will likely raise a concern about
what type of prospective relief the parties injured by a self-enforcing tort law
could request. Pursuant to Ex parte Young, the parties challenging a selfenforcing tort law would arguably have standing to request both injunctive and
declaratory relief. In the case of a self-enforcing tort law, however, there is no
"enforcement" action to enjoin through a court order. In theory, the injured
parties could request injunctive relief ordering the repeal of the challenged tort
statute. Such a drastic request for relief seems both unlikely to succeed and
unnecessary, however. Because plaintiffs are barred from suing the legislature as
an entity by the Eleventh Amendment, a court could not order the legislature as
a whole to repeal the law (in contrast to cases in which courts have issued
injunctions to enact or repeal laws to local government bodies that are not

Ex parte Young in suit challenging distribution of funds from school lands); Mobil Oil Corp. v.
Attorney Gen., 940 F.2d 73, 76-77 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that case or controversy existed even if
statute was mainly intended to be enforced by private lawsuits because Attorney General had right to
intervene).
273. See, e.g., 1st Westco Corp. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 6 F.3d 108, 113 (3d Cir. 1993) ("General
authority to enforce the laws of the state is not sufficient to make government officials the proper
parties to litigation challenging the law."); Shell Oil Co. v. Noel, 608 F.2d 208, 211-12 (1st Cir. 1979)
("The mere fact that a governor is under a general duty to enforce state laws does not make him a
proper defendant in every action attacking the constitutionality of a state statute.... [I]t has been held
that in an action attacking the constitutionality of a statute a governor or an attorney general has not a
sufficiently intimate connection with the statute to be a proper defendant if all that is shown is that the
statute in question determines the right of one private person to recover from another ... ").
274. See, e.g., Nat'l Audubon Soc'y, Inc. v. Davis, 307 F.3d 835, 847 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that
suit could not proceed against the Governor but could proceed against other state officials with more
direct enforcement connection); Snoeck v. Brussa, 153 F.3d 984, 987-88 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that
suit against judicial commission was barred by Eleventh Amendment where plaintiffs filed suit
alleging that requirement of confidentiality in commission rules violated their First Amendment rights;

plaintiffs must file suit against state supreme court, which enforces rules). Compare Muskrat v. United
States, 219 U.S. 346, 361-63 (1911) (finding no case or controversy exists in preenforcement challenge
to federal statute), with Gritts v. Fisher, 224 U.S. 640, 641 (1912) (allowing challenge to same federal
statute where Secretaries of Interior and Treasury were named as defendants); Lytle v. Griffith, 240
F.3d 404, 410 (4th Cir. 2001) (questioning whether Governor is proper defendant), with Lytle v. Doyle,
326 F.3d 463, 468 (4th Cir. 2003) (allowing same suit against different state officials), and 1st Westco
Corp., 6 F.3d at 113 (holding that proper state defendant is school district, not commonwealth
officials), and Sweat v. Hull, 200 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1172-75 (D. Ariz. 2001) (holding that suit could not
proceed against Governor due to insufficient connection but suit could proceed against other state
officials).
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protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity 275). Ordering individual legislators
to vote to repeal the challenged statute is arguably an ineffective solution, 276 and
in any case seems more invasive of state legislative prerogatives than is
necessary. 277 A declaratory judgment declaring the challenged tort statute
unconstitutional would provide sufficient redressability, with minimal intrusion
into the state legislative process. 278 No affirmative conduct would be required of
the state legislators, and the injured parties would be sufficiently assured against
liability under the self-enforcing tort statute by a declaratory judgment stating
that such a law was unconstitutional.
In sum, the reasoning behind Ex parte Young provides further support for
the argument that there ought to be someone to sue when faced with a selfenforcing tort law. Standing doctrine requires that suit to be against the state
officials who enacted the self-enforcing tort legislation.
3.

Legislative Immunity No Bar to Suit

Since suing individual state legislators in a challenge to self-enforcing tort
legislation would address the strictures of standing requirements, as well as fulfill
Ex parte Young's underlying goal of protecting constitutional rights through
judicial review, the only remaining hurdle is one not yet addressed by courts or
commentators-legislative immunity. Legislative immunity is a doctrine of
federal common law that may be raised as an affirmative defense by individual
state legislators and, in some instances, by governors or other executive officials

engaged in legislative acts.
This section argues that, in the case of self-enforcing tort laws, legislative
immunity should not apply to any of these state officials. Allowing state
legislators to raise the defense of legislative immunity against challenges to selfenforcing tort laws would completely immunize these laws from judicial review,
even when they violate constitutional rights. Not only would such immunity

275. Cf Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 279-80 (1990) (holding that court could order
city council to enact ordinance pursuant to consent decree because Eleventh Amendment does not bar
suit against local government entity).
276. Scott v. Taylor, 405 F.3d 1251, 1259 (11th Cir. 2005) (Jordan, J., concurring) (arguing that
plaintiff could not obtain injunctive relief against legislators for allegedly unconstitutional law because
"even an extraordinary decree ordering the legislators to vote to repeal or amend Act 401 would be
ineffective, for the [individual] legislators, by themselves, are powerless to pass laws").
277. See Larsen v. Senate of the Commonwealth of Pa., 152 F.2d 240, 254 (3d Cir. 1998)
(rejecting request for injunctive relief against state Senators because: "Larsen seeks reinstatementnothing less than that the individual Senators rescind their guilty vote on his impeachment. It is
difficult to imagine a remedy that would more directly interfere with the role assigned exclusively to
the Senators by the Pennsylvania Constitution."); Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and
Limits of Law: Printz & Principle?,111 HARv. L. REv. 2180, 2251-52 (1998) (arguing that compelling
legislators to vote is more troubling than compelling judicial or executive actors to follow outside
mandates and analogizing compelled voting to compelled speech).
278. Cf. Colo. Common Cause v. Bledsoe, 810 P.2d 201, 211-12 (Co. 1991) (holding that, under
state constitution's speech-or-debate clause, which is analogous to federal law, declaratory relief
against unconstitutional legislative action would be permitted even though injunctive relief would not
be permitted).
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contradict the fundamental principle animating Ex parte Young, but it would
also contradict the purposes of legislative immunity. The doctrine of legislative
immunity relies on an understanding that unconstitutional legislative action can
be captured at the enforcement end. It does not protect legislators from suit
when they are acting like executive officers in an enforcement capacity. Because
legislators are asserting executive enforcement powers when they enact selfenforcing tort laws, legislative immunity should not apply.
a.

State Legislators

Legislative immunity protects government officials from lawsuits
challenging "legislative" actions. 279 It is an affirmative defense that may be
waived. If individual legislators or other officials do not raise the defense, the
case would be justiciable. 280 As described above, a number of cases against
individual legislators have proceeded to judgment where the defense of
legislative immunity was not raised. 281 Obviously, however, it is quite likely that
state legislators who wish to immunize a self-enforcing tort statute from legal
challenge would raise this defense.
The legislative immunity afforded to individual members of the U.S.
Congress derives from the Speech or Debate Clause of the United States
Constitution. 282 State legislators are not entitled to immunity based on the
constitutional protection provided in Article I, § 6.283 Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court has developed a common law doctrine of legislative immunity for state,
regional, and local legislators against suits brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
similar to federal constitutionally based legislative immunity. The Civil Rights
Act of 1871,284 which established § 1983, is the statutory mechanism that
expressly allows suits against state officials for violations of federal law-it
essentially codifies Ex parte Young. Although absolute legislative immunity

279. The courts have struggled to define what counts as "legislative" actions, as described infra
notes 311-12, 321-27, and accompanying text.
280. See supra Part IV.B.1 for a discussion of standing to sue individual state legislators. See, e.g.,
Larsen, 152 F.2d at 248, 252 (rejecting argument that suit against state Senators was nonjusticiable
political question but going on to find absolute legislative immunity applied).
281. See Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 131 (1966) (holding that Court had jurisdiction to review
whether Georgia House of Representatives deprived one of its members of his constitutional rights;
defense of legislative immunity not raised); Parker v. Merlino, 646 F.2d 848, 852 (3d Cir. 1981)
(holding that group of New Jersey state Senators could file § 1983 claim against other state Senators;
again, defense of legislative immunity was not raised on appeal); Davids v. Akers, 549 F.2d 120, 123
(9th Cir. 1977) (holding that constitutional claims against state Senators are justiciable as there are no
separation of powers concerns; Senators apparently did not raise defense of legislative immunity).
282. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 ("[F]or any speech or debate in either House, [Senators and
Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other place.").
283. Cole v. Gray, 638 F.2d 804, 810 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. DiCarlo, 565 F.2d 802, 805
(1st Cir. 1977); 26A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE &

PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5675 (1992) ("The refusal to extend speech or debate privilege protection
to state legislators could be called a 'retreat' only by someone who could not distinguish between
riding an escalator and falling down stairs.").
284. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
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against § 1983 claims is a creation of federal common law, the Supreme Court
has emphasized that it is analogous to the constitutional protection accorded to
federal legislators, at least for civil lawsuits. 285 It has long been settled that state
legislators are entitled to absolute legislative immunity from § 1983 damages
liability, 286 but more recently the Supreme Court held that legislative immunity
extends to suits for prospective relief as well. 287 No other officials besides
legislative actors have immunity from § 1983 suits for prospective relief.
Over time, the Court has relied on several different rationales for
preserving the common law doctrine of legislative immunity in the § 1983
context and for treating legislative actors differently than other state actors in
terms of prospective relief. First, in a line of cases discussing absolute legislative
immunity for § 1983 lawsuits, the Supreme Court concluded that Congress did
not intend § 1983 to abrogate the common law immunity of state legislators
when it enacted the statute in 1871. Second, beyond the historical roots of
legislative immunity, the Court has also emphasized the importance of protecting
the independence of legislators and the democratic process. Third, and probably
most importantly, the Court has emphasized the need to shield legislators from
the disruption and delay of defending lawsuits.
In early cases in which the Court held that Congress did not abrogate
common law state legislative immunity when it enacted § 1983, the Court relied
288
heavily on the historical roots of legislative immunity. In Tenney v. Brandhove,
the first case to hold that state legislative officials are absolutely immune from §
1983 liability for monetary damages, the Court concluded that common law
legislative immunity survived the enactment of § 1983, even for claims of
constitutional violations. 289 Tenney emphasized the long tradition at common law
of legislative immunity, describing the development of the doctrine in England
and its eventual adoption by the Framers. 290 Based on its historical analysis, the
Court concluded that Congress could not have intended § 1983 to "impinge on a
291
tradition so well grounded in history and reason."

285. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1951) (explaining that immunity for federal
legislators was reflection of immunity enjoyed by most state legislators at framing of Federal
Constitution). Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union of the U.S., Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 732-33 (1980)
("We have also recognized that state legislators enjoy common-law immunity from liability for their
legislative acts, an immunity that is similar in origin and rationale to that accorded Congressmen under
the Speech or Debate Clause ....
Although the separation-of-powers doctrine justifies a broader
privilege for Congressmen than for state legislators in criminal actions, United States v. Gillock, 445
U.S. 360 (1980), we generally have equated the legislative immunity to which state legislators are
entitled under § 1983 to that accorded Congressmen under the Constitution.").
286. Tenney, 341 U.S. at 371-76.

287. See Consumers Union, 446 U.S. at 732-33; cf. Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S.
491, 503 (1975) (holding that Speech or Debate Clause immunizes Congresspersons from suits for
either prospective relief or damages).
288. 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
289. Tenney, 341 U.S. at 377.
290. Id. at 372.
291. Id. at 376. In a later case discussing legislative immunity from § 1983 suits, the Court again
underscored the long tradition of legislative immunity in the common law: "The immunity of
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Because the Court has extended legislative immunity to regional and local
legislators who historically did not receive such immunity, the Court has also
emphasized other policy rationales behind immunity for individual legislators. In
Bogan v. Scott-Harris,292 the Court's most recent case on legislative immunity,
the Court extended absolute legislative immunity to local legislators. 293 The
Court stated that the doctrine of legislative immunity finds support not only in
common law tradition, "but also in reason," and therefore the "rationales for
according absolute immunity to federal, state, and regional legislators apply with
equal force to local legislators." 294 The Court opined that legislative immunity
serves to protect "the exercise of legislative discretion" and ensures the
295
independence of individual legislators by preventing judicial interference.
Scholars have also suggested that the purpose of legislative immunity is to
prevent the executive from using the judiciary as a weapon to attack the
legislative branch and to preserve the separation of powers. 296 Nevertheless, the
separation of powers rationale does not fully explain why legislative immunity
should apply to § 1983 suits by private citizens or to state legislators sued in
federal court, where arguably separation of powers concerns do not directly
apply since such suits do not involve coequal branches of the same level of
297
government.
Another rationale the Court has recently relied on more heavily, one that is
broader than the separation of powers argument for legislative immunity, is to
shield legislators from the inconvenience and disruption that defending a lawsuit
can bring. In Bogan, the Court particularly emphasized that legislators should

legislators from civil suit for what they do or say as legislators has its roots in the parliamentary
struggles of 16th- and 17th-century England; such immunity was consistently recognized in the
common law and was taken as a matter of course by our Nation's founders." Lake Country Estates,
Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 403 (1979); see also id. at 406-07 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) ("Underlying the decision in Tenney was a recognition of the unique status of the
legislative privilege, maintained for several centuries at common law and enshrined in the Federal
Constitution, Art. I. § 6, as well as in all but seven of the States' constitutions. Absent evidence of
explicit congressional intent, the Court was unwilling to strip state legislators of a protection so long
enjoyed when there remained power in the voters to 'discourag[e] or correc[t]' abuses by their elected
representatives." (alteration in original) (citations omitted)); Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV.
L. REv. 1190, 1200 (1977) ("The legislative immunity ...enjoys a unique historical position.").
292. 523 U.S. 44 (1998).
293. Bogan, 523 U.S. at 53-54.
294. Id. at 52.
295. Id.; see also Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 617 (1972) (stating that legislative
immunity, "prevent[s] intimidation of legislators by the Executive and accountability before a possibly
hostile judiciary"); Larsen v. Senate of the Commonwealth of Pa., 152 F.3d 240, 250 (3d Cir. 1998)
("As such, [legislative immunity] reinforces the separation of powers that is fundamental to the
structure of both the federal and state governments.").
296. Robert J. Reinstein & Harvey A. Silverglate, Legislative Privilege and the Separation of
Powers, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1113, 1146-47 (1973).
297. Cf 26A WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 283, § 5675 (stating that separation of powers
argument in support of Speech or Debate Clause does not explain "why legislators should be immune
from attacks from private citizens or in non-federal fora").
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'2 98
not be inhibited by the "time and energy required to defend against a lawsuit.
According to the Court, legislative immunity serves not only to protect
legislators, but also to serve the public good by preserving legislative
resources.2 99 This last rationale better explains why state and local legislators
should be immune from private suits in federal court under § 1983, and why the
Court extended legislative immunity to suits for prospective relief where the
3°°
individual legislator has no personal liability.
Although for some time it was uncertain whether legislative immunity
would extend to § 1983 suits for prospective relief,30 1 in Supreme Court of
Virginia v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc.,302 the Court held that
30 3
legislative immunity also applies to claims for injunctive and declaratory relief.
Notably, no other state officials, including judges and prosecutors, have absolute
immunity from a suit requesting prospective relief based on § 1983. In
Consumers Union, however, the Court rejected the argument that prospective
relief should be treated differently than damages relief for purposes of legislative
immunity. The Court explained that although previous cases upholding
legislative immunity under § 1983 only addressed actions for damages, the
rationale of preserving legislative resources was equally applicable to § 1983
actions seeking declaratory or injunctive relief. 3°4 In reaching this conclusion, the
Court emphasized that "a private civil action, whether for an injunction or
damages, creates a distraction and forces [legislators] to divert their time, energy,

298. Bogan, 523 U.S. at 52; see also Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 503 (1975)
("[A] private civil action ... creates a distraction and forces [legislators] to divert their time, energy,
and attention from their legislative tasks to defend the litigation.").
299. Bogan, 523 U.S. at 53 ("Bereft of any historical antecedent to the regional agency, we relied
almost exclusively on Tenney's description of the purposes of legislative immunity and the importance
of such immunity in advancing the 'public good."'); see also Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'I
Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 404-05 (1979) (noting that Tenney Court found immunity for state
legislator not in the Speech or Debate Clause or in any state constitutions or statutes but rather in the
need for such immunity in order to protect the public good); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377
(1951) ("Legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their legislative duty,
not for their private indulgence but for the public good.").
300. 26A WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 283, § 5675 (discussing and critiquing rationales for
legislative immunity in context of Speech or Debate Clause).
301. Compare Jordan v. Hutcheson, 323 F.2d 597, 604 (4th Cir. 1963) (stating courts do not
normally grant "wholly prospective equitable relief against legislative action"), with Eslinger v.
Thomas, 476 F.2d 225, 230 (4th Cir. 1973) (holding that legislators are not immune from suit for
prospective relief).
302. 446 U.S. 719 (1980).
303. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. at 732; see also Scott v. Taylor, 405 F.3d 1251, 1254 (11th Cir.
2005) (applying Consumers Union to deny declaratory and injunctive relief in § 1983 claim against
state legislators and election commission); Larsen v. Senate of the Commonwealth of Pa., 152 F.3d
240, 252-53 (3d Cir. 1998) (reading Consumers Union as holding absolute legislative immunity applied
to prospective equitable relief as well as to action for monetary damages).
304. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. at 732. The Court emphasized that "[in holding that § 1983
'does not create civil liability' for acts ... 'in a field where legislators traditionally have power to act,'
we did not distinguish between actions for damages and those for prospective relief." Id. at 732-33
(quoting Tenney, 341 U.S. at 379) (citation omitted).
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and attention from their legislative tasks to defend the litigation."3 °5 Therefore,
legislators "should be protected not only from the consequences of litigation's
' 30 6
results but also from the burden of defending themselves."
Although legislative immunity thus provides broad protection, it does not
necessarily apply to all actions taken by legislators. Another significant aspect of
legislative immunity, and of official immunity in general, is that the Supreme
Court takes a functional approach to the question of whether immunity applies.
A court determines whether an individual state official is entitled to absolute
legislative, judicial, or prosecutorial immunity by analyzing the official function
performed, rather than by a formalist approach that would look only to the title
of the official's office. 30 7 The Supreme Court has explained:
Running through our cases, with fair consistency, is a "functional"
approach to immunity questions other than those that have been
decided by express constitutional or statutory enactment. Under that
approach, we examine the nature of the functions with which a
particular official or class of officials has been lawfully entrusted, and
we seek to evaluate the effect that exposure to particular forms of
liability would likely have on the appropriate exercise of those
308
functions.
For example, judges have absolute immunity for their judicial functions, but
not when they act in an administrative or executive capacity, such as by firing
employees. 30 9 Similarly, officials are entitled to absolute legislative immunity
only when engaged in legislative functions. This functional approach obviously
has led to definitional problems, and the Supreme Court and lower courts have
struggled to delimit what counts as a protected legislative function. The Court
has generally described protected activity as any conduct that falls within "the
310
sphere of legitimate legislative activity."
In determining whether challenged acts fall within the sphere of legitimate
legislative activity, the Supreme Court has made it clear that legislative immunity
applies to legislative acts regardless of the official's purpose in engaging in the
challenged action. The Court has repeatedly stated that courts should not look
into a legislator's motive in calculating whether legislative immunity applies.
305. Id. at 733 (quoting Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491,503 (1975)).
306. Id. at 732 (quoting Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 85 (1967)).
307. See Manzi v. DiCarlo, 982 F. Supp. 125, 128 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) ("The Supreme Court has
utilized a functional analysis to determine when immunity is available, in order to insure that
immunity is not extended further than its purposes require."); TRIBE, supra note 227, at 1015-20
(noting that Supreme Court's decisions are guided by "distinction[s] between legislative and political
acts," rather than by category of official performing acts); 26A WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 283, §
5675 (noting that Supreme Court's determination of whether official is entitled to immunity is
dependent on whether act in question is performed in legislative context).
308. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224 (1988).
309. See id. at 220-21 (holding that judge who demoted and dismissed probation officer was not
entitled to judicial immunity).
310. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951); see also Powell v. Ridge, 247 F.3d 520, 525
(3d Cir. 2001) (noting without deciding that state legislators may have waived legislative immunity by
intervening in suit against executive branch officers and personnel).
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"Whether an act is legislative turns on the nature of the act, rather than on the
motive or intent of the official performing it."'311 This is because the "privilege of
absolute immunity would be of little value if [legislators] could be subjected to
the cost and inconvenience and distraction of a trial upon a conclusion of the
pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against them based upon a jury's
312
speculation as to motives."
When faced with the criticism that absolute immunity will lead to abuses
and unchecked power of the legislature, the Court has repeatedly responded:
"Courts are not the place for such controversies. Self-discipline and the voters
313
must be the ultimate reliance for discouraging or correcting such abuses."
Relying on the will of the voters to recognize and check abuses of individual
constitutional rights by state officials is hardly a satisfying scheme, however, and
it is directly contrary to the remedy that Ex parte Young establishes. Much
critique of legislative immunity (and of other immunity doctrines as well) is
based on this problem of having a right without a remedy. 31 4 Again, no other
315
state official is entitled to absolute immunity against prospective relief.
In practice, however, extending legislative immunity to prospective
remedies has had little effect on the protection of constitutional rights, since
usually injured parties have no need to obtain declaratory or injunctive relief
against the legislators who enact a specific statute. Instead, unconstitutional
legislative action is simply captured at the enforcement end. Plaintiffs seeking to
enjoin the enforcement of a law they believe is unconstitutional can obtain
316
judicial review by filing suit against the state official who enforces the law.
Unlike legislative officials, executive officials who are charged with enforcement
317
of legislation have no common law immunity from suit for prospective relief.
311. Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 54 (1998).
312. Id. at 54-55 (internal quotation omitted); see also Tenney, 341 U.S. at 377 ("The claim of an
unworthy purpose does not destroy the privilege. Legislators are immune from deterrents to the
uninhibited discharge of their legislative duty, not for their private indulgence but for the public
good.").
313. Tenney, 341 U.S. at 378; cf Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 510-11 (1975)
(internal citation omitted) ("Respondents make the familiar argument that the broad protection
granted by the Clause creates a potential for abuse. That is correct, and in Brewster we noted that the
risk of such abuse was 'the conscious choice of the Framers' buttressed and justified by history. Our
consistently broad construction of the Speech or Debate Clause rests on the belief that it must be so
construed to provide the independence which is its central purpose.").
314. See, e.g., Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 408
(1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that legislative immunity should not be expanded because
"[a] doctrine that denies redress for constitutional wrongs should, in my judgment, be narrowly
confined to those contexts where history and public policy compel its acceptance"); John C. Jeffries,
Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87, 90 (1999) (discussing rightremedy gap in constitutional law with focus on availability of money damages versus availability of
prospective relief).
315. See Tenney, 341 U.S. at 385 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (noting that "[n]o other public official
has complete immunity for his actions").
316. And, as described in detail earlier, Ex parte Young allows a preenforcement suit to proceed.
317. The rationales for treating legislative actors differently than executive actors are explained
infra.
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A number of commentators have noted that this "substitution of defendants"
theory justifies absolute legislative immunity even from prospective relief. 318 In
other words, "the availability of judicial relief against those who carry out the
judgments of legislative bodies should be regarded as reconciling the existence of
legislative immunity with the rule of law. '319 The different doctrines of official
immunity fit together like pieces of a puzzle, which when viewed in the full
picture largely ensures judicial review of allegedly unconstitutional state
320
legislation.
For example, in a number of Speech and Debate Clause cases, the Supreme
Court held that, although individual legislators are entitled to immunity from
suit even for allegedly unconstitutional actions, injured parties could bring suit
against the legislators' aides or employees who merely carried out the legislative
will. In Powell v. McCormack,321 the Court held that members of Congress were
entitled to legislative immunity in a suit challenging the refusal by the House to
seat a duly elected member. 322 The Court also stated, however, that an action
against the House employees who acted pursuant to House orders to exclude the
plaintiff would not be barred, and that the decision to exclude plaintiff could
324
thereby be subject to judicial review. 323 Similarly, in Kilbourn v. Thompson,
although the Court found that judgment could not be entered against the
defendant members of the House, the Court did allow the Sergeant-at-Arms to
be held liable for false imprisonment, even though he did nothing more than
execute the House Resolution that the plaintiff Kilbourn be imprisoned. 325 In
another case, the Court explained its reasoning in Kilbourn, observing that the
"resolution authorizing Kilbourn's arrest ...was clearly legislative in nature. But
the resolution was subject to judicial review insofar as its execution impinged on
a citizen's rights as it did there. That the House could with impunity order an
318. Jeffries, supra note 314, at 93 n.22 ("[The] legislator who passes the law may have absolute
immunity, but the executive officer who enforces it does not. Usually, the opportunity to sue an
enforcement official suffices to establish liability for unconstitutional legislation."); Ann Woolhandler,
Patternsof Official Immunity and Accountability, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 396,400-06 (1987) (arguing

that executive accountability is perhaps necessary concomitant to legislative immunity).
319. Jackson, supra note 277, 2249-50.
320. This theory underlying absolute legislative immunity-that legislation is captured for
judicial review through enforcement officials-works well for obtaining judicial review of legislation,
but not as well for preventing abuses that stem from appropriations and investigatory powers of
legislation, where there may be no executive involvement in enforcement. See 26A WRIGHT &
GRAHAM, supra note 283, § 5675 (discussing absolute legislative immunity and stating: "This
legislative hegemony may seem more acceptable if one supposes that Congressional abuses will stem
from legislation which is subject to veto and judicial review. But these checks and balances do not
work well to prevent abuses that stem from the appropriation power or the investigatory power of
Congress." (footnotes omitted)); Jeffries, supra note 314, at 93 n.22 (stating that even though absolute
legislative immunity generally does not bar judicial review because of option to substitute enforcement
officials as defendants, there are "some situations in which no alternative remedy exists").
321. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
322. Powell, 395 U.S. at 489,506.
323. Id. at 506.
324. 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
325. Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at 201.
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326
unconstitutional arrest afforded no protection for those who made the arrest.
Although there are some instances where the work of legislative aides or
employees is so integral to the legislative process that the aide may also be
entitled to legislative immunity, for the most part courts have ensured that
unconstitutional legislative actions will be subject to judicial review by capturing
327
the actions through the enforcing officials.

326. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 618 (1972). In several other Speech and Debate
Clause cases, the Court has similarly noted that, although legislators were entitled to immunity, the
plaintiff could sue an employee of the legislators who would carry out the legislative vote. See
Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 516 (1975) (Marshall, J., concurring) (stating that
although Speech or Debate Clause barred suit against Senators and their counsel, plaintiffs could seek
injunctive relief against functionaries seeking to enforce nonlegislative commands of legislators); Doe
v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 319-24 (1973) (holding that congressional committee members and their
staff involved in investigating and compiling report are immune pursuant to Speech or Debate Clause,
but persons who, with authorization from Congress, perform function of disseminating report and
thereby infringe on right of privacy are not immune from private suit); Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387
U.S. 82, 84-85 (1967) (holding that disputed issues of fact prevented dismissal of suit against Senate
subcommittee employee who allegedly conspired to violate plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights and
determining that legislative immunity does not protect such an employee).
327. The Court has noted that legislators should be more highly protected by immunity than
legislative aides. For example, in Tenney v. Brandhove, the first case to uphold state legislative
immunity against § 1983 claims, the Court stated: "It should be noted that this is a case in which the
defendants are members of a legislature. Legislative privilege in such a case deserves greater respect
than where an official acting on behalf of the legislature is sued or the legislature seeks the affirmative
aid of the courts to assert a privilege." 341 U.S. 367, 378 (1951). On the other hand, courts have
permitted legislative aides in some cases to assert absolute legislative immunity. In these cases, the
Court has emphasized that the work of such aides was "so critical to the Members' performance that
they must be treated as [the Members'] alter egos." Eastland,421 U.S. at 507. Thus, lawyers and staff
performing investigative work or compiling reports for legislative committees have been protected by
legislative immunity. See Doe, 412 U.S. at 319-24 (holding that certain staff members of legislative
committee were entitled to legislative immunity); Romero-Barcelo v. Hernandez-Agosto, 75 F.3d 23,
31-32 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding that legislators and chief counsel for legislators' committee were
absolutely immune from suit); Green v. DeCamp, 612 F.2d 368, 371 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding that
counsel for state legislative committee was protected from liability by absolute immunity). The Court
has distinguished these cases using a functional analysis, describing some actions by legislative aides as
"essential to legislating," but other kinds of actions as simply "nonlegislative" and therefore not
protected by immunity. Gravel, 408 U.S. at 621. For example, Justice Marshall explained that
legislators and their aides are both protected by immunity if "the conduct of the latter would be a
protected legislative act if performed by the [legislators themselves]. At the same time, however, the
Speech or Debate Clause does not insulate legislative functionaries carrying out nonlegislative tasks."
Eastland, 421 U.S. at 516-17 (Marshall, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). In other words, legislative immunity shields acts by legislative aides that are "an integral part
of the deliberative and communicative processes by which Members participate in committee and
House proceedings with respect to consideration and passage or rejection of proposed legislation" but
not actions in "executing a legislative order" or "carrying out [legislative] directions." Gravel, 408 U.S.
at 620-21, 625; see also Eastland,421 U.S. at 507-08 (rejecting argument that legislative immunity does
not apply to subpoenas because subpoenas are routinely used to obtain information used in
"legislating"). Unfortunately, the case law is not clear on precisely what types of actions by legislative
employees are "essential to legislating" and would be protected by immunity. See Nat'l Ass'n of Soc.
Workers v. Harwood, 69 F.3d 622, 635, 638 (1st Cir. 1995) (revealing disagreement between majority
and dissent on scope of legislative immunity for aides carrying out legislative orders).
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In fact, in each of the Supreme Court cases addressing common law
legislative immunity for § 1983 suits, plaintiffs at least had the potential to obtain
judicial review of the allegedly unconstitutional legislative conduct by
32 8
substituting another defendant not protected by absolute legislative immunity.
In Tenney, one Justice noted that the plaintiff could challenge the allegedly
unconstitutional legislative committee investigations when the committee
attempted to enforce its powers by bringing contempt charges against the
plaintiff. 329 In Bogan and Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency,330 where the Court extended legislative immunity to local and regional
legislators respectively, the Court noted that although the plaintiffs' suit could
not proceed against individual legislators, suit could proceed against the local or
regional entity as a whole, since such entities are not entitled to Eleventh
331
Amendment immunity.
Finally, in Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of the United
States, Inc., the Supreme Court held that the defendant state officials could be
sued for prospective relief not in their legislative capacity, but in their capacity as
administrators who enforced the challenged rules.332 The Consumers Union case
involved a challenge to civil rights attorneys' fees imposed on Virginia state
court judges by a district court based on its holding that the state Bar Code's
prohibition of advertising by attorneys was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court
held that in promulgating the Bar Code's disciplinary rules the defendant judges
were acting in a legislative capacity, and therefore, were entitled to absolute
legislative immunity for enacting the unconstitutional rule.333 Since the judges
were also enforcers of the Bar Code, however, the Court permitted prospective
relief against the judges in their enforcement capacity pursuant to Ex parte
334
Young.
Similarly, a number of other lower court cases have recognized that even
though individual legislators have absolute immunity from challenges to
legislative actions, state officials who enforce those actions are available to serve

328. See Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 53 (1998) (noting that plaintiffs could obtain relief
for alleged First Amendment violation against local governing board as an entity since local entities
are not protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity); Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union of
the U.S., Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 736 (1980) (providing equitable relief against defendants in their capacity
as administrators); Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 401-02
(1979) (holding that plaintiff could obtain relief against regional agency as entity since it was not
protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity); Tenney, 341 U.S. at 379-80 (Black, J., concurring)
(stating that "there is still much room for challenge to the Committee action" because if and when
committee attempted to enforce its power through fine, imprisonment, contempt or other charges,
plaintiff could defend on ground that committee's actions were unconstitutional).
329. Tenney, 341 U.S. at 379-80.
330. 440 U.S. 391 (1979).
331. Bogan, 523 U.S. at 53; Lake Country Estates, 440 U.S. at 401-02.
332. 446 U.S. 719, 736 (1980).
333. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. at 734.

334. Id. at 736-37 ("[Wle believe that the Virginia Court and its chief justice properly were held
liable in their enforcement capacities.").
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as defendants to ensure judicial review.335 Those cases in which the allegedly
unconstitutional legislative action could not be captured for judicial review at the
enforcement end generally have addressed legislative activities other than the
3 36
enactment of legislation, such as internal appropriations and operations rules.
In sum, absolute legislative immunity from § 1983 suits, even for prospective
relief, has not immunized allegedly unconstitutional legislation from judicial
review-the action is simply captured for judicial review at the enforcement
end.

337

As in the standing context, the dilemma with self-enforcing tort statutes is
that no separate enforcement action is necessary for the statute to achieve its
goal of prohibiting constitutionally protected conduct, and in fact no
enforcement action by any private party may ever be brought. There is little to
no possibility of capturing a self-enforcing tort statute at the enforcement end.

335. See Scott v. Taylor, 405 F.3d 1251, 1256 (11th Cir. 2005) (declaring plaintiffs assertion that
absolute legislative immunity will leave her no recourse at all incorrect because she could maintain suit
against Board of Elections); Star Distribs., Ltd. v. Marino, 613 F.2d 4, 7-8 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that
public interest requires that state legislators be immune from suit for § 1983 liability for prospective
relief but noting that plaintiff could still raise his constitutional challenge to legislative subpoena if and
when legislature attempted to enforce subpoena); Eslinger v. Thomas, 476 F.2d 225, 228, 230 (4th Cir.
1973) (holding that state Senators and Lieutenant Governor had absolute legislative immunity but suit
could be brought against Clerk of South Carolina Senate who would enforce resolution disallowing
appointment of females as senate pages, and determining that resolution was unconstitutional).
336. Youngblood v. DeWeese, 352 F.3d 836, 842 (3d Cir. 2003) (granting legislative immunity to
state Representatives in claim alleging denial of adequate budget appropriation because permitting
such claim to go forward would "enable the judicial branch to scrutinize the manner in which the
General Assembly allocates internal funds" and thus "compromise the independence of the legislative
branch, the very principle legislative immunity is intended to protect"); Larsen v. Senate of the
Commonwealth of Pa., 152 F.3d 240, 248 (3d Cir. 1998) (finding legislative immunity where state court
judge challenged legislator's impeachment process and requested repeal of state legislators' votes on
his impeachment); Nat'l Ass'n of Soc. Workers v. Harwood, 69 F.3d 622, 633-34 (1st Cir. 1995)
(holding that legislative aides who enforced allegedly unconstitutional resolution prohibiting public
lobbyists from House floor were entitled to legislative immunity but noting that "there may be some
conduct, even within the legislative sphere, that is so flagrantly violative of fundamental constitutional
protections that traditional notions of legislative immunity would not deter judicial intervention");
Green v. DeCamp, 612 F.2d 368, 371, 372 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding that plaintiff failed to state claim
under § 1983 for constitutional violation but nevertheless holding that defendant state Senators and
Senators' counsel on legislative committee, which investigated and released report critical of plaintiff's
conduct during homicide investigation, were entitled to legislative immunity); Porter v. Bainbridge,
405 F. Supp. 83, 90-91 (S.D. Ind. 1975) (finding no claim for relief under § 1983 where Republican
candidate challenged manner in which Indiana House of Representatives conducted recount of votes
and seated his Democratic opponent but nevertheless also stating that legislative officials and their
employees had legislative immunity under § 1983).
337. 1A MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS AND DEFENSES §9.08[B], at
9-200.1 (4th ed. 2006). Schwartz observes:
The extension of legislative immunity to prospective relief has had little pragmatic
significance. There is normally no need for § 1983 plaintiffs to enjoin the legislative process
or the enactment of specific legislation. It is usually sufficient that relief may be granted
against the executive and administrative officials who are charged with enforcing legislative
enactments that allegedly conflict with federal law.
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Again, the key point is that the enactment of a self-enforcing tort statute is the
enforcement action in and of itself; there is no other person or state official to
sue besides the individual legislators who have caused the injury by enacting the
law. Allowing legislators to raise the defense of legislative immunity to a selfenforcing tort law would allow an unconstitutional piece of legislation to be
completely immunized from judicial review, a result that absolute legislative
immunity is not meant to produce and that in fact defies the "substitute
defendants" theory that justifies legislative immunity even from claims for
prospective relief.

3 38

Furthermore, not only would allowing a defense of legislative immunity
contradict the "substitute executive defendants" theory behind permitting
immunity for prospective relief, but it would also contradict the doctrine as it
currently stands. As explained above, the Supreme Court has made it clear that
it follows a functional approach to official immunity. This functional approach
requires courts to determine whether official action is legislative in nature or
executive in nature, or both. Because absolute legislative immunity extends only
to "conduct within the scope of legislative authority or within the traditional
sphere of legislative activity," the Supreme Court has had to define what kinds of
acts fall within the scope of legislative activity. 339 In Bogan, the Supreme Court
explained that official action will be considered legislative in nature when it is (1)
legislative in form, in that it follows a traditional legislative process, and (2)

338. Furthermore, given the history and purpose of § 1983, this result is not what Congress could
have intended. See Ammond v. McGahn, 390 F. Supp. 655, 657-60 (D.N.J. 1975) (holding Senators
comprising state Democratic caucus not immune from Democratic Senator's § 1983 action alleging
exclusion in retaliation for publicly criticizing caucus and declaring that absolute immunity in such
circumstances is wholly inconsistent with purpose of § 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 532 F.2d 325 (3d
Cir. 1976).
339. See Supreme Court ofVa. v. Consumer's Union of the U.S., Inc., 446 U.S. 719,734-36 (1980)
(holding Virginia Supreme Court was legislating, and therefore, immune when promulgating rules of
professional responsibility, but was also enforcing rules, and therefore subject to suit for injunctive and
declaratory relief, when acting pursuant to statute granting them independent authority to initiate suits
against attorneys); Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1163 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that for
legislative immunity to attach, allegedly unlawful action must have been legislative function); Baird v.
Bd. of Educ. for Warren Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 205, 389 F.3d 685, 696 (7th Cir. 2004) (determining
that school board's termination of school superintendent involved administrative, not legislative, acts
and defendants were not entitled to legislative immunity); Green, 612 F.2d at 371 (stating that conduct
of state legislative committee that exceeds legitimate legislative activity or is not essential to legislative
process is not entitled to legislative immunity); City of Safety Harbor v. Birchfield, 529 F.2d 1251, 1256
(5th Cir. 1976) (expressing view that state legislator acting within traditional sphere of legislative
activity is immune from suit under § 1983 and this immunity is not destroyed even where motivation
for the challenged conduct is questionable or unworthy); Horne v. Russell County Comm'n, 379 F.
Supp. 2d 1305, 1336 (M.D. Ala. 2005) (holding legislators entitled to absolute immunity from suit
under § 1983 for all actions taken in sphere of legitimate legislative activity). It is important to note,
however, that official action does not fall outside the sphere of legitimate legislative activity merely
because plaintiffs allege that such activities violate their constitutional rights. Colon Berrios v.
Hernandez Agosto, 716 F.2d 85, 91 (1st Cir. 1983) (holding that legislators do not lose immunity
merely because plaintiffs allege that such activities violate their constitutional rights and judiciary
committee activities fell within legitimate sphere of legislative activity).
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legislative in substance, in that it reflects discretionary policymaking and has
34°
prospective implications.
Understandably, courts have experienced frequent difficulty in applying this
definition and in distinguishing legislative acts from executive acts. 341 Lower
courts have developed criteria to determine whether an official action is
legislative in character, which largely follow Bogan's focus on procedure and
substance. 342 That is, that the process used for the challenged action occurred
through established legislative procedures, and that the substance of the action
reflects policymaking of a general scope with potential impact on the public at
large, rather than on a small number of persons or single individual. 343 Despite
some amount of definitional uncertainty, the passage of a self-enforcing tort
statute by a state legislature would fall within Bogan's definition of legislative
activities, as long as established state legislative procedures were followed and

340. Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 55-56 (1998).
341. For example, the Supreme Court has recognized absolute immunity for committee-related
activities of legislators, but not for public statements and press releases. Compare Tenney v.
Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 (1951) (holding legislative committee's investigative activities
immunized), and Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 501 (1975) (holding committee
related acts immunized), with Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 133 (1979) (finding press
statements not immunized).
There is a split in lower courts as to whether the hiring and firing of legislative personnel should
be considered a legislative task for which absolute immunity exists or merely an administrative task
deserving only qualified immunity. See Camacho v. Brandon, 317 F.3d 153, 164-65 (2d Cir. 2003)
(discussing circuit split on this issue). Compare Chateaubriand v. Gaspard, 97 F.3d 1218, 1221 (9th Cir.
1996) (denying legislative immunity), Carver v. Foerster, 102 F.3d 96, 100 (3d Cir. 1996) (same), and
Davis v. Passman, 544 F.2d 865, 880 (5th Cir. 1977) (same), rev'd on other grounds, 442 U.S. 228
(1979), with Carlos v. Santos, 123 F.3d 61, 66 (2d Cir. 1997) (granting legislative immunity), and
Agromayor v. Colberg, 738 F.2d 55, 60 (1st Cir. 1984) (same).
Legislative immunity has been applied to state legislators who voted for particular legislation, see,
e.g., City of Safety Harbor, 529 F.2d at 1256-57, or participated in committee work, see, e.g., Colon
Berrios, 716 F.2d at 90; Star Distribs., Ltd. v. Marino, 613 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1980), or served on a
statutory commission, see, e.g., Bergman v. Stein, 404 F. Supp. 287,298-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
A legislative official's casting of a vote does not in all circumstances count as legislative in nature,
however. For example, in Smith v. Lomax, 45 F.3d 402,403, 406 (11th Cir. 1995), members of a county
legislative body who voted to terminate an employee allegedly based on her race were not entitled to
legislative immunity because the vote in that case was not legislative but administrative in nature.
Similarly, a borough council's abolition of the police force by vote, rather than by enactment, was not
a legislative act because state law required that legislative powers of boroughs be exercised by
ordinance and not merely by vote. Donivan v. Dallastown Borough, 835 F.2d 486,489 (3d Cir. 1987).
342. See, e.g., Lomax, 45 F.3d at 406 (holding that members of county board of commissioners
were not entitled to absolute legislative immunity when voting to dismiss employee because
employment action was administrative rather than legislative).
343. See, e.g., Chateaubriand, 97 F.3d at 1220 (considering whether official action involves
formulation of policy as opposed to ad hoc decision making and whether action applies to few
individuals or to public at large in applying legislative immunity); Ryan v. Burlington County, 889 F.2d
1286, 1290-91 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that to come within legislative immunity, conduct must be both
procedurally and substantively legislative, by following established legislative procedures and
involving policymaking of general scope); Cutting v. Muzzey, 724 F.2d 259, 261 (1st Cir. 1984) (stating
that courts should focus on nature of facts relied on, process utilized, and impact of state action in
determining whether acts are legislative in nature).
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the substance of the tort law is dealing with a class of persons, rather than a
single individual. 3"
Self-enforcing tort legislation serves dual functions, however-it is both a
legislative act and an executive enforcement act. This dual function is the crux of
the argument for why self-enforcing tort statutes require preenforcement judicial
review and why suit should be had against the legislators who enact the law. Such
suit will be allowed, according to the "effects on a reasonable person test," only to
tort statutes that are truly self-enforcing, i.e., situations in which legislators have
arrogated the enforcement powers of the executive to themselves. Given that under
this test a self-enforcing tort statute serves two functions, both legislative and
executive, according to existing doctrine legislative immunity should not apply.
In a number of cases, which I will call "dual function" cases, the Court has
refused to apply absolute legislative immunity when the same actor engages in
both legislative and executive functions. For example, in the Consumers Union
case, which established that legislators are entitled to absolute immunity even
from prospective relief, the Court in fact allowed suit for prospective relief
against the defendant state officials who were engaged in both legislative and
executive functions. Even though defendants were judges of the state court
system, they were treated as legislators in their role as issuers of the state Bar
Code and granted legislative immunity. 345 Yet, since the judges were also
enforcers of the Bar Code, the Court permitted prospective relief against the
judges in their enforcement capacity. 346 Under the dual function approach, the
same defendants operated in two capacities, both legislative and executive, and
could be held liable for prospective relief in their executive capacity. The Court
in Consumers Union emphasized that prosecutors (the enforcers of the law)
enjoy absolute immunity only from damages liability, citing Ex parte Young as
the doctrine that has naturally allowed a myriad of injunctive suits against state
officers who threaten to enforce an allegedly unconstitutional law. Notably, the
Court emphasized:
If prosecutors and law enforcement personnel cannot be proceeded
against for declaratory relief, putative plaintiffs would have to await
the institution of state-court proceedings against them in order to
344. See Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 47, 55-56 (1998) (holding that defendants' actions
were both procedurally and substantively legislative, even though plaintiff alleged that sole reason for
budget change was to terminate her employment); Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, 838 F.2d 1031, 1047
(9th Cir. 1988) (stating that rules of general applicability "within an affected profession, industry or
type of business" will be considered legislative in character); Eslinger v. Thomas, 476 F.2d 225, 228
(4th Cir. 1973) (noting that passing of acts and resolutions is very essence of legislative process);
Redwood Village v. Graham, 819 F. Supp. 867, 871 (D.N.D. 1993) (holding that regulations
promulgated by agency were "classically legislative" as rules were of general applicability, even though
in reality rules only affected plaintiff).
345. Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union of the U.S., Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 734 (1980)
("[T]he Virginia Court is exercising the State's entire legislative power with respect to regulating the
Bar, and its members are the State's legislators for the purpose of issuing the Bar Code. Thus the
Virginia Court and its members are immune from suit when acting in their legislative capacity.").
346. Id. at 736-37 ("[W]e believe that the Virginia Court and its chief justice properly were held
liable in their enforcement capacities.").
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assert their federal constitutional claims. This is not the way the law
has developed, and, because of its own inherent and statutory
enforcement powers, immunity does347not shield the Virginia Court and
its chief justice from suit in this case.
Similarly, state legislators, by enacting a self-enforcing tort law, engage in
both legislative and prosecutorial or enforcement functions at the same time. Based
on the dual function approach used by the courts, state legislators should not be
able to raise absolute legislative immunity as a bar to obtaining declaratory relief
against a self-enforcing tort statute. Legislators have no immunity from suit for
prospective relief when they are also functioning in an executive enforcement
capacity.
A number of lower courts have also applied this "dual function" approach
to allow suit to proceed against state officials who act in both legislative and
executive capacities. For example, the Seventh Circuit followed Consumers
Union in a case involving similar facts, where judges of the state supreme court
both promulgated and enforced administrative rules. 348 In another interesting
"dual function" case, Mainstream Loudoun v. Board of Trustees of the Loudoun
County Library,34 9 plaintiffs brought a § 1983 suit against a library board to
challenge its policy restricting access to sexually explicit material on library
computers. Plaintiffs argued that the policy violated their First Amendment
rights. 350 A federal district court held that the board members could claim
absolute legislative immunity for adopting the policy. 351 The court found that
adoption of the policy fit within the definition of a legislative act because "the
Policy is prospective in nature, and of general application."' 352 The plaintiffs
could still pursue their suit for prospective relief against the board members,
however, since the board members also had a prominent role in enforcing the
challenged policy. Because of their dual role as enforcers, the board members
were not protected by legislative immunity, and the allegedly unconstitutional
regulation could be subject to preenforcement review. 353 In sum, when the same
state officials perform dual functions, both legislative and executive, they are
subject to suit in their executive capacity. As one district court put it, "that which
Consumers Union giveth to the named defendants-namely, a derivative

347. Id. at 737.
348. Lawline v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 956 F.2d 1378, 1382 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that, in lawsuit
challenging adoption of two attorney disciplinary rules by justices of state supreme court, justices were
protected by legislative immunity but action for declaratory relief could proceed against them as
enforcers of rules); see also Hughes v. Lipscher, 852 F. Supp. 293, 298-99 (D.N.J. 1994) (holding that,
where Administrative Director of New Jersey Supreme Court had both legislative and enforcement
functions in promulgating administrative directives, Director could be subject to suit for prospective
relief and be subject to civil rights attorneys fees based on enforcement function).
349. 2 F. Supp. 2d 783 (E.D. Va. 1998).
350. Mainstream Loudoun, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 787.
351. Id. at 783.
352. Id. at 788.
353. Id. at 789.
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legislative immunity ...vis-d-vis its promulgatory actions-it also taketh away as
354
a result of the defendants' own enforcement activities."
Another interesting legislative immunity case, from the post-Brown v.
Board of Education355 era, provides further support for denying legislative
immunity for legislators who enact self-enforcing tort laws. In Bush v. Orleans
Parish School Board,356 parents of local school children sought to restrain a
committee of Louisiana state legislators from interfering with federal court
ordered desegregation efforts. The Louisiana legislature had declared that it
would not recognize the Supreme Court's decision in Brown and enacted a
package of legislation that included abolishing the local school board and
transferring its functions to a legislative committee.357 The parents charged that
the members of this committee, acting pursuant to legislative enactment, were
attempting to enforce unconstitutional legislative resolutions aimed at frustrating
school desegregation. 358 The court found that the legislative resolutions
attempting to maintain segregated schools were unconstitutional; however, since
these resolutions were implemented by the legislative committee, the members
of the committee raised the defense of absolute legislative immunity.
The court held that there was no merit in their claim of legislative
immunity. 359 The court observed that there was "no effort to restrain the
Louisiana Legislature as a whole, or any individual legislator, in the performance
of a legislative function." 360 Although legislative committee work is usually
treated as a legislative function, here the court found that the members of the
legislative committee were purporting to act as the administrators of the local
schools, a nonlegislative function.3 61 The court emphasized:
Having found a statute unconstitutional, it is elementary that a court
has power to enjoin all those charged with its execution. Normally,
these are officers of the executive branch, but when the legislature
itself seeks to act as executor of its own laws, then, quite obviously, it is
no longer legislating and is no more immune from process than the
362
administrative officials it supersedes.
By using a functional approach to official immunity, the court was able to
hold the Louisiana legislators accountable for their blatantly unconstitutional
actions. In contrast, if the state legislators had instead promulgated a tort law
granting money damages against members of the school board who established

354. Hughes v. Lipscher, 852 F. Supp. 293, 300 (D.N.J. 1994); see also May v. Cooperman, 578 F.
Supp. 1308, 1317 (D.N.J. 1984) (holding legislative immunity inapplicable to intervenor-defendants
representing legislature because defendants adopted "quasi-enforcement role by intervening to
defend" challenged statute).
355. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
356. 188 F. Supp. 916 (E.D. La. 1960).
357. Bush, 188 F. Supp. at 921.
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. Id. at 122.
362. Bush, 188 F. Supp. at 922.
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integrated classrooms, the Okpalobi approach would deny judicial review and
allow legislators to in effect violate equal protection. Unlike in Okpalobi, the
novel use of legislative enactments in order to evade the Supreme Court's
dictates and eviscerate established constitutional rights did not deter the Bush
court from ensuring judicial review. 363 Similarly, where the legislature "itself
seeks to act as executor of its own laws" through the enactment of self-enforcing
tort laws, courts should deny any claims of legislative immunity. Without judicial
review, there will be no means of protecting constitutional rights from legislative
encroachment through draconian tort remedies. Both policy and doctrine
support courts taking a functional approach and rejecting legislative immunity in
the case of self-enforcing tort laws.
Of course, the proposition that a state legislator's vote to enact a piece of
tort legislation is also an enforcement action may be viewed as stretching the
functional analysis of legislative immunity a bit too far.364 Legislators will argue
that they will be subject to unnecessary judicial scrutiny and sidetracked by the
time and energy required to defend a civil suit for every tort law they pass.
Critics may raise the same floodgate concern raised by the courts, except that
courts will now be opening the floodgate to challenges against state legislators.
This could be particularly troubling given that the policies supporting legislative
immunity are especially concerned with protecting legislators from the burdens
and distractions of defending lawsuits.
These concerns are exaggerated, however, primarily because the "effects on
a reasonable person" test will restrict suits against state legislators to selfenforcing tort laws. A preenforcement suit against legislators will be permitted
only where legislators use tort statutes to violate fundamental constitutional
rights by arrogating enforcement powers to themselves. Injured parties will need
to establish in the first instance that the mere enactment of the tort statute
causes a cognizable, ongoing constitutional injury. In addition, the effects on a
reasonable person test will render any preenforcement judicial review of state
tort law consistent with the underlying policies of legislative immunity. Utilizing
an effects test means that the courts would not be looking into legislative motive
or the purpose behind the challenged tort law. The test would not require
personal testimony from any legislators, as the focus of the inquiry is on the
effects of the law on the injured parties. Again, the burden of proof would be on
the challengers to show that the tort law targets a fundamental constitutional

363. The Court noted: "However ingeniously worded some of the statutes may be, admittedly the
sole object ... of the Louisiana Legislature is to preserve a system of segregated public schools in
defiance of the mandate of the Supreme Court in Brown." Id. at 927. Similarly, in Bush v. Orleans
ParishSchool Board, 191 F. Supp. 871, 879 (E.D. La. 1961), a U.S. District Court enjoined a state
legislature and individual members thereof from not only "enforcing or seeking to enforce" laws and
resolutions requiring continued racial segregation but also from "interfering in any way with the
operation of the public schools."
364. See supra note 341 for more on this point. Although there are some cases holding that
voting for a particular action may be executive rather than legislative in nature, these cases generally
deal with local governmental bodies voting on a narrow administrative issue rather than passing an
ordinance or law of more general scope.
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right and is so draconian that it causes ongoing constitutional injury.
Furthermore, since the challengers would only seek declaratory relief, no
365
legislative action would be required of individual legislators.
Although it could be somewhat burdensome to legislators to defend
lawsuits challenging the mere enactment of a tort law in some cases, legislators
can use early stage litigation tools to dismiss frivolous cases and, importantly, are
entitled to immediate appeal from a denial of legislative immunity. 366 Finally,
courts should not forget that self-enforcing tort laws are a problem of the
legislators' own creation. Legislators are presuming to co-opt the power of the
executive to themselves and then claim absolute legislative immunity.367 Not
only is the problem of the legislators' own creation, but the solution is simple. If
legislators wish to avoid the disruption of litigation, they should leave
enforcement to the executive, who is accustomed to dealing with § 1983
368
lawsuits.

365. Cf Colo. Common Cause v. Bledsoe, 810 P.2d 201, 211 (Colo. 1991) (reasoning that
declaratory relief does not interfere with legislative activities to same extent as injunctive relief or
damages because court's declaration neither compels nor restrains legislative action).
366. See Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500, 506 (1979) (holding denial of claim of legislative
immunity pursuant to Speech or Debate Clause is immediately appealable). Furthermore, courts have
noted that legislative immunity does not ensure that legislators never have to defend against lawsuits.
26A WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 283, § 5675 (citing, inter alia, Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S.
606, 622 (1972) (no immunity where criminal conduct threatens person or property of others), United
States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 513 (1972) (no immunity when lobbying executive agencies on behalf
of constituents or campaign contributors), and United States v. Myers, 692 F.2d 823, 849 (2d Cir. 1982)
(no immunity where legislator failed to file required financial disclosure statement)).
367. For example, the Third Circuit held that legislative immunity did not protect state legislators
who intervened to defend the constitutionality of a state statute when executive officials refused to
perform that function. Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Attorney Gen. of N.J., 297 F.3d 253, 262,
264 (3d Cir. 2002). Once the legislators invoked executive enforcement powers, they had no claim to
absolute legislative immunity. Id. at 262.
368. If we recognize that the injury caused by a self-enforcing tort law should be traced back to
the legislators who enact the challenged law, then there may be other functionaries who assist in that
process who may be sued. For example, some states require the Governor to file approved legislation
with the Secretary of State, who then presumably sees to its dissemination. E.g., MINN. CONST. art IV,
§ 23; OHIO CONST. art. II, § lb. Could injured parties file suit for prospective relief against the
Secretary of State or other functionary in order to test the constitutionality of a self-enforcing tort
law? There is some tension in the case law on whether legislative immunity extends to legislative aides,
employees, or other officials who execute the will of the legislature. In the end, the courts have again
relied on a functional analysis to determine whether absolute legislative immunity should extend to
legislative aides or employees. See supra note 327 for a discussion of whether legislative aides or
employees are immune from suit in context of trying to capture unconstitutional legislative acts at
enforcement end.
If a state has procedures in place requiring an aide or other nonlegislator, such as the Secretary of
State, to carry out some functionary duty in order to enact the law, it is possible that suit for
prospective relief could be had against such official without running into the bar of absolute legislative
immunity. Cf. Donohue v. Bd. of Elections of N.Y., 435 F. Supp. 957, 963 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (holding
that Secretary of State could be sued for injunctive relief in challenge to voter registration and conduct
of presidential election, where state law requires her to prepare certified list of electors; although
certification of electors is seemingly ministerial, function performed is part of enforcement of scheme
to choose electors and therefore subject to suit). There are several roadblocks to such a suit, however.
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In sum, both the theory behind absolute legislative immunity of capturing
unconstitutional legislation at the enforcement end and the courts' functional
approach to immunity supports allowing suit for declaratory relief against state
legislators in the context of self-enforcing tort laws. The use of the effects test to
define and limit such suits to self-enforcing tort statutes will address any fear of
opening a gaping hole in legislative immunity.
b.

Governors

In Okpalobi, the injured parties attempted to sue the Governor on the
theory that the Governor was generally charged with "upholding" or
"defending" all state laws. In this respect, the challengers argued that the
Governor was the "enforcer" of the tort law at issue, even though he had no
power to file suit under the law and thereby "cause" the constitutional injury.
The court of course rejected this line of argument based on the causation issue.
Perhaps a more persuasive argument for suing the Governor would be that the
Governor is the cause of the constitutional injury if he or she signed the selfenforcing tort statute into law, similarly to the legislators who voted for the law.
As noted earlier, executive actors are not entitled to immunity from suits
for prospective relief. Because the Supreme Court takes a functional approach to
all official immunities, however, when executive officials act in a legislative
capacity, the Court has allowed the executive to raise a defense of absolute
legislative immunity. 369 In Bogan, the Court clearly established that an executive
official acting in a legislative capacity is entitled to legislative immunity. More
specifically, the Court held that a mayor who signed an ordinance into law was
engaging in a legislative act, and therefore was entitled to absolute legislative
immunity. 370 The Court emphasized that it has "adopted a functional approach
to immunity issues so that '[w]hether an act is legislative turns on the nature of
371
It
the act,'. . . rather than the nature of the actor's office or his or her intent.-

First, states may not require any functionary role in order to have a proposed bill become a law. A bill
may become a law automatically upon signature by the Governor or by sufficient votes in the state
legislature. Second, even in states that require a functionary act prior to a bill becoming a law, if that
act is viewed as an integral part of legislative activity, the nonlegislator official may still be entitled to
absolute legislative immunity. As argued in this section, however, due to the dual nature of selfenforcing tort legislation, even if such functionary acts involved in putting a law "on the books" are
viewed as legislative action, enacting the law also constitutes an enforcement action at the same time.
Therefore, legislative aides or other officials involved in enacting a self-enforcing tort law should also
be subject to suit under the functional approach to official immunity.
369. Although at least one other commentator has noted that the Governor's signing a selfenforcing tort statute would satisfy the causation element of standing, no one has addressed the
question of legislative immunity as it would apply to the Governor. See Borgmann, supra note 167, at
778 (arguing that Governor's signing bill into law is cause of plaintiffs' injury for self-enforcing tort
law).
370. See Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 55 (1998) (finding that mayor committed legislative
acts when he signed ordinance into law and was entitled to absolute legislative immunity).
371. Larsen v. Senate of the Commonwealth of Pa., 152 F.3d 240, 249 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting
Bogan, 523 U.S. at 54); see also Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union of the U.S., Inc., 446 U.S.
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therefore follows that a Governor's signing a372bill into law would be considered a
legislative act entitled to absolute immunity.
Thus, even if a suit against the Governor challenging a self-enforcing tort
law satisfies the causation element of standing because it is based on a
Governor's vote in favor of the law, a Governor could also raise the defense of
absolute legislative immunity. Under the same "dual function" theory argued
with respect to state legislators, however, the same solution applies. Because the
Governor's enactment of a self-enforcing tort law is both a legislative and an
enforcement action, the Governor should be subject to suit for declaratory relief
on the basis of the specific action of enactment, rather than on general
enforcement duties of the Governor. 373 This approach both satisfies the
causation requirement of standing and enables a way through the defense of
legislative immunity.
V.

CONCLUSION

State legislators' use of self-enforcing tort legislation makes a mockery of
constitutional rights. These statutes have arisen in the abortion context because
abortion is a particularly contested constitutional right that some state officials
are intent on overturning. This tactic could certainly be utilized by state
legislators to attack any number of constitutional rights, however. If tort statutes
are categorically immune from preenforcement review, there is no logical limit

719, 734 (1980) (affording legislative immunity to justices of state supreme court when acting in their
rulemaking capacity).
372. Bogan, 523 U.S. at 55-56 ("Petitioner Bogan's introduction of a budget and signing into law
an ordinance also were formally legislative, even though he was an executive official. We have
recognized that officials outside the legislative branch are entitled to legislative immunity when they
perform legislative functions." (citing Consumers Union, 446 U.S. at 731-34; Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S.
355, 372-73 (1932))); see also Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 440 U.S.
391, 406 (1979) (holding that "to the extent the evidence discloses that these individuals were acting in
a capacity comparable to that of members of a state legislature, they are entitled to absolute immunity
from federal damages liability"). A number of lower federal courts have also extended legislative
immunity to executive officers when they are acting in a legislative capacity, such as by vetoing an
ordinance or voting to enter into a contract. See Tucker v. City of Richmond, 388 F.3d 216, 224 (6th
Cir. 2004) (holding mayor was entitled to absolute legislative immunity for her vote in favor of
ordinance because she acted in legislative capacity in so doing); Healy v. Town of Pembroke Park, 831
F.2d 989, 993 (11th Cir. 1987) (granting legislative immunity to mayor's vote to contract out police
service as acting in legislative capacity); Aitchison v. Raffiani, 708 F.2d 96, 99-100 (3d Cir. 1983)
(granting legislative immunity to mayor's role in voting on ordinance); Hernandez v. City of Lafayette,
643 F.2d 1188, 1193-94 (5th Cir. 1981) (granting legislative immunity to mayor's veto of ordinance);
Eslinger v. Thomas, 476 F.2d 225, 228 (4th Cir. 1973) (holding that Lieutenant Governor of South
Carolina, in his capacity as President ex officio of the state senate, was protected by legislative
immunity); Saffioti v. Wilson, 392 F. Supp. 1335,1343 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (stating that in challenge to
set aside Governor's veto of bill, executive is exercising legislative power rather than executive power
and may be found to be within scope of legislative immunity).
373. In addition, unlike legislators, Governors are accustomed to defending suits for prospective
relief challenging the constitutionality of state regulations, fitting with the theory behind legislative
immunity that legislation can be captured for review at the enforcement end.
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to state officials' ability to violate constitutional rights through the use of
ostensibly "private" tort remedies.
In attempting to "privatize" what is essentially a publicly enforced law, state
legislators are manipulating the public/private distinction to their advantage.
Courts must undertake a more nuanced analysis of self-enforcing tort legislation
in order to make Ex parte Young's promise to protect constitutional rights
meaningful. By recognizing that the promulgation of a self-enforcing tort statute
is in fact an "enforcement" action by state legislators, federal courts can assert
preenforcement jurisdiction over tort laws that have the effect of infringing
constitutional rights by their mere existence. Both reason and precedent dictate
that courts should not permit state legislators to cloak their violations of
fundamental rights in the veil of private rights of action.
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